Young v. Hutchins

• Decision Date: 08 October 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73-281-Civ-J-S,73-767-Civ-J-S.,73-281-Civ-J-S
• Citation: 383 F. Supp. 1167
• Parties: Harvey YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. D. L. HUTCHINS, as Chief, Department of Public Safety, Motor Vehicle Inspection Division, and Joseph C. Dekle, as Chairman, Civil Service Board, Jacksonville, Florida, Defendants. George R. THURSTON, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Joseph C. DEKLE, as Chairman, Civil Service Board, Jacksonville, Florida, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

383 F. Supp. 1167

Harvey YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. D. L. HUTCHINS, as Chief, Department of Public Safety, Motor Vehicle Inspection Division, and Joseph C. Dekle, as Chairman, Civil Service Board, Jacksonville, Florida, Defendants.

George R. THURSTON, Individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Joseph C. DEKLE, as Chairman, Civil Service Board, Jacksonville, Florida, et al., Defendants.

Nos. 73-281-Civ-J-S, 73-767-Civ-J-S.

United States District Court, M. D. Florida, Jacksonville Division.

October 8, 1974.

Paul C. Doyle, Carolyn S. Zisser, Duval County Legal Aid Ass'n, Jacksonville, Fla., for plaintiffs.

William Lee Allen, Asst. Counsel, Jacksonville, Fla., for defendants.

ORDER, OPINION, INJUNCTION AND DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

CHARLES R. SCOTT, District Judge.

These are actions in which the plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that certain rules and regulations of the Civil Service Board of the City of Jacksonville, Florida,¹ relating to the suspension and dismissal of nonprobationary civil service employees for cause, are violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, including classwide back pay. For the reasons set forth below, the relief requested will be granted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND²

(a) Harvey Young, Case No. 73-281-Civ-J-S

The plaintiff in Case No. 73-281-Civ-J-S, Harvey Young, had been in the employment of the Department of Public Safety, Motor Vehicle Inspection Division, City of Jacksonville, Florida, since August 7, 1968, and had achieved permanent civil service status after being duly qualified by examination and otherwise. On February 10, 1973, he reported to work and was directed by his supervisor to return home for allegedly having been "under the influence of intoxicants while on duty." On or about February 13, 1973, he received a letter³ from the defendant D. L. Hutchins, Chief of the Motor Vehicle Inspection Division of the Department of Public Safety, stating that he was suspended for a period of 30 days without pay after which time he would be permanently discharged as an employee of that division. At no time prior to his suspension was he given notice of said suspension, an opportunity for a prior hearing, or other due process safeguards to determine the merits of the suspension. By the terms of the aforesaid letter from the defendant Hutchins, the plaintiff was automatically suspended for 30 days effective February 10, 1973, at the end of which period he was to be automatically permanently discharged.

Young's hearing before the Civil Service Board was set for April 24, 1973, 56 days after he received notice of his suspension and impending discharge. Plaintiff filed his complaint alleging denial of due process based upon his suspension and dismissal without pay from his public employment without first being afforded a prior hearing and other elementary due process procedures to determine the merits of defendant's grounds for suspension and dismissal. In the meantime, at his hearing before the Civil Service Board, his discharge was upheld.⁴

On April 19, 1973, this Court entered an injunction and order and held as follows: (1) that Young was not entitled to a hearing before he was temporarily suspended from employment for 30 days "because, in the interest of public safety, there was an overwhelming necessity for immediate action by defendants;" (2) that he was "entitled to a hearing within a reasonable time after suspension and was entitled to other elementary due process procedures to determine the merits of defendants' grounds for dismissal before he was permanently discharged from his civil service job;" (3) that "56 days between the time of the suspension of plaintiff and the hearing before the Civil Service Board was unreasonable and excessive;" (4) that he was "entitled to receive his back pay for the time period beginning 30 days after his suspension was effective — that is to say, March 12, 1973, when his invalid discharge became effective — until the time period ending when he was to be given a proper due process hearing before the Civil Service Board ...;" (5) that he was "not entitled to receive his back pay for the 30 day period of suspension beginning February 10, 1973, and ending March 11, 1973, unless the Civil Service Board, at the hearing on the merits so ruled;" (6) that plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction did not issue; (7) that "before a person is deprived of a protected interest, he must be afforded an opportunity for some kind of hearing except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event;" and (8) that "in the interest of public safety it was necessary in this case to temporarily suspend plaintiff from his duties as auto safety inspector pending the outcome of the hearing on the merits" and that "this need supplied the requisite governmental interest and extraordinary situation to justify postponing the hearing until after the suspension."

On this basis, this Court: (1) required the defendants to provide Young with back pay for the period beginning March 12, 1973, until his permanent dismissal; and (2) enjoined the defendants "from permanently discharging plaintiff until a hearing was held and other elementary due process procedures were afforded him, in order to determine the merits of defendant's dismissal."

(b) George R. Thurston, Case No. 73-767-Civ-J-S

The named plaintiff⁵ in Case No. 73-767-Civ-J-S, George R. Thurston, began employment with the Department of Housing and Urban Development of the City of Jacksonville on March 1, 1971, and achieved permanent civil service status with the City of Jacksonville on or about September 1, 1971. On August 13, 1973, Thurston reported to work and was handed a letter dated August 10, 1973, which informed him that he was suspended effective Monday, August 13, 1973, for a period of 30 days, without pay, after which time he would be permanently discharged as an employee of the City of Jacksonville. Thurston was charged with violating Civil Service Board Rule 12.4(b)(9) in that he was alleged to be "incompetent or inefficient in the performance of the duties of his position." At no time prior to Thurston's suspension was he given notice of said suspension, an opportunity for a prior hearing, or other due process safeguards to determine the merits of his suspension. Thurston appealed his dismissal before the Civil Service Board on Monday, September 10, 1973. However, his appeal was denied and his dismissal was upheld.

(c) The Board's Uniform Policy

The parties have stipulated that it is the policy of the Civil Service Board of the City of Jacksonville that all permanent city employees who are to be permanently dismissed from their employment are automatically suspended for a period of 30 days without pay, after which time they are automatically dismissed.⁶ Furthermore, during the period in which city employees are suspended from employment, the benefits of salary, seniority, vacation and sick leave are frozen and do not accrue.

The plaintiffs contend that their suspension for 30 days without pay from employment pursuant to Civil Service Board Rules⁷ without first affording

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

them notice of said suspension, an opportunity for a prior hearing, and other due process safeguards, to determine the merits of the suspension in the absence of valid criteria promulgated by the Civil Service Board to determine whether an extraordinary situation exists where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the suspension is a denial of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment in that it operates to deprive the plaintiffs of a "property" interest in continued governmental employment without proper due process safeguards.

The defendants, on the other hand, contend that they are complying with procedural due process in that: (1) the Civil Service Board Rules provide that where an employee is to be dismissed he is given written notice of a 30 days suspension without pay with dismissal to follow at the end of 30 days; (2) the rules further provide that an employee may appeal to the Civil Service Board within ten days after suspension; (3) if an appeal is taken, he must, under the rules be given a hearing before the board within 20 days after the appeal, thus affording a hearing prior to the effective date of discharge.

II. APPLICABILITY OF ARNETT v. KENNEDY

To determine the appropriate legal standard to apply in these cases, the Court must ascertain to what extent the most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court regarding procedural due process and public employment, Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974), is applicable. Unfortunately, no clear majority opinion emerged from this case and the five separate opinions served merely to obfuscate what had been until that time a relatively settled area of the law. However, a close reading of the various opinions rendered in the case provide some guidance in deciding the instant cases.

In Arnett, a nonprobationary federal employee of the Office of Economic Opportunity was discharged by his supervisor after the supervisor had given him notice of written charges against him. One of the charges was that the plaintiff employee, "without any proof" and "in reckless disregard of the actual facts" known to him or reasonably discoverable by him, had publicly stated that the supervisor and his assistant had attempted to bribe a third party. The affected employee had chosen not to exercise his rights under the administrative regulations to reply orally or in writing to the charges, but had instead asserted that he had a right to a trial-type evidentiary hearing before an impartial hearing officer before he could be dismissed from his federal employment, and that...