Young v. House
| Decision Date | 08 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021-CA-0501-DG |
| Citation | 648 S.W.3d 706 |
| Parties | Ricky YOUNG and Sandy Young, Appellants v. William HOUSE and Pauline House, Appellees |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: James Fahringer, Somerset, Kentucky, Evan B. Smith, Prestonsburg, Kentucky.
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.
BEFORE: DIXON, McNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
Ricky and Sandy Young (collectively "the Youngs") appeal the Pulaski Circuit Court's order affirming the judgment of the Pulaski District Court finding them guilty of forcible detainer with respect to property owned by William and Pauline House (collectively "the Houses"). After careful review of the brief, record, and law, we reverse the opinion of the Pulaski Circuit Court and remand the matter to the Pulaski District Court for entry of an order vacating the judgment and dismissing the complaint.
On September 8, 2020, the Houses filed a forcible detainer complaint against the Youngs. A hearing was held on September 22, 2020. Due to COVID-19 protocols, the Youngs were expected to attend remotely. Counsel for the Youngs called his clients as witnesses; however, after an unsuccessful attempt to reach them via the phone number provided in the record, the court denied counsel's request to make additional attempts, and they did not testify. Consequently, Pauline House was the sole witness, and the facts are not in dispute.
The Houses are the owners of the property at issue, and the Youngs have been their tenants for five years. After a prior lease expired, the Youngs rented the property month-to-month with rent payable between the 1st and 3rd of each month. There were no allegations of unpaid rent. Written notice to vacate within 30 days was provided to the Youngs on August 8, 2020, but they did not vacate the property. After the close of evidence, the court concluded that, contrary to the Youngs’ assertion, the written notice to vacate was sufficient and adjudged the Youngs guilty of forcible detainer.
The Youngs appealed to the Pulaski Circuit Court arguing the Houses had provided insufficient notice. In its opinion affirming, the circuit court stated that the notice to vacate should have been provided on August 1, 2020, instead of August 8, in order to terminate the Youngs’ lease on September 1, 2020. However, the court found that the matter was moot because it had been more than four months since the Houses demonstrated their intent to terminate the Youngs’ tenancy, and "the main issue of contention in this case was always a lack of time – and not whether [the Houses] could terminate the tenancy[.]" We granted discretionary review.
As the Youngs’ claims involve questions of law, our review is de novo.
Pennyrile Allied Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. Rogers , 459 S.W.3d 339, 342 (Ky. 2015).
As an initial consideration, because the Youngs vacated the premises following the denial of their direct appeal, we must determine whether this matter is moot. A matter is moot when the judgment sought " ‘cannot have any practical legal effect upon a then existing controversy.’ " Morgan v. Getter , 441 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Ky. 2014) (citing Benton v. Clay , 192 Ky. 497, 500, 233 S.W. 1041, 1042 (1921) ). Despite their relocation, the Youngs claim our review is proper given that the forcible detainer judgment has collateral consequences – for instance, damaging their credit and negatively impacting their future ability to obtain housing, employment, and benefits. Alternatively, the Youngs argue that we should review the matter under the public interest exception to mootness and cite in support Shinkle v. Turner , 496 S.W.3d 418 (Ky. 2016), and Phillips v. M & M Corbin Properties, LLC , 593 S.W.3d 525 (Ky. App. 2020). While the Youngs’ assertion of collateral consequences may have merit, we hold that the public interest exception applies.
To meet the public interest exception, a litigant must clearly show that: "(1) the question presented is of a public nature; (2) there is a need for an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers; and (3) there is a likelihood of future recurrence of the question." Morgan , 441 S.W.3d at 102 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court of Kentucky has previously concluded that "the proper and efficient application of the law pertaining to the special statutory proceeding for forcible entry and detainer is a matter of public interest[,]" satisfying the first criteria. Shinkle , 496 S.W.3d at 420. Additionally, as there is no appellate guidance concerning the notice provision at issue herein, and given the import of notice in the proper execution of these ever-prevalent causes of action, we likewise conclude that the remaining criteria have been established. Accordingly, we shall review the merits of the Youngs’ arguments.
The Youngs contend the court erred in affirming the judgment of guilt where: (1) due to improper notice, the Houses did not have the right of immediate possession at the time they filed their complaint, and (2) the Youngs were denied due process by the court's refusal to make a second attempt to obtain their testimony. Because we agree that the underlying action should be dismissed for the Houses’ failure to provide adequate notice, as we will detail below, we do not reach the merits of the Youngs’ due process claim.
Forcible detainer is a special statutory proceeding which deals exclusively with the present right of possession of real property and is governed by KRS 1 383.200 -285. Shinkle , 496 S.W.3d at 421-22. "In Kentucky, a tenant is guilty of a forcible detainer when he refuses to vacate the premises after his right of possession has ended." Id. at 421 ; KRS 383.200(3)(a). Under the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA),2 codified at KRS 383.500 -705, a month-to-month tenant's right to possession may be terminated by the landlord or the tenant giving written notice to the other "at least thirty (30) days before the periodic rental date specified in the notice." KRS 383.695(2). A tenant can only be guilty of forcible detainer if he or she remains after the notice period has expired. Shinkle , 496 S.W.3d at 424.
Though the proper application of KRS 383.695(2) is a matter of first impression, the plain meaning of the statute controls. Executive Branch Ethics Comm'n v. Stephens , 92 S.W.3d 69, 73 (Ky. 2002). KRS 383.695(2) requires not only that notice be provided 30 days in advance but also mandates that it occur wholly prior to a specified periodic rental date.3 ,4 Applying KRS 383.695(2), for the Houses to obtain the right of immediate possession to the property, as required by KRS 383.200(3)(a) to sustain their September 8, 2020, complaint, notice must have...
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