Young v. Home Telephone Co.
Decision Date | 28 January 1918 |
Docket Number | No. 12720.,12720. |
Citation | 201 S.W. 635 |
Parties | YOUNG et al. v. HOME TELEPHONE CO. et al. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; Allen C. Southern, Judge.
Suit by Albert Young and F. Titus against the Home Telephone Company and the Missouri & Kansas Telephone Company. From judgment sustaining demurrers to the petition, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
F. Titus, of Kansas City, for appellants. Battle McCardle, J. W. Gleed, and D. E. Palmer, all of Kansas City, for respondents.
Plaintiffs, on February 6, 1917, brought suit against the above-named telephone companies alleging that the defendants were telephone corporations operating and maintaining telephone lines for hire in the state of Missouri; that plaintiffs were the owners of a certain tract of land, describing it; that defendants without lawful right entered upon said land and erected thereon sundry constructions, namely, seven large wooden poles from 30 to 40 feet in height, with crossbars, insulators, braces, and numerous wires thereon, for the transmission of defendants' telephone messages and business; that said use and occupation of said land and the frequent entering thereon for repairs of said constructions and uses thereof by defendants have existed since January 1, 1013, to the present time and still continue; that neither of said corporate defendants, nor any person or persons through whom they exercise the use and occupation complained of, has ever lawfully obtained any right whatever warranting their entry upon, use and occupation of, said land under the law of eminent domain regarding the condemnation of land or the use thereof or right to enter thereon; that plaintiff, on or about April 9, 1913, duly served upon said defendants, and each of them, a certain written notice, as follows:
Plaintiffs further alleged that said defendants assented, agreed to, and acquiesced on their part in the obligation named in and arising from the foregoing instrument so delivered to and received by them, but have neglected and entirely failed to remove said poles, wires, etc., and the same, together with the replacements, from time to time made, yet exist and continue, and an obligation, contractual on the part of defendants and each of them to pay plaintiffs the aforesaid charge of $5 per month per pole during the continuance thereof upon plaintiff's land, has arisen and exists by force of law, by reason, among other facts, of the continued use and occupation of said land and premises as set forth, following said written notification and up to the commencement of this action; that by reason of which facts, as hereinbefore stated, there is now due plaintiffs the sum of $225 for each of said poles for a period of 45 months prior to the filing of the petition aggregating $1,575, for which sum judgment was prayed. Defendants demurred to the petition, and their demurrers were sustained. The plaintiffs, declining to plead further, stood upon their petition, and appealed.
It is manifest that the petition discloses that defendants' original entry upon and appropriation of the land was a trespass. If the petition, under section 1794, R. S. Mo. 1909, which requires only "a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action, without unnecessary repetition," can be treated as suing for damages for the trespass, then there is no cause of action stated, since there are no allegations setting forth the character and amount of damages recoverable for the trespass. In the trespasses enumerated in sections 5448 and 5449, R. S. Mo. 1909, the character and amount of the recovery is prescribed. In all other kinds of trespass, the recovery would be either the value of the thing appropriated, removed, or destroyed, or a sum equal to the damage done. The trespass alleged herein is not such as are enumerated in sections 5448 and 5449, and, as stated, the petition makes no allegations as to damages except on the basis of a monthly sum fixed and agreed upon in the way set forth therein.
Assuming that the suit is not one for the use and occupation of land, but that it is, as plaintiffs claim, a suit based upon a contract implied by law from the giving of the notice herein set out and the silent receipt of same by defendant with continued use of said land, the question still remains, Does the petition state a cause of action? There is no doubt but that, in Missouri, a suit "for use and occupation," based merely upon use and occupation, cannot be maintained unless the relation of landlord and tenant, express or implied, exists between the parties. Edmonson v. Kite, 43 Mo. 176; McLaughlin v. Dunn, 45 Mo. App. 645; Bracht v. Johnson, 187 Mo. App. 220, 173 S. W. 692. In some states a suit can be maintained having no other basis than the use...
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