Young v. Hosemann
| Citation | 598 F.3d 184 |
| Decision Date | 25 February 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-60188.,No. 08-60941.,08-60941.,09-60188. |
| Parties | Jerry YOUNG; Christy Colley, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Delbert HOSEMANN, in his official capacity as the Secretary of State of Mississippi; Kristin Buse, in official capacity as Election Commissioner of Lee County; Debby McCafferty, in official capacity as Election Commissioner of Lee County; Harry Grayson, Jr., in official capacity as Election Commissioner of Lee County; Vivian Burkley, in official capacity as Election Commissioner in Panola County; Julius Harris, in official capacity as Election Commissioner in Panola County; Jimmy Herron, in official capacity as Election Commissioner in Panola County; Bonnie G. Land, in official capacity as Election Commissioner in Panola County; Ronald McMinn, in official capacity as Election Commissioner in Panola County; John H. Edwards, in official capacity as Election Commissioner of Lee County; John M. Wages, in official capacity as Election Commissioner of Lee County, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit) |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
Nancy G. Abudu (argued), M. Laughlin McDonald, ACLU Foundation, Inc., Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Shawn Stephen Shurden (argued), Jackson, MS, for Hosemann.
William C. Murphree, Michael Dale Chase, Mitchell, McNutt & Sams, P.A. Lit. Counsel, Gary L. Carnathan, Carnathan & McAuley, Tupelo, MS, for Buse McCafferty, Grayson, Edwards and Wages.
Darrin Jay Westfaul, Westfaul Law Firm, Batesville, MS, for Burkley, Harris Herron, Land and McMinn.
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and SMITH and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
Jerry Young and Christy Colley, both convicted felons, contend that § 241 of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi grants felons the right to vote in presidential elections. That the state denies them this right, they claim, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the National Voter Registration Act. The plain text of § 241, however belies Young and Colley's proffered interpretation of the provision. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of their case.
Section 241 of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi provides as follows:
!!! Qualification for Electors. Every inhabitant of this state, except idiots and insane persons, who is a citizen of the United States of America, eighteen (18) years old and upward, who has been a resident of this state for one (1) year and for one (1) year in the county in which he offers to vote, and for six (6) months in the election precinct or in the incorporated city or town in which he offers to vote, and who is duly registered as provided in this article, and who has never been convicted of murder, rape, bribery, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false pretense, perjury, forgery, embezzlement or bigamy, is declared to be a qualified elector, except that he shall be qualified to vote for President and Vice President of the United States if he meets the requirements established by Congress therefor and is otherwise a qualified elector.
Appellants Jerry Young and Christy Colley are felons. They otherwise meet Mississippi's requirements to vote. In 2008, they sought to register to vote in that year's presidential election, but were told that, as felons whose voting rights had not been restored by pardon or legislative enactment, they were ineligible to do so.
On September 12, 2008, Young and Colley filed this lawsuit against the Mississippi Secretary of State and the election commissioners of their counties ("election officials"), seeking a preliminary injunction to allow them to register and to vote. The final clause of § 241 (), they argued, is an exception to the bar on felon voting that precedes it and therefore guarantees them the right to vote. Under this interpretation, the state's actions violated state law, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the National Voter Registration Act.
The district court denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction from the bench, stating that their interpretation of § 241 was not "fair or reasonable." This court subsequently denied the plaintiffs' motion for emergency injunctive relief pending appeal.
In October, the election officials filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), (6). On March 9, 2009, the district court granted that motion as to 12(b)(6), concluding that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs' complaint was "without merit and should be dismissed with prejudice" because their interpretation of § 241 was "legally incorrect." The court also concluded that "defendants have correctly construed this provision."
The plaintiffs timely appealed.
Whether a district court possesses subject matter jurisdiction is, as question of law, reviewed de novo on appeal. Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 553 F.3d 913, 915 (5th Cir.2008). A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is also subject to de novo review. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.2007). The facts pled by the appellants before the district court are uncontested and so not subject to review.
The appellants raise three issues on appeal. First, they argue that the district court's order dismissing their complaint failed to set forth a basis for the decision sufficient for review by this court. Second, they challenge the state's interpretation of § 241. And third, they propose that, if this court rejects their proffered interpretation of § 241, it abstain under the doctrine of Railroad Commission v Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941), and leave the question of § 241 to Mississippi courts.
First, however, we address the matter of jurisdiction. The election officials contend that Young's and Colley's federal claims do not establish federal question jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because they are clearly "immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or... wholly insubstantial and frivolous." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946).
When a federal claim appears on the face of the complaint, "[dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is only proper in the case of a frivolous or insubstantial claim, i.e., a claim which has no plausible foundation or which is clearly foreclosed by a prior Supreme Court decision." Bell v. Health-Mor, 549 F.2d 342, 344 (5th Cir.1977). Further, when a complaint asserts a cognizable federal claim, dismissal for want of jurisdiction is disfavored as a matter of policy:
Judicial economy is best promoted when the existence of a federal right is directly reached and, where no claim is found to exist, the case is dismissed on the merits. This refusal to treat indirect attacks on the merits as Rule 12(b)(1) motions provides, moreover, a greater level of protection to the plaintiff who in truth is facing a challenge to the validity of his claim: the defendant is forced to proceed under Rule 12(b)(6) () or Rule 56 (summary judgment)—both of which place greater restrictions on the district court's discretion.
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 41516 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc). Therefore, the pleading burden to establish federal question jurisdiction is low: only claims "patently without merit... justify the district court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction." Suthoff v. Yazoo County Indus. Dev. Corp., 637 F.2d 337, 340 (5th Cir.1981).
In their complaint, the appellants alleged that, because § 241 gives felons the right to vote, the election officials' "action of failing and/or refusing to allow Plaintiffs to register and vote for President and Vice President treats them differently from other qualified voters and violates the Equal Protection Clause." Similarly, they alleged that Mississippi's failure to provide a registration form for federal elections is, if state law permits them to vote in such elections, a violation of the National Voter Registration Act's requirement that each state "shall include a voter registration application form for elections for Federal office as part of an application for a State motor vehicle driver's license." 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-3.
The election officials challenge federal question jurisdiction on three grounds. First, they argue that the appellants' federal claims merely restate their state claim. A disputed application of state law, however, can be the basis for a S 1983 claim and thereby support federal question jurisdiction. Daigle v. Opelousas Health Care, Inc., 774 F.2d 1344, 1347-348 (5th Cir.1985). State law is challenged here, but an Equal Protection challenge to state practices that deny a class of voters the right to participate on an equal basis with other qualified voters is a federal claim, as is a challenge to such a practice under the NVRA. That these claims alleging violations of rights conferred by federal law are predicated on an alleged violation of state law is of no moment.
Second, the election officials argue that the substance of the appellants' federal claims is clearly foreclosed by law and therefore frivolous. As to the Equal Protection claim, the Supreme Court has stated that "the Equal Protection Clause confers the substantive right to participate on an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an electoral process for determining who will represent any segment of the State's population." Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 713 94 S.Ct. 1315, 1318, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-105, 121 S.Ct. 525, 530, 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (2000) ...
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