Young v. Copeland

• Decision Date: 16 September 1947
• Docket Number: No. 27203.,27203.
• Citation: 204 S.W.2d 455
• Parties: YOUNG v. COPELAND et ux.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

204 S.W.2d 455

YOUNG v. COPELAND et ux.

No. 27203.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

September 16, 1947.

Rehearing Denied October 17, 1947.

Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Louis County; John A. Witthaus, Judge.

"Not to be reported in State Reports."

Suit by Taylor R. Young against Earl G. Copeland and Anna Copeland, his wife, for an injunction and other relief, wherein defendants filed a counterclaim. From judgment for plaintiff, plaintiff appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

Taylor R. Young, Alvin M. Goldman, and Boggiano & Hessel, all of St. Louis, for appellant.

Philip Gallop, of St. Louis, for respondents.

BENNICK, Commissioner.

This is a suit in equity brought by Taylor R. Young, the owner of sixty-seven acres of farm land in St. Louis County, against Earl Copeland and Anna Copeland, his wife, who occupied and cultivated the farm under a contract with Young for the period from December, 1944, to December, 1945.

In his petition plaintiff alleged that on October 24, 1944, he entered into a contract with defendants, partly in writing and partly in parol, under the terms of which defendants agreed to occupy and cultivate the farm for the benefit of both plaintiff and themselves. It was alleged that under the terms of the contract plaintiff gave defendants an exclusive license to operate the farm, and agreed that he would not revoke the license for a period of five years.

Plaintiff then charged a breach of the contract by defendants in numerous particulars, including, among other things, the failure to provide him with milk, butter, eggs, and vegetables produced on the farm; to install electrical wiring in the barn and chicken house; to paint the house, barn, and chicken house; to cultivate certain crops; to take reasonable care of the shrubbery; to keep all private roads in repair; and to pay taxes of $70.90 assessed against the land for 1945. He further charged that in violation of their agreement, defendants cut down and sold some twenty-three trees of the value of $290.

Elsewhere it was alleged that several tons of hay which had been produced on the farm were stored in the barn, and that plaintiff had a lien thereon under the terms of the contract.

The relief sought was that defendants be permanently enjoined from removing any of the hay and livestock produced on the farm until such time as they should have accounted to plaintiff for their use and occupation of the farm; that in the meantime they be temporarily enjoined from removing the hay and livestock; that the court establish plaintiff's lien against such personal property, and on final decree direct that said property be sold and the proceeds applied to the satisfaction of a judgment in plaintiff's favor; and that a money judgment for $1,520 be entered in plaintiff's favor against defendants, $870 of which should represent treble damages for the value of the timber removed from the farm, and the remainder the value of the use and occupation of the farm for the period in question.

Upon the institution of the suit the court entered a temporary restraining order coupled with an order to show cause why a temporary injunction should not issue.

Defendants thereafter filed their return to the order to show cause together with a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order, and in due time filed an answer denying the several breaches of contract charged against them in plaintiff's petition alleging that the hay stored in the barn was their own personal property; setting up that plaintiff's cause of action was barred by the provision of Section 3354, R.S.Mo.1939, Mo.R.S.A. § 3354, that no action shall be brought upon any lease for a longer term than one year, unless the same, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith; and further alleging that on November 24, 1945, they had paid plaintiff the sum of $93.72 in full accord and satisfaction of any and all claims which plaintiff had against them.

Along with their answer defendants filed a counterclaim for $775, comprising items of $500 allegedly spent in improving and repairing the farm and the improvements thereon, and $275 as the value of eleven tons of hay which defendants had left in the barn when they removed from the premises.

After a hearing upon the issues joined, the court rendered judgment in plaintiff's favor for the sum of $70.90 and costs; dissolved the temporary restraining order and denied an injunction; and found in favor of plaintiff on defendant's counterclaim. Being dissatisfied with the judgment upon the ground of its inadequacy, plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial; and this being overruled, he gave notice of appeal, and by subsequent steps has caused the case to be transferred to this court for our review.

Plaintiff's first contact with defendants came as the result of defendants' answer of an advertisement which he had inserted in one of the county papers for a tenant on his farm. Negotiations thereafter continued until October 24, 1944, when plaintiff prepared a contract in the form of a letter to defendants, with appropriate places for him to sign and for them to note their written acceptance. As a matter of fact, however, the contract was never signed by either of the parties, the reason being that defendants objected to certain of the terms, which required them to furnish the paint for painting the house and outbuildings, as well as the wire for wiring the house and outbuildings for electricity. Plaintiff agreed to furnish the paint and wire, but otherwise there was no change in the terms of the proposed agreement, which required defendants to...