Young v. Florida
| Decision Date | 30 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:08-CV-707-T-27TGW |
| Parties | CURTIS NOVELL YOUNG, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner, an inmate in a Florida penal institution proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging convictions for racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, and 25 counts of grand theft entered in 2003 by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court, Polk County, Florida (Dkt. 1), and two memorandums of law in support of the petition (Dkts. 3, 8). Respondent filed a response to the petition (Dkt. 19). Petitioner filed a reply to the response (Dkt. 21-2), and a supplement to the reply (Dkt. 24).
Respondent asserts no challenge to the petition's timeliness. The matter is now before the Court for consideration on the merits of Petitioner's claims. An evidentiary hearing is not required for the disposition of this matter. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 8(a) (2011).
On October 9, 2001, Petitioner was charged by Grand Jury Indictment with racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, and 26 counts of grand theft in case no. 2001-6672 . On February 17, 2003, Petitioner entered a plea of no contest to all the charges except one of the grand theft charges which the State nolle pressed .1 The plea was entered pursuant to a written plea agreement with the State . Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years incarceration on each of the two racketeering counts and five years on each of the 25 grand theft counts, with all counts running concurrently with each other and the sentences imposed in the four unrelated cases . On June 11, 2004, the appellate court per curiam affirmed his convictions and sentences (Respondent's Ex. 4); Young v. State, 879 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) [table].
On April 3, 2005, Petitioner filed a motion for post conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 ("Rule 3.850 motion") raising thirteen grounds for relief (Respondent's Ex. 6). On May 2, 2005, the state post conviction court issued an order denying grounds 2 through 13 of the Rule 3.850 motion, and directing the State to respond to ground 1 (Respondent's Ex. 7). Following a response to ground 1 by the Office of the Statewide Prosecutor (Respondent's Ex. 9), the state post conviction court issued an order on January 24, 2006, denying ground 1 (Respondent's Ex. 10). On August 30, 2006, the appellate court per curiam affirmed the denial of Petitioner's Rule 3.850 motion (Respondent's Ex. 14); Young v. State, 939 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) [table].
On January 4, 2007, Petitioner filed a second Rule 3.850 motion (Respondent's Ex. 16). The state post conviction court denied the second Rule 3.850 motion on February 22, 2007 (Respondent's Ex. 17). On January 18,2008, the appellate court per curiam affirmed the denial of Petitioner's second Rule 3.850 motion (Respondent's Ex. 18); Young v. State, 976 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) [table].
On April 24, 2008, Petitioner filed a third Rule 3.850 motion (Respondent's Ex. 22). The Polk County, Florida, Clerk of the Court's Case Progress Docket indicates that the motion was denied onSeptember 8,2008 (Respondent's Ex. 24). On November 6,2009, the appellate court per curiam affirmed the denial of Petitioner's third Rule 3.850 motion.2 Young v. State, 25 So. 3d 1241 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) [table].
Petitioner filed his § 2254 petition in this Court on April 7, 2008 (Dkt. 1).3 The petition raises ten grounds for relief:
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e) as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), this Court's review of the state court's factual findings is highly deferential. Those findings are presumed to be correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Similarly, the state courts' resolutions of issues of law-including constitutional issues-must be accepted unless they are found to be "contrary to" clearly established precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States or involved an "unreasonable application" of such precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). It is not enough that the federal courts believe that the state court was wrong; it must be demonstrated that the state court decision was "objectively unreasonable." Id. Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952 (11th Cir. 2002).
To have a facially valid claim in alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, a Petitioner must meet the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland's two-part test requires a Petitioner to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and "there was a reasonableprobability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. However, if a claim fails to satisfy the prejudice component, the court need not make a ruling on the performance component.
Our standard of review is "doubly deferential" when "a Strickland claim [is] evaluated under the § 2254(d)(1) standard." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (2009). "The question is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable —a substantially higher threshold." Id. (quotation marks omitted).
A § 2254 application cannot be granted unless a petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; . . ." 28 U.S.C. 2254(b)(1)(A); Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998). In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). See also, Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003)("A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief cannot raise a federal constitutional claim in federal court unless he first properly raised the issue in the state courts.")(quoting Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001)); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995)("[E]xhaustion of state remedies requires that the state prisoner 'fairly present' federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the 'opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights[.]"') (citation omitted).
Under the procedural default doctrine, "if the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is applicable." Smith v. Jones, 256F.3d 1135, 1138 (11 Cir. 2001). "The doctrine of procedural default was developed as a means of ensuring that federal habeas petitioners first seek relief in accordance with established state procedures." Henderson, 353 F.3d at 891 (quoting Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d at 1313).
Pre-AEDP A decisions from the Supreme Court establish the framework governing procedural default in federal habeas cases. A procedural default will only be excused in two narrow circumstances. First, petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim if he shows both "cause" for the default and actual "prejudice" resulting from the default. "Cause" ordinarily requires petitioner to demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded the effort to raise the claim properly in the state court. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892; Marek v. Singletary, 62 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 1995).
To show "prejudice," the petitioner must show "not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his factual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471, 1480 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)). The petitioner must show that there is at least a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892.
Second, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim, without a showing of cause or prejudice, if review is necessary to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892. This exception is only available "in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent." Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892. The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception concerns a petitioner's "actual" innocence rather than his "legal" innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156,1171 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998)). To meetthis standard, a petitioner must "show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him" of the underlying offense. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). In addition, '"to be credible,' a claim of actual innocence must be based on [new] reliable evidence not presented at trial." Calderon, 523 U.S. at 559 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324) ( "given the rarity of such evidence, in virtually every case, the allegation of actual innocence has been summarily rejected") (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate, interview, and depose available witnesses Vanbossell Preston, Dennis Bannon, Chauncey Gardner, Vernard Goodman, Willie Lee Brown, Angela Lanier, and Kanisha West. Petitioner asserts that had counsel interviewed these witnesses, counsel would have...
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