Young v. Cook

• Citation: 10 N.E. 719,144 Mass. 38
• Parties: YOUNG HIGGINS v. COOK. HIGGINS v. SAME.
• Decision Date: 24 February 1887
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

144 Mass. 38

10 N.E. 719

YOUNG HIGGINS v. COOK. HIGGINS v. SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Barnstable.

February 24, 1887

COUNSEL

George W. McConnell, for plaintiffs.

If the theory of the defendant is correct, then it is necessary in all cases to allege that a plaintiff was known by the name used in the slanderous statement, whether the fact were so or not, and, if such an allegation be not made, the declaration would be demurrable. See Pub.St. 979; Chenery v Goodrich, 98 Mass. 228. If it be conceded that the words used, in their primary sense, are not defamatory, still, if there were any facts existing at the time they were spoken which were known both to the defendant and those who heard him speak them, which would reasonably lead the latter to understand the words in a secondary and a defamatory sense and the declaration set forth such facts, then it is a question for the jury to determine whether the words were defamatory, provided there is any evidence to go to them of such facts. Snell v. Snow, 13 Metc. 278; Fitzgerald v. Robinson, 112 Mass. 371, 382; Brettun v. Anthony, 103 Mass. 37. It is submitted that, under the Public Statutes, all a plaintiff is required to do is to set forth in his declaration the defamatory words used, and, where such words are not in themselves intelligible in the same sense in which he claims them to have been spoken, to make them so by inserting a concise and clear statement of such things as are necessary to make the words relied on intelligible to the court and jury in the same sense in which they were spoken; and "such things" are not required to be set forth with such precision of averment as would have been necessary under the old common-law rules of pleading. Pub.St. 979; Chenery v. Goodrich, 98 Mass. 228; Chace v. Sherman, 119 Mass. 387; Riddell v. Thayer, 127 Mass. 487. Under the declarations in these cases, it is not material here to consider whether the defendant, at the time he uttered the words complained of, believed, thought, or suspected that the infant had been murdered. The declarations fairly and reasonably set forth that he spoke the words after the discovery of the infant, to persons who knew of the discovery, and believed the infant had been murdered; that he spoke the words intending that said persons should believe that these plaintiffs were participants in its murder and burial; and that said persons thereupon suspected these plaintiffs. It is a question for the jury to say whether these allegations are sustained.

It is not absolutely material to consider whether the infant was or was not murdered. The authorities and inhabitants of the town believed it was; and the defendant, while such belief existed, maliciously intending to bring the plaintiffs into hatred, contempt, and disgrace, and intending to incite and instigate criminal proceedings against them, falsely and maliciously used the words complained of, to the great damage in mind and body of the plaintiffs.

J.M. & T.C. Day, for defendant.

In order to maintain an action for slander for words spoken, the words themselves, or with relation to the facts in connection with which they are alleged to have been spoken, must impute the commission of some criminal offense. Chaddock v. Briggs, 13 Mass. 252; Bloss v. Tobey, 2 Pick. 328; Chenery v. Goodrich, 98 Mass. 224; Brettun v. Anthony, 103 Mass. 37. Neither the words by themselves, nor in connection with the facts alleged to exist when they were spoken, impute a criminal offense to plaintiff. Goodrich v. Hooper, 97 Mass. 1. The declaration does not allege knowledge by defendant of existence of the belief of the people of Wellfleet that a crime had been committed, or that defendant spoke the words alleged with reference to the existence of such belief. The belief of people of Wellfleet cannot enlarge meaning of words, unless defendant knew of such belief. As the declaration does not allege that defendant's words were spoken in relation to such belief or knowledge on the part of the people of Wellfleet, it imputes no offense to the plaintiff. Brettun v. Anthony, 103 Mass. 37; Tebbetts v. Goding, 9 Gray, 254.

OPINION

DEVENS J.

The declarations set out that the defendant spoke of the plaintiffs respectively the words alleged as slanderous. They do not contain an allegation that the plaintiff Jerusha A Young was intended by the words "Aunt Jerusha," or "Jerusha Young," or was known or called by either or both these names, or that the plaintiff Eliza H. Higgins was known also as "Eliza Higgins" or "Liza Higgins." The declarations are not, on this account, demurrable. When the words are alleged to be spoken of the plaintiff, no innuendoes are necessary to apply them; and, although the names of both plaintiffs are used in the words set out in each declaration, there can be no doubt as to which applied to one and which to the other plaintiff. If a plaintiff sets forth as slanderous words not intelligible by themselves as charging an actionable offense, without further explanation or reference to facts understood, but not mentioned, or parts of conversation not stated, the declaration must contain a concise and clear statement of such things as are necessary to make the words intelligible in the same sense in which they were spoken. Pub.St. c. 167, § 94. It is...