Young v. Nelson

Decision Date20 September 1922
Docket Number17085.
Citation121 Wash. 285,209 P. 515
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesYOUNG v. NELSON.

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Kitsap County; Walter M. French, Judge.

Bill by Ada Young against Nels Nelson. From a decree for plaintiff defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Poe &amp Falknor, of Seattle, for appellant.

F. W Moore, of Bremerton, for respondent.

HOLCOMB J.

This is an action by respondent for specific performance of an agreement for the extension of a lease, against appellant which resulted in a decree of specific performance, as prayed.

The complaint alleged that, on December 2, 1915, a lease was entered into between appellant and Andrew Young for the entire two upper stories of a certain building in Bremerton, and for the joint use and occupancy of the basement beneath the premises, the two upper stories to be used by the lessee for hotel and rooming purposes; that the lease contained the following provision, to wit:

'To have and to hold the said premises for a term of five years from the first day of March, 1916, to the first day of March, 1921, at a monthly rental sum of one hundred twenty-five ($125.00) and no/100 dollars, with an option to the lessee herein at the expiration of this lease for an extension of this lease for a period of five (5) years thereafter at such rental as may then be agreed upon between the lessor and the lessee.'

The complaint further alleges that respondent is the wife of Andrew Young, now deceased, holding the lease under a duly probated nonintervention will. It is alleged that Andrew Young and respondent have at all times performed all of the conditions incumbent upon them under the terms of the lease. It is further alleged that 30 days prior to the expiration of the term stated in the lease, the respondent, intending to exercise her option to extend the lease for a term of 5 years, gave notice that she wished to exercise the option contained therein, and requested appellant to consult as to what would be a reasonable rental; that appellant refused to recognize that provision of the lease, and demanded $225 rental for the month of April, 1921, which is alleged to be exorbitant and in violation of the terms of the lease; that she demanded that the lease be extended for a period of 5 years upon a reasonable rental, and that a reasonable rental therefor was the sum of $150 per month; that appellant refused that offer, and insisted upon $225 for the month of April, 1921, without stating terms as to the conditions of tenancy, and repudiated the terms of the lease aforesaid; that respondent had no adequate and complete remedy at law for the breach of appellant, since she was operating a hotel, depending largely upon its reputation for her income, and that any eviction on the part of appellant would injure her, and her remedy at law would be inadequate; that she was operating a hotel on the premises in accordance with the terms of the lease, and was in actual danger of eviction by appellant. She prayed for a decree against the appellant, requiring him to specifically perform the agreements of his lease in accordance with its provisions for a term of 5 years at a reasonable monthly rental to be fixed by the court at $150 per month, and prayed for an injunction pendente lite, restraining the defendant from disturbing her peaceful possession.

A demurrer to the complaint upon the grounds that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action was overruled, and appellant answered, tendering issue on all of the allegations of the complaint, except that it was admitted that appellant and respondent had endeavored to mutually agree, and that the demanded $225 per month rent, and that respondent was willing to pay only $150 per month rent; that the sum of $225 per month was reasonable rental; that the parties had been unable to agree upon the rent; and that no provision was made in the lease itself for any procedure for fixing the rent in case of mutual disagreement.

Upon the trial the court summoned a jury to advise him as to what would be a reasonable rent for the ensuing 5 years, and upon hearing the evidence the jury found that $150 per month would be a reasonable rental for the ensuing term of 5 years. The trial court thereupon made findings that $150 per month would be a reasonable rental for the extended term of the lease, and that respondent was entitled to have the lease extended for 5 years from the 1st day of March, 1921, upon other terms and conditions the same as in the original lease, and entered judgment accordingly.

The errors assigned by appellant are grouped for discussion into two fundamental questions, which are the essential issues of the case: First, can the court decree specific performance of a renewal contract where the question of the rental, by its terms, is such as the parties themselves shall fix, and cannot be made certain by means provided or contemplated by the contract itself? Second, assuming that the court has power to fix the amount of the rental, is the sum of $150 a reasonable monthly rental?

It is first asserted that the lease contained no provision by which the renewal rental could be made certain by means provided or contemplated in the lease itself, and can only be fixed by agreement of the parties. Our cases are cited to the effect that----

'Courts of equity will not undertake to enforce a specific performance of an agreement unless its terms are such that it cannot be reasonably misunderstood. * * * The price or consideration to be paid is an essential ingredient of the contract, and, if it is neither ascertained nor rendered ascertainable, the contract is void if incomplete and incapable of enforcement.' Huston v. Harrington, 58 Wash. 51, 107 P. 874; Le Marinel v. Bach, 114 Wash. 651, 196 P. 22.

Another case cited by appellant, extensively quoted and stoutly relied upon, is that of Livingstone Water Works v. City of Livingstone, 53 Mont. 1, 162 P. 381, L. R. A. 1917D, 1074.

In the last-cited case there was a provision for the renewal...

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34 cases
  • Edgewater Enterprises, Inc. v. Holler
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 29 Diciembre 1982
    ...Clubs, Inc., 62 Tenn.App. 383, 462 S.W.2d 890 (1970); Diettrich v. J.J. Newberry Co., 172 Wash. 18, 19 P.2d 115 (1933); Young v. Nelson, 121 Wash. 285, 209 P. 515 (1922); Anderson v. Frye & Bruhn, Inc. 69 Wash. 89, 124 P. 499 (1912). See generally Annot., 6 ALR2d 448 (1949) (factors and ele......
  • Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • 6 Agosto 1979
    ...875; Rainwater v. Hobeika, 208 S.C. 433, 38 S.E.2d 495; Playmate Club v. Country Clubs, 62 Tenn.App. 383, 462 S.W.2d 890; Young v. Nelson, 121 Wash. 285, 209 p. 515; and Moolenaar v. Co-Build Cos., 354 F.Supp. 980 cases where the word "reasonable" was read into renewal clauses which provide......
  • Slayter v. Pasley
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • 25 Noviembre 1953
    ...a legal conclusion. The following cases are a few which fall in this category and illustrate its application. In Young v. Nelson, 121 Wash. 285, 209 P. 515, 30 A.L.R. 568, the matter of rental during the extended period was "at such rental as may then be agreed upon". It will be noted that ......
  • Duke v. Whatley
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 8 Mayo 1991
    ...between the parties have generally been held unenforceable and void for uncertainty and indefiniteness. See note to Young v. Nelson, 121 Wash. 285, 209 P. 515, 30 A.L.R. 568. See, also, 16 R.C.L. 886; 35 C.J. 108, 109; Howard v. Tomicich, 81 Miss. 703, 33 So. Giglio v. Saia, 140 Miss. 769, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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