Young v. Kenley
| Citation | 641 F.2d 192 |
| Decision Date | 24 March 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-1205,80-1205 |
| Parties | 27 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 208, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,597 Willie E. YOUNG, Appellant, v. Dr. J. B. KENLEY, individually and as Commissioner of Health, Virginia State Department of Health; Sarah E. Sayers, individually and as Director of Public Health Nursing, Virginia State Department of Health; Wayne Hardin, individually and as Director of Personnel, Virginia State Department of Health; H. H. Hedley, individually and as Retired and Former Director of Personnel, Virginia State Department of Health, jointly and severally, Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
Brent E. Simons, Washington, D. C. (Elaine R. Jones, Washington, D. C., Charles M. L. Mangum, Leonard L. Brown, Jr., Lynchburg, Va., on brief), for appellant.
John R. Butcher, Richmond, Va. , for appellees.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, and BUTZNER and RUSSELL, Circuit Judges.
Willie E. Young appeals from an order of the district court denying for the second time her application for attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 2000e-5(k). Young made this application after settlement of her suit alleging that she had been denied equal promotional opportunities as a public health nurse in the Virginia State Department of Health because of her race. In the appeal from the district court's first denial of attorneys' fees, Young v. Kenley, 614 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1979), we remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Bonnes v. Long, 559 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1979).
Upon remand the district court again denied attorneys' fees. Young v. Kenley, 485 F.Supp. 365 (E.D.Va.1980). It concluded that although Young was a prevailing party, special circumstances justified denial of attorneys' fees as a matter of its discretion. The district court characterized Young's suit as "superfluous" because she persisted in her suit even after she learned about the elimination of a regulation that formerly had barred her advancement. Finding that Young meets the tests of Bonnes, we reverse and remand.
Willie E. Young is a black woman who has been employed as a public health nurse with the Virginia State Department of Health since October, 1973. She was graduated from Meharry Medical College School of Nursing, a predominantly black institution, with a B.S. in 1956 and earned a master's degree in health education at City University of New York in 1972.
Young was hired by the Central Virginia Health District as a public health nurse at the lowest level, "A," despite a request by local health officials that she be hired at the next level, "B," for which the salary was greater. The State Health Department informed Young that she was not eligible for the higher level and greater pay because Meharry had not been accredited by the National League of Nursing at the time of her graduation. After she protested the "A" classification and filed a complaint with the Virginia Equal Opportunity Coordinator, negotiations took place with officials of the Health Department. The Department decided that by substituting, according to an established formula, previous experience for an accredited degree, Young could qualify for level "B" and promoted her.
Young received a copy of a March 3, 1975, memorandum which indicated that she could not advance to level "C" because of her non-accredited degree. On June 1, 1975, she wrote the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Washington, D. C., to complain about this ineligibility for promotion above level "B." She received an acknowledgment of her complaint and was assigned a charge number.
In a letter dated February, 1976, the Virginia EEO Program Specialist informed the Director of Public Health Nursing that Meharry's School of Nursing had in fact been accredited in 1956 and that the portion of the March, 1975, memorandum denying Young's eligibility for further promotion should be disregarded. In February, 1977, the Health Department eliminated the requirement that barred Young.
Young first filed a complaint in federal court on January 25, 1978, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. The district court dismissed the complaint because of the two-year statute of limitations but granted leave to amend. An amended complaint of April 11, 1978, added alleged violations of title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. It was dismissed for failure to show receipt of a right to sue notice from the EEOC. Although Young had requested such a notice several times beginning in August, 1976, it did not issue until May 2, 1978.
On June 23, 1978, the Deputy State Health Commissioner invited Young to apply for the position of public health nurse level "C." She passed the merit examination for the position on September 13, 1978, and received a list of level "C" vacancies elsewhere in the state for which she could apply.
Young filed her final complaint in federal district court on October 30, 1978. In it she alleged that because of her race and despite her qualification, she had been denied promotion to public health nurse level "C" since October 1, 1973, and that health officials had failed to inform her of the February, 1977, change in requirements that made her eligible for promotion.
On November 2, 1978, Young appeared for trial, but the state, because of a misunderstanding, appeared late and unprepared. The district court heard Young's evidence and reserved the right to hear the state's evidence on November 21. On November 16, however, the parties reached a settlement. The terms of the settlement gave Young a promotion to public health nurse level "C" retroactive to March 1, 1977. She was also given $992 in back pay, and her current position was reclassified from level "B" to level "C" to avoid the need for her to relocate.
After being advised of the settlement, the district court held a separate hearing on the issue of attorneys' fees. It denied the fees, and an appeal was taken. Upon remand pursuant to Young v. Kenley, 614 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1979), the district court again denied attorneys' fees.
As we observed in Bonnes, 599 F.2d at 1318, "(t)he discretion of the district court in deciding whether to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party is narrowly limited." Furthermore, we stated:
That civil rights litigation ends in a consent judgment does not preclude an attorney's fee award...
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