Young v. Kenny
Decision Date | 11 October 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 88-3995.,88-3995. |
Citation | 907 F.2d 874 |
Parties | Robert H. YOUNG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Phyllis KENNY, Thomas Manning, Henry Rose, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Robert H. Young, Shelton, Wash., in pro per.
Richard R. Wiebe, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.
Aaron K. Owada, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, Wash., for defendants-appellees.
Before BROWNING, KOZINSKI and RYMER, Circuit Judges.
Rehearing En Banc Denied June 25, 1990.
The opinion filed on October 11, 1989, 887 F.2d 237 is amended as reflected in the attached revised opinion.
With these amendments the petition for rehearing is denied. The full court has been advised of the suggestion for en banc rehearing and no judge has requested a vote thereon. The suggestion for rehearing en banc is therefore rejected. Fed.R. App.P. 35(b).
Robert Young, a Washington state prisoner, filed a complaint for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), claiming that state officials had unconstitutionally failed to apply jail-time credits to his prison sentence. The district court dismissed his complaint; we modify the district court's order to stay rather than dismiss the claim.
1. Where a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his confinement, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1836-37, 1841, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973).1 This is largely because, while a habeas petitioner must exhaust state remedies, Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1202, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982), a section 1983 plaintiff need not. Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33, 95 S.Ct. 1691, 1695, 44 L.Ed.2d 274 (1975). The exhaustion requirement in federal habeas actions "is rooted in considerations of federal-state comity." Preiser, 411 U.S. at 491, 93 S.Ct. at 1837. It is well-established that the states have a substantial interest in the administration of their prisons, and in the correction of any problems that may arise therein. "The strong considerations of comity that require giving a state court system that has convicted a defendant the first opportunity to correct its own errors thus also require giving the States the first opportunity to correct the errors made in the internal administration of their prisons." Id. at 492, 93 S.Ct. at 1837-38.
If habeas were not the exclusive federal method for challenging the length of a state prison sentence, the exhaustion requirement could be undermined by a section 1983 plaintiff who obtains a federal court's ruling that his sentence is too long. A prevailing section 1983 plaintiff in an action seeking release from jail or other prospective relief could obtain a judgment against state officials in their official capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311 n. 10, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Such a judgment might preclude the state from relitigating the issue in a subsequent state habeas proceeding, frustrating the exhaustion requirement and the important considerations of federal-state comity it protects.
Federal-state comity is a concern even where, as here, the prisoner does not specifically request the reduction of his sentence in the section 1983 complaint. Before a district court could award damages to Young, it would have to determine that his jail-time credits were unconstitutionally withheld. Such a ruling would not bar a state from relitigating the issue in a subsequent state habeas proceeding because "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacity are `persons' under § 1983" when the relief requested is damages. Will, 109 S.Ct. at 2312. Nevertheless, should a federal court find a term of imprisonment unlawful without first giving the state court system an opportunity to correct its own constitutional errors, it may result in "unnecessary friction between the federal and state court systems." Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490, 93 S.Ct. at 1836. Were the state court then to uphold the sentence, the prisoner would be entitled to bring federal habeas, perhaps in the same district court that had earlier ruled that the sentence was unlawful. The purpose of the exhaustion requirement — to give the state courts the first opportunity to rule on the claims of state prisoners — would accordingly be frustrated. As a result, habeas must be the exclusive federal remedy not just when a state prisoner requests the invalidation or reduction of his sentence, but whenever the requested relief requires as its predicate a determination that a sentence currently being served is invalid or unconstitutionally long.
All nine federal circuit courts to consider this question have arrived at the same conclusion. See Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1251-55 (1st Cir.1974) ( ); Mack v. Varelas, 835 F.2d 995, 998 (2d Cir.1987) ( ); Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 397-99 (3d Cir.1987) ( ); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70, 72-73 (4th Cir.1983) (same); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 373 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) ( ); Hadley v. Werner, 753 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir.1985) (per curiam) ( )(quoting Guerro, 498 F.2d at 1252); Hanson v. Heckel, 791 F.2d 93, 94-97 (7th Cir.1986) (per curiam) ( ); Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256, 1258-61 (8th Cir.1987) ( ); Gwin v. Snow, 870 F.2d 616, 626-27 (11th Cir.1989) ( ).
Such a rule is not inconsistent with our prior decisions, which have never expressly addressed the question, but point in the same general direction. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1102-03 (9th Cir.1986) (, )cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 682 (9th Cir.1984) ( ); Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 812-14 (9th Cir.1974) (, )modified, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.1975), rev'd on different grounds sub nom. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976). See also Bergen v. Spaulding, 881 F.2d 719, 720, 722 (9th Cir.1989) ( ). We become the tenth circuit court to adopt it.
2. Although we join our sister circuits, we share a concern expressed by many of them. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court observed:
The complaint in this case sought restoration of good-time credits, and the Court of Appeals correctly held this relief foreclosed under Preiser. But the complaint also sought damages; and Preiser expressly contemplated that claims properly brought under § 1983 could go forward while actual restoration of good-time credits is sought in state proceedings. Respondent's damages claim was therefore properly before the District Court and required determination of the validity of the procedures employed for imposing sanctions, including loss of good time, for flagrant or serious misconduct. Such a declaratory judgment as a predicate to a damages award would not be barred by Preiser ....
Id. at 554-55, 94 S.Ct. at 2973-74 (citation and footnote omitted). We are acutely aware that this language appears to conflict with the rule we have just adopted; this passage from Wolff may suggest that the exclusivity of habeas turns on the type of relief requested by the plaintiff. We are not the first court to worry about this problem: Many of the decisions cited above discuss Wolff at length and attempt to distinguish it, none very persuasively. See, e.g., Offet, 823 F.2d at 1259-61; Todd, 712 F.2d at 72-73; Hanson, 791 F.2d at 95-96. While we, too, are unable to come up with a principled way of distinguishing Wolff, we agree with Judge Bowman, writing for the Eighth Circuit, that "to read Wolff as allowing a state prisoner to avoid the exhaustion requirement by artful pleading is to set Wolff at odds with the rationale of Preiser, and we do not believe that the Court intended such a result." Offet, 823 F.2d at 1260.
We would nevertheless feel bound to follow Wolff, and thereby create a conflict with nine of our sister circuits, were it not for a brief excursion made by the Supreme Court at the end of its opinion in Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 104 S.Ct. 2820, 81 L.Ed.2d 758 (1984)....
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