Young v. Davis

Decision Date09 December 1935
Docket Number31942
Citation164 So. 586,174 Miss. 435
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
PartiesYOUNG et al. v. DAVIS

Division B

JUDGMENT.

In action for alleged assault on plaintiff by town marshal during marshal's attempt to arrest plaintiff, admitting evidence that plaintiff was tried and acquitted of offense for which marshal attempted to arrest him held reversible error since parties to proceedings and burden of proof therein were different.

HON JULIAN P. ALEXANDER, Judge.

APPEAL from the circuit court of Hinds county HON. JULIAN P ALEXANDER, Judge.

Action by Albert Davis against Q. M. Young and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

Watkins & Eager, of Jackson, for appellants.

The trial court erred in reopening the case after both sides had rested, and in permitting appellee to introduce in evidence the affidavit of Q. M. Young made in the mayor's court of Terry charging appellee with a misdemeanor and the jury's verdict of acquittal shown thereon.

It is the contention of the appellants that the introduction of the affidavit, together with a verdict of the jury thereon in the criminal case, was not only immaterial, incompetent and irrelevant, but was highly prejudicial. In the first place, it was incompetent because of a lack of mutuality of parties. The affidavit was the origination of a suit or controversy between the state of Missouri and Albert Davis, the appellee here. Neither the appellant, Q. M. Young, nor the appellant, Maryland Casualty Company, were parties thereto. The result of that controversy would certainly not be binding on either of the appellants and is not evidence of anything involved in the controversy in the case at bar.

The degree of proof in the two cases was entirely different, consequently the affidavit and the finding of the jury in the criminal case has no bearing whatever and did not belong in the civil case.

Smith et al. v. Bryson, 33 S.W.2d 268; Piechotta v. Fried, 181 N.W. 602; Haverbekken v. Johnson, 228 S.W. 256; Bonino v. Caledonio, 11 N.E. 98; Fitzgerald v. Lewis, 41 N.E. 687; Adams, Revenue Agent, v. Sigman, 43 So. 877.

Howie & Howie, of Jackson, for appellee.

The contention that the court erred in reopening the case is answered by the fact that it was solely within the discretion of the trial court to reopen a case and permit further testimony, and such action by the lower court will not be disturbed in the absence of the abuse of such discretion by the lower court.

Royston v. I. C. R. Co., 7 So. 320, 67 Miss. 376; French v. Canton, A. & N. R. Co., 21 So. 299, 74 Miss. 542; Watkins v. Jackson & E. R. Co. et al., 115 So. 897, 149 Miss. 766.

The theory upon which the affidavit was introduced by appellee is that counsel for appellants first brought the subject up on cross-examination of the appellee, and, therefore, that appellee had a right to show to the jury the true facts and circumstances, and the record of the case instead of leaving this matter beclouded before the jury, and that it was for the purpose of having the issues and facts properly before the jury that the appellee introduced the affidavit and requested permission for the introduction of such evidence in order to offset the effect of appellants' cross-examination in regard to the charges.

The testimony brought out on cross-examination of appellee needed to be answered and for that purpose and after it had first been introduced by counsel for appellants the affidavit and the verdict of acquittal thereon was shown to the jury and offered for the purpose of clearing up in the minds of the jury any doubt or suspicion that may have been created by such testimony as brought out in the cross-examination.

Carlisle v. City of Laurel, 124 So. 786, 156 Miss. 410; Barnes v. State, 143 So. 475, 164 Miss. 126.

Argued orally by Tom Watkins, for appellant, and by W. B. Fontaine, for appellee.

OPINION

Anderson, J.

Appellee brought this action in the circuit court of Hinds county against appellants, the marshal of the town of Terry, and the Maryland Casualty Company, the surety on his official bond, to recover damages for an alleged assault committed on him by Young in attempting to arrest him for a criminal...

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6 cases
  • Gibson v. Gibson
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • March 10, 1971
    ...evidence in a subsequent civil action to prove the innocence of the accused. For cases similar to the instant one, see Young v. Davis, 174 Miss. 435, 164 So. 586 and Hampton v. Westover, 137 Neb. 695, 291 N.W. 93. See also Note in 18 A.L.R.2d 'There are substantial reasons for different tre......
  • United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Moore, EC 6759.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi
    • December 4, 1969
    ...exclude all evidence of prior criminal convictions or acquittals Adams v. Sigman, 89 Miss. 844, 43 So. 877 (1907); Young v. Davis, 174 Miss. 435, 164 So. 586 (1935); Williams v. Cambridge Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 293 (5 Cir. 1956); Bush, Criminal Convictions as Evidence in Civil Proce......
  • Stamps v. Frost
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • December 9, 1935
  • Holly v. MISSISSIPPI DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, 97-CP-00643-SCT.
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • October 22, 1998
    ...higher burden of proof than civil judgments. In re Estate of Mask v. Elrod, 703 So.2d 852, 858 n. 2 (Miss.1997); Young et al. v. Davis, 174 Miss. 435, 164 So. 586, 586 (1935). As a result, it is possible that the evidence was sufficient to support Holly's termination while being insufficien......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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