Young v. Dudney

Decision Date23 September 1911
Citation140 S.W. 802
PartiesYOUNG et al. v. DUDNEY.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Appeal from District Court, Hardeman County; S. P. Huff, Judge.

Suit by R. L. Dudney against T. M. Young and others. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed, and injunction dissolved.

Fires, Decker, Clarke & John, for appellants. Berry & Stokes, J. C. Marshall, and L. P. Bonner, for appellee.

GRAHAM, C. J.

This case is before us on appeal from a temporary, mandatory injunction order, made by the court below on September 9, 1911; the order having been granted after notice and on an inspection of the bill and answer, without the introduction of any evidence.

The bill in substance alleges that the relator, Dudney, is a teacher by profession, and had been for a number of years, having filled the position of superintendent of the public schools, Chillicothe independent school district for the past two years, and is thoroughly qualified and competent in every way to fill said position; that on February 4, 1911, the then qualified and acting trustees of said school district passed and entered of record on the minutes of the school board a resolution, electing him superintendent of said schools for the school year of nine months for 1911 and 1912, at a salary of $1,500 for said school year; that, in pursuance of said order, and on the 24th day of April, 1911, a written contract was duly executed by the then board of trustees (being the same who had elected him) and relator, but that in writing said order relator was through mutual mistake of all parties to the contract designated as teacher, allegation being further made that said trustees and their officers (naming them) had made affidavit, showing the existence of said mutual mistake; that on the first Saturday in May, 1911, an election was held in said school district, at which four new trustees were elected, and who succeeded four of the old ones; that the then school trustees and relator ratified and acquiesced in relator's contract and employment until about the latter part of May, 1911, when, at a session of the new board, a motion was made to rescind the contract and employment of relator, which after some discussion was lost; that on May 30, 1911, at another meeting of said board, a motion was passed to ignore relator's said contract, and he, being present at the time, protested against such action by the board, and informed them that he would comply with his part of the contract and expected the board to do likewise, whereupon said board notified relator that he was no longer connected with said schools, nor entitled to participate at meetings of the board of trustees, and also requested him to withdraw, and further notified relator that they would not carry out said contract of employment, and that he would not be permitted to act as superintendent of said schools for the ensuing year, whereupon relator requested a written statement of the reasons of such action by the trustees, which they agreed to furnish, but that said promise was never complied with; that just prior to this the trustees had passed a resolution attempting to abolish the position of superintendent; that said resolution was not passed in good faith, but as a means of enabling the trustees to repudiate relator's said contract; that one of the defendants, Bridges, is proclaiming himself superintendent principal of said schools, within the knowledge and consent of said trustees; that relator had relied on said contract of employment, and made no effort to procure a position elsewhere until said last act of repudiation by said trustees, when all available positions known to him were filled, and he was unable to procure another like position; that relator had at no time waived or in any manner repudiated his said contract; that from the action of said board of trustees your relator appealed to the county superintendent of public schools, who, on July 20, 1911, after proper notice, heard all the facts and thereon rendered judgment, sustaining relator and holding that his contract was valid and binding; that said board of trustees appealed said cause to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, who, on August 29, 1911, rendered his decision, sustaining the validity and binding force of relator's contract; that said trustees appealed from said order of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction to the state board of education, which, on September 2, 1911, affirmed the decision of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, sustaining the validity and binding force of relator's contract and his rights thereunder; that, on September 4, 1911, that being the day set apart by the trustees for the opening of the schools, relator opened the schools, and at once proceeded to assume control thereof as superintendent, the county superintendent having, as a part of the opening exercises, read the rulings of the state board of education on the controversy that had existed, and advised the trustees, patrons, and all concerned that it was their duty to abide by said ruling and observe the same; that on the same day the trustees assembled the teachers, and notified them in a body not to pay any attention to relator, stating that they would not permit him to take any further part in the conduct of said schools, and also refused to let him proceed with said schools and perform his services as such superintendent; that said trustees had made their threats that they would not allow relator to perform said service; that the teachers in said schools, if not intimidated, and if permitted to do so, would work in harmony with relator and perform their respective duties, except possibly the said Bridges, who is claiming to act as principal and superintendent; that a rule adopted by the school board of said district in 1910 was still in force, and provides, in substance, that no grievance against the superintendent could be considered, unless in writing and made to the committee on grievances; that there has been no such complaint filed against relator, and no grounds exist for such; that the profession of teaching is the only one he has followed for many years, and is the only one for which he is fitted; that he is dependent on his salary for a living, and that to be ousted would work an irreparable injury to him financially, and to his reputation as a school man; that he is now able and ready to perform said service, and would be so doing, except for such acts of said trustees; that the said trustees still refuse to allow relator to act as superintendent, and threaten to continue to do so, and refuse to allow the other teachers to recognize him as superintendent, or have induced them not to do so, and that said teachers will so act, unless restrained by the court; that, unless restrained from so doing, the trustees will illegally pay out and divert the part of the school fund belonging to said district to which relator is entitled, and which should be paid to him, and said school be seriously injured; that, as relator understands it, the opposition to him by the trustees is based on the amount of salary specified in his contract, but allegation is made that it is the same paid him for the preceding year for the same services.

Prayer is then made as follows:

"Wherefore, premises considered, plaintiff prays for proper service herein against the defendants, and that your honor grant a peremptory mandamus or mandatory injunction, or other proper writs, against said trustees, and cause the same to be properly served upon them, requiring them to observe the decisions of the county superintendent of Hardeman county and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and the state board of education, and to recognize plaintiff as superintendent of the public schools of the Chillicothe independent school district for the school year 1911-12, and the validity of his said contract, and to issue and pay his vouchers for his said services, according to his said contract, and to grant a temporary injunction against all of the defendants, and order the same served upon them, restraining them from in any manner interfering with the plaintiff in the exercise and performance of his duties as such superintendent, and that said trustees be restrained from in any manner interfering with the teachers in their duty to work with and under the direction of plaintiff as such superintendent, and from paying out any of the funds of said district to any other superintendent, or from paying out the funds thereof that should be applied to the payment of plaintiff to any other person; that upon hearing said writs be perpetuated; for costs of suit and proper relief of whatever nature, and that, if required, he be permitted to offer evidence in support of the allegations herein contained." And the bill is duly verified by affidavit.

The answer of respondents is, in substance, as follows: That the cause of action cannot be maintained or prosecuted, for the reason that, under the law governing independent school districts, before a teacher or other officer of such who has been discharged, or whose employment or control of such schools has been interfered with, can maintain an action in the courts for relief, he shall appeal to the county superintendent, the State Superintendent, and the state board of education, where the scholastic population exceeds 500 scholastics; that since before the alleged grievance the scholastic population of Chillicothe independent school district has exceeded 500; and that relator did not lay his claims before said board of trustees of said district, and before said county superintendent seek relief from an adverse decision by said board of trustees, or appeal to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, or to the state board of education; wherefore prayer is made that the cause abate.

Further answering, respondents pleaded a...

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  • Yates v. Summers
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