Young v. IRS

• Decision Date: 25 September 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. No. F 84-135.
• Citation: 596 F. Supp. 141
• Parties: Jerry L. YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; Roscoe L. Egger, Jr.; Paul D. Williams; and Anita Wells, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

596 F. Supp. 141

Jerry L. YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; Roscoe L. Egger, Jr.; Paul D. Williams; and Anita Wells, Defendants.

Civ. No. F 84-135.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

September 25, 1984.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jerry L. Young, pro se.

David H. Miller, Asst. U.S. Atty., Fort Wayne, Ind., Jerome A. Busch, Trial Atty., Tax Division, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants.

ORDER

LEE, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on defendants' "Motion to Dismiss and for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs," filed July 20, 1984 and plaintiff's "Motion for Summary Judgment," filed August 2, 1984. For the following reasons, defendants' motion will be granted, and plaintiff's motion will be denied.

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). This court also recognizes that federal courts have historically exercised great tolerance to insure that an impartial forum remains available to plaintiffs invoking the jurisdiction of the court without the guidance of trained counsel. Pro se complaints, such as plaintiff's, are held to less stringent pleading requirements; technical rigor in the examination of such pleadings is inappropriate.

Liberally construing plaintiff's complaint and "statement of support" filed with the complaint, it appears that plaintiff is contesting the assessment of federal income taxes and certain tax deficiencies against him by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") and its agents. According to the statutory notice of deficiency forms attached to the complaint, plaintiff owes a total of $17,968.00 in taxes for the years 1978-1981, plus penalties under 26 U.S.C. § 6653(b) totaling $8,984.00. Plaintiff has filed this suit to redress the violation of his civil rights allegedly caused by this assessment of taxes, and seeks a total of 10.8 million dollars in damages.

The complaint lists 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1986 as the basis of the claim, but also alludes to the use of a "bill of attainer" sic and the violation of due process rights. Plaintiff believes the tax assessment violates his civil rights because the IRS was never created by "positive law" (that is, a law passed by the Congress) and thus has no jurisdiction over him. Also, the plaintiff believes that the Internal Revenue Code does not apply or pertain to him because he is a "sovereign citizen."

Defendants have responded by filing a motion to dismiss. The thrust of the motion is that none of the named defendants can be sued. Defendants allege that the IRS and the United States (to the extent it is involved here) are protected by principles of sovereign immunity, while the individual defendants were improperly served and are protected by executive officer immunity. The motion also seeks fees and costs for defending this case.

Plaintiff has also filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that the defenses offered are moot because the defendants are not "real persons." This court then issued a stay pending resolution of the motion to dismiss. The court turns to that motion first.

MOTION TO DISMISS

Although defendants have denominated their motion as a motion to dismiss, it is clear that the issues presented by this motion are best addressed after reference is made to the exhibits and other pleadings in the case. When matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, a motion to dismiss will be converted into a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may only be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Thus, summary judgment serves as a vehicle with which the court "can determine whether further exploration of the fact is necessary." Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 464 (1st Cir.1975).

In making this determination, the court must keep in mind that the entry of summary judgment terminates the litigation, or an aspect thereof, and must draw all inferences from the established or asserted facts in favor of the non-moving party. Peoples Outfitting Co. v. General Electric Credit Corp., 549 F.2d 42 (7th Cir.1977). A party may not rest on the mere allegations of his pleadings or the bare contentions that an issue of fact exists. Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir. 1983). See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). See generally C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts, § 99 (4th ed. 1983); 6 Moore's Federal Practice, § 56.15 (2d ed. 1983).

Thus, the moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The court views all evidence submitted in favor of the non-moving party. Even if there are some disputed facts, where the undisputed facts are the material facts involved and those facts show one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 296-97 (7th Cir.1983); Collins v. American Optometric Assn., 693 F.2d 636, 639 (7th Cir.1982). Further, if the court resolves all factual disputes in favor of the non-moving party and still finds summary judgment in favor of the moving party is correct as a matter of law, then the moving party is entitled to summary judgment in his favor. Egger, 710 F.2d at 297. See also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2079 n. 11, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976).

Although not raised by the defendants directly in their motion, the court turns first to the issue of whether a proper basis of jurisdiction exists for hearing this cause. Because of the limited nature of a district court's jurisdiction, the court may inquire into its jurisdiction sua sponte. Rice v. Rice Foundation, 610 F.2d 471 (7th Cir.1979).

A. Jurisdiction

Plaintiff's complaint asserts that the civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1986, give this court jurisdiction over his suit. However, none of these provisions is an appropriate basis for relief in this case. Section 1981 is restricted by the import of its language to discrimination based on race or color. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 25 L.Ed. 667 (1880); Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 482 F.2d 535, 537 n. 1 (5th Cir.1973). In fact, the language of § 1981 militates against plaintiff's case, because the section provides that "all persons" shall be subject to taxes. Section 1983 prohibits deprivation of rights under color of state law. However, actions of IRS officials, even if beyond the scope of their official duties, are acts done under color of federal law and not state law, thus making § 1983 inapplicable. Seibert v. Baptist, 594 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 1851, 64 L.Ed.2d 271 (1980); Mack v. Alexander, 575 F.2d 488, 489 (5th Cir.1978). Section 1986 creates a cause of action for failure or neglect to prevent a § 1985 conspiracy. However, § 1985(1) deals with conspiring to prevent an official from discharging his duties, while § 1985(2) deals with obstructing justice, both of which are inapplicable here. Section 1985(3) requires that there be "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action," Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971), none of which is alleged to be present here. It is therefore obvious that none of these statutory provisions can provide plaintiff with a basis for suit.

The court notes that two general jurisdiction statutes may have some potential applicability to this case. However, the court is convinced that neither one of these statutes will supply this court with jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim. The first statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1340, grants the district court original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any act of Congress providing for internal revenue. The very language of the statute indicates that this section does not create jurisdiction in and of itself. Section 1340 makes clear that the jurisdiction extends to civil actions arising under the Internal Revenue laws; as such, the suit must be based on some cause of action which the Internal Revenue Code recognizes and allows the plaintiff to bring. Absent some recognition of this kind of suit under the Internal Revenue Code, § 1340 will not create an independent basis for jurisdiction. As one court has noted, "given the limitations which Article III of the Constitution places on the jurisdiction of the federal courts, it is doubtful that the various jurisdictional statutes like § 1340 could do more than waive the congressionally imposed jurisdictional amount requirement." Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commn., 463 F.Supp. 120, 127 n. 8 (E.D.Pa.1979).

It appears that this case does not arise under the Internal Revenue Code. Plaintiff does not seek either to enforce any provision of the Code or to pursue a statutory remedy under the Code. Rather, he seeks damages for the alleged violation of his rights. In fact, the whole thrust of plaintiff's case is that he is outside the scope of the Code so that the actions of the defendants are violations of his rights. However, if the plaintiff's claim comes from outside the Code, then it logically cannot "arise under" the Code, and therefore § 1340 cannot provide plaintiff with jurisdiction.

A second possible source of general jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the federal question jurisdiction statute. Plaintiff claims that he is outside the scope of the federal income tax laws. Such a claim brings into question the interpretation of several provisions of the ...