Young v. Menifee Union Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 19 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | D075135 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | ETHAN YOUNG, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MENIFEE UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Raquel A. Marquez, Judge. Affirmed.
Kyle Scott Law and Kyle Scott for Plaintiff and Appellant.
DeClues Burkett & Thompson, Jeffrey A. Smith and Steven J. Lowery for Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff Ethan Young (Plaintiff), a minor, suffered an eye injury in his eighth grade history class as a result of the actions of another student. Among others, he sued the classroom teacher, Brooke Snyder, and Snyder's employer, the Menifee Union School District (District) (together Defendants). The superior court entered judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff following a jury trial in which jury answered "No" to the special verdict question "Was Brooke Snyder negligent?"
Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury and that substantial evidence does not support the verdict. Because Plaintiff did not meet his burden of establishing reversible error, we will affirm the judgment.
The incident at issue took place in early March 2015 in Snyder's eighth grade history class at the District's Bell Mountain Middle School. At that time, Plaintiff was 14 years old, and without a record reference, Plaintiff tells us that the other classmate-witnesses—D.W., I.W., and C.S.—were approximately 14 years old.
On the date in question, during the last period of the day, Snyder showed the class a movie about the Civil War. The screen was at the front of the room, and at the back of the room was a table with two desktop computers. In between, the classroom had three columns of rectangular tables, and each column had four rows of tables. The tables in thetwo outside columns each had two seats facing the front, and the tables in the middle column had four seats facing the front.
From the back of the classroom looking forward toward the screen, Snyder's desk was in the front of the room to the right of the screen at the head of the right column of two-seated tables. During the movie, while Snyder sat at her desk, she was grading papers, watching the movie, and "mak[ing] sure the children were doing what they were supposed to be doing." Snyder kept her computer underneath her desk and her screen on top of her desk.
Toward the end of the movie, Plaintiff, D.W., I.W., and C.S. began throwing bits of erasers at each other. Plaintiff, D.W., and I.W. engaged in this misbehavior only after they checked to make sure Snyder was not looking at them. At one point, D.W., who was seated in the front row of the center section of tables, turned around to his left and with his right hand threw a pencil toward Plaintiff, who was seated in the third row of the center section of tables. The pencil went over the table in the second row, bounced on the table in the third row (where Plaintiff was seated) and hit Plaintiff in his right eye.
Almost immediately, liquid came from Plaintiff's eye, and Plaintiff covered his eye with his hand and tried to blink and open his eye. Plaintiff did not say anything to anyone, but remained in his seat until the class period ended approximately 10 minutes later. Plaintiff ran out of class and met his mother, who was at school to pick up him and his brother.
Later that day, Plaintiff's mother took Plaintiff to urgent care and a hospital emergency room, and the next day she took him to a specialist. The following dayPlaintiff had eye surgery and a second surgery a few weeks later; he was out of school for approximately a month.
In May 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants and others2 related to an injury he suffered in March 2015 in Snyder's middle school classroom as a result of the actions of a classmate, D.W. In one cause of action for negligence against Snyder and the District, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants: "failed to adequately supervise the students that were in [Snyder's] class"; "failed to maintain discipline, regulate student conduct, enforce those rules and regulations regarding the proper conduct in class that [is] necessary for the protection of the students"; "failed to provide adequate medical care and assistance to Plaintiff after the subject incident"; and "failed to adequately investigate and document the subject incident." Plaintiff further alleged that the District was negligent in its "instruction, supervision, control and/or discipline, on a continuing basis of its employees in the performance of their duties to supervise students during class time."
Snyder and the District filed separate answers, each generally and specifically denying the allegations in the complaint and asserting various affirmative defenses.
Plaintiff's one cause of action for negligence went to trial against Defendants in July 2017. The jury heard testimony from eight witnesses, and the court received 21 exhibits into evidence. Following instructions and closing argument, in 32 minutes thejury selected a foreperson, deliberated, and reached a decision, unanimously answering "No" to the first question of the special verdict form, "Was Brooke Snyder negligent?" Complying with the instructions on the special verdict, the jury did not reach the remaining questions.
Given the jury's factual finding that Snyder was not negligent, the court determined as a matter of law that Plaintiff could not recover on his complaint and in August 2017 entered a judgment on the special verdict against Plaintiff and in favor of Snyder and the District. (Code Civ. Proc., § 624 [].)
Plaintiff filed postjudgment motions for a partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict (Code Civ. Proc., § 629) and for a new trial (Code Civ. Proc., § 657), which Defendants opposed and the court denied.
Plaintiff timely appealed from both the judgment and the postjudgment order denying Plaintiff's motion for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict.3
On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the judgment should be reversed on two bases: The trial court erred in instructing the jury; and the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the verdict. Because the trial court's judgment is presumed correct, Plaintiff (as the appellant) has the burden of establishing reversible error. (Denham v.Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 (Denham).) As we explain, Plaintiff did not meet his burden of establishing reversible error on either ground.
"A party is entitled upon request to correct, nonargumentative instructions on every theory of the case advanced by him which is supported by substantial evidence." (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 572 (Soule).) " ' " '[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.' " ' " (Bay Guardian Co. v. New Times Media LLC (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 438, 462 (Bay Guardian), quoting in part People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 538, overruled on other grounds in People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 753.)
"A court may refuse a proposed instruction that incorrectly states the law or is argumentative, misleading, or incomplete." (Caldera v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 31, 44 (Caldera).) " ' "[I]nstructions should state rules of law in general terms and should not be calculated to amount to an argument to the jury in the guise of a statement of law." ' " (Uriell, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at pp. 742-743.) " ' "For ambiguous instructions, the test is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood and misapplied the instruction." ' " (Cristler v. Express Messenger Systems, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 72, 82 (Cristler).)
The existence of instructional error alone, however, is insufficient to reverse a judgment based on a jury verdict. (Soule, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 570.) The appellant mustalso establish prejudice from the error, and instructional error is prejudicial only if the appellant establishes a reasonable probability it would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the error. (Ibid.; accord, Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069 [same]; see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 []; Code Civ. Proc., § 475 [].) Prejudice, like error, is not presumed; and prejudice, like error, must be established by the appellant. (Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 566; Wilkinson v. Bay Shore Lumber Co. (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 594, 599 [].) If called upon to "assess[] prejudice from an erroneous instruction, we consider, insofar as relevant, '(1) the degree of conflict in the evidence on critical issues [citations]; (2) whether respondent's argument to the jury may have contributed to the instruction's misleading effect [citation...
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