Young v. Crawford
| Decision Date | 23 November 1886 |
| Citation | 23 Mo.App. 432 |
| Parties | ALEX. YOUNG, Appellant, v. DUGALD CRAWFORD, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
APPEAL from the St. Louis Circuit Court, DANIEL DILLON, Judge.
Affirmed.
UPTON M. YOUNG and ALEX. YOUNG, for the appellant: With full knowledge of the services rendered, in the trial of his case, Crawford had no right to be silent. Bank v. Gay, 63 Mo. 33. In support of the plaintiff's instructions, we rely upon well established principles of agency, and upon the following authorities: Holmes v. The Board of Trade of Kansas City, 81 Mo. 137; McCrary v. Ruddick, 33 Ia. 521; Scott v. Railroad, 86 N. Y. 200; Fister v. La Rue, 15 Barb. 324.
WALKER & WALKER, for the respondent.
This is an action to recover the reasonable value of legal services which plaintiff states were rendered by him to the defendant at his request. There was no evidence that the defendant had retained the plaintiff, but the evidence tended to show that one Kinealy, the defendant's attorney, had retained him to assist in the defence of a cause pending in the circuit court, and that plaintiff did render valuable legal services, in the defendant's presence and on his behalf in said cause.
When Kinealy first saw the plaintiff in connection with the case he simply stated that the defendant was very uneasy about it, and that he (Kinealy) wanted the plaintiff to assist in procuring testimony and to aid at the trial. The evidence tended to show that on the day of the trial Kinealy introduced the plaintiff to the defendant, with the statement, “This is Mr. Young, the attorney who is going to assist us in the trial of the case.” Also, that Kinealy informed the defendant, prior to entering upon the trial of the case, that he had retained the plaintiff to assist, and that the defendant had answered, “all right,” or, “that is good.” These facts, however, were denied by the defendant, who, testifying on his own behalf, stated that he never authorized Kinealy to employ the plaintiff; that he never employed him himself, and never spoke to him; that he was present at the trial and heard the plaintiff argue a motion, made in his (the defendant's) behalf, but that the first intimation of the fact that the plaintiff looked to him for compensation, he received long afterwards when he settled with Kinealy for his legal services in the case.
This being substantially all the testimony, the plaintiff asked three instructions to the jury, all of which were refused by the court. The first made the defendant's liability dependent on the fact that he was informed by Kinealy that the plaintiff had been employed in the case. The second and third made the defendant's liability dependent on the fact that the services were rendered by the plaintiff in the defendant's presence, without objection on the part of the defendant.
The jury found for the defendant. The plaintiff, appealing, assigns for error the refusal of these instructions.
These instructions were properly refused. The first was objectionable because it sought to make the defendant responsible, regardless of the time when he was informed by Kinealy of the plaintiff's employment in the defendant's behalf. The court gave this instruction in a modified form, and such modification was proper, in view of the fact that there was a conflict in the testimony as to when the defendant was first informed touching the nature of the plaintiff's employment.
The second and third instructions were objectionable because they predicated the defendant's liability on the fact that the services were rendered in his presence, and without any objection on his part, regardless of the fact whether the defendant knew, or had good reason to believe, that the plaintiff had been employed on his behalf and looked to him for compensation. The case of Holmes v. The Board of Trade (81 Mo. 144), relied on by the plaintiff in support of these instructions, shows the necessity of the qualification which they omit.
While the employment of an attorney is one that...
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State ex rel. Massman Const. Co. v. Buzard
...plaintiff Nelson. Mills v. Ry. Co., 282 Mo. 132; Fem v. Hart Dairy Co., 231 Mo.App. 1011; Smith v. Wright, 153 Mo.App. 719; Young v. Crawford, 23 Mo.App. 432; Secs. 11717, R. S. 1929. (3) The original pleading alleged a joint obligation to several while the amendment seeks a recovery on an ......
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State ex rel. Massman Const. Co. v. Shain
...following decisions of this and other courts and the general law on the subject: Lamport v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 199 S.W. 1023; Young v. Crawford, 23 Mo.App. 432; Kingsbury v. Joseph, 94 Mo.App. 298; City Pilot Grove v. McCormick, 56 Mo.App. 530; Fuhr v. Express Co., 180 Iowa 518; Sabath v.......
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State ex rel. Massman Const. Co. v. Buzard, 36997.
...Nelson and, hence, can never state a cause of action for his fees against relator. Smith v. Wright, 153 Mo. App. 719; Young v. Crawford, 23 Mo. App. 432; Secs. 11716, 11717, R.S. 1929. (2) Mr. Deacy cannot recover from relator since he could not recover from plaintiff Nelson. Mills v. Ry. C......
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Lamport v. Ætna Life Ins. Co.
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