Young v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn.
| Decision Date | 15 March 1944 |
| Docket Number | 15635. |
| Citation | 29 S.E.2d 482,204 S.C. 386 |
| Parties | YOUNG v. LIFE & CASUALTY INS. CO. OF TENNESSEE. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
N A. Turner, of Columbia, for appellant.
T P. Taylor, of Columbia, for respondent.
The policy in this suit was issued on January 26, 1931, upon the life of Ernest Colvin, and designated the plaintiff, Barney J. Young, as beneficiary. The insured was enrolled in the Army of the United States in 1942, when this country was actively engaged in war. He died on December 24, 1942 shortly after his induction into the military forces. His death resulted from an automobile accident while he was visiting relatives at Hartsville, South Carolina. It is admitted that his accidental death had no causal connection with his military service, and that it occurred at a time when he was on furlough from the Army.
The policy provides that upon receipt of due proof that the death of the insured resulted directly from bodily injury independently of all other causes, and that such bodily injury was effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means, and that death occurred within ninety days thereafter, the company would pay to the beneficiary double indemnity.
By stipulation, the case was tried before the Judge of the County Court of Richland County without a jury, and a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the accidental death benefit.
The defense relied upon by the appellant arises under the following provisions of the policy:
It is admitted that prior to entering the military service, the insured did not obtain a written permit from the company for such service, nor did he pay an extra premium. The appellant contends that by virtue of the second clause above quoted, in order to keep the insurance in full force, the insured was required, in case he entered the military service in time of war, to obtain written consent from the company and pay an extra premium. The further position is taken that the insured's mere status by enrolment as a member of the military organization would be sufficient to make operative the first clause of the policy hereinabove quoted, and would bar recovery; and that causation between the participation of the insured in military service and his subsequent death need not be established.
The respondent takes the contrary view, and maintains that the parties did not intend that the reduction in liability should be operative merely because of the status of the insured as a soldier, but was conditioned upon the insured's death resulting from his participation in military service; that consequently the double indemnity could be recovered when it appeared that the insured was killed in an automobile accident while on furlough from his military unit. It is argued that it was not incumbent upon the insured to apply for a writter permit or to pay an extra premium since his death was in no way related to or caused by military activities connected with his service in the Army.
The decisions in the various state courts are not in accord as to whether a provision excepting or limiting the liability of the insurer while the insured is engaged in military or naval service applies to death from any cause while in such service in point of time, or applies merely to death caused by such military or naval service. An examination of the cases shows that this apparent conflict is due in some measure to the difference in the phraseology in the policies. In some cases, the view has been taken that a provision excepting or limiting the liability of the insurer while the insured is "engaged" in military or naval service, means death while doing or taking part in some military activity, and that the parties intended that the liability should relate to a death resulting from some act connected with the service in contradistinction to a period of time when the insured was in such service.
Other cases, however, have held that an exception or limitation of liability in the event of death while engaged in military or naval service means the status of the insured, and not the causation of his death, where there is no provision indicating a contrary intention. See Note, 137 A.L.R. p. 1263, et seq.
In the case at bar, the word "engage" is not found in either of the clauses of the policy issued to the insured. By the second clause it is provided that "should the insured die while enrolled in such military service in war time without such permit, the Company's liability will be restricted to the net reserve on this policy." The first clause quoted, after exempting the company if the death of the insured results from or is caused by various contingencies, provides, "or while the insured is in military or naval service in time of war."
There is no question but that when the insured became enrolled and took the prescribed oath, he entered the military service of the United States Government, and thereafter became subject to the orders and discipline provided for that branch of the service. The sole issue here is whether the...
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Edwards v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn.
...Young v. Life & Casualty Insurance Co. of Tennessee, decided by the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina and reported in 204 S.C. 386, 29 S.E.2d 482, 483. It is to observed that the defendant in the cited case is the same as the one new before this court, and the provisions of the p......
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