Young v. Richard Smith Deputy Constable, in His Individual Capacity, Laura B. Conway, Main St. Renewal, LLC
| Decision Date | 17 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:16-cv-03395-TWP-DML |
| Parties | SHEMECA YOUNG, RACQUEL YOUNG, and K.W. by Next Friend, SHEMECA YOUNG, Plaintiffs, v. RICHARD SMITH Deputy Constable, in his individual capacity, LAURA B. CONWAY, MAIN STREET RENEWAL, LLC, NICK'S PACKING SERVICES, INC., and CRAIG HUFF, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on Motions to Dismiss filed by each of the Defendants Deputy Constable Richard Smith ("Deputy Smith") (Filing No. 68), Laura B. Conway (Filing No. 38), Main Street Renewal, LLC ("Main Street") (Filing No. 35), Nick's Packing Services, Inc. ("Nick's Packing") and Craig Huff ("Huff") (Filing No. 42). After being forcibly removed from their leased residence, Plaintiffs Shemeca Young ("Shemeca"), Racquel Young ("Racquel"), and K.W. (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed an Amended Complaint asserting federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ("FDCPA"), as well as Indiana state law claims for statutory deception and civil conversion. (Filing No. 28.) Each of the Defendants' filed Motions to Dismiss arguing that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)"). For the reasons stated below, the Motions are granted in part and denied in part.
The following facts are not necessarily objectively true. But as required when reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all factual allegations in the Amended Complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs as the non-moving parties. See Bielanski v. County of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008).
In March 2015, Shemeca signed a lease to occupy the real estate located at 8136 Carina Drive, Indianapolis, Indiana ("the Residence"). (Filing No. 28 at 2.) Shemeca leased the Residence from its owners Dennis and Katherine Young (collectively, "the Youngs"), who are not related to any of the Plaintiffs despite their common surname. (Id at 3.) Shemeca moved into the Residence with her minor son, K.W, and made monthly lease payments to the Youngs in the amount of $1,250.00. (Id.) She invited her sister Racquel to live at the Residence. (Id.) Racquel suffers from a serious medical condition that requires daily kidney dialysis, therefore, she kept special medical equipment at the Residence to perform her daily kidney dialysis. (Id.)
In late 2014, the Residence became part of a foreclosure action against the Youngs. (Filing No. 28 at 3.) The Plaintiffs were unaware of the foreclosure status and continued to make monthly lease payments to the Youngs. Shemeca received "court papers" addressed to the Youngs and left on the Residence's door, but she forwarded the documents to the Youngs without reading them. (Id.) The foreclosure action did not name any of the Plaintiffs. (Id.)
A Decree of Foreclosure was eventually entered against the Residence. (Filing No. 28 at 4.) On June 21, 2016, Jeff 1, LLC, purchased the Residence at a sheriff's sale. At the time of the purchase, Main Street provided property management services for Jeff 1, LLC. (Id.)
On or about August 2, 2016, Laura Conway ("Conway"), an attorney who acted on behalf of Main Street, filed a "Notice of Claim for Possession of Real Estate" ("Eviction Notice") in thePike Township of Marion County Small Claims Court. (Filing No. 28 at 4.) In the Eviction Notice, Conway states that she is a "debt collector" and provides other language from the FDCPA. The Eviction Notice names the defendants as "Dennis P. Young, Katherine L. Young, and all unknown occupants." (Id.) The Eviction Notice contains a written statement indicating to the court that the Plaintiffs "unlawfully hold over and detain possession of [the Residence] from the Plaintiff to its damage in the sum of no less than $1.00." (Id.)
On August 30, 2016, a hearing took place on the Eviction Notice. (Filing No. 28 at 4.) Following the hearing, a writ ("the Writ") was issued, which listed in the field for the defendants: "DENNIS P. YOUNG AND KATHERINE L. YOUNG & A." (Filing No. 28 at 4-5.) Conway presented the Writ to the Constable of Pike Township, along with payment, and requested the Constable to execute the Writ. (Filing No. 28 at 5.) The Writ is reproduced below.
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(Filing No. 69-2.)1
On September 29, 2016, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Shemeca and K.W. were at the Residence when Conway and Deputy Smith, a duly appointed deputy of the Pike Township Constable's Office, knocked on the door. (Filing No. 28 at 1, 5.) Shemeca answered the door and Deputy Smith asked if she was the person named on the Writ, to which she told the deputy that the individuals were her landlords. (Filing No. 28 at 5.) Deputy Smith entered the residence, drew his firearm, and proceeded upstairs where then four (4) year-old K.W. was located. (Id.) Deputy Smith entered K.W.'s bedroom, pointed his firearm at K.W., and then ordered K.W. and Shemeca to leave the Residence. (Filing No. 28 at 6.)
Deputy Smith then allowed employees or agents of Nick's Packing to enter the Residence. (Filing No. 28 at 6.) Although Racquel was not present, Shemeca informed Deputy Smith and the agents of Nick's Packing that Racquel needed the dialysis machine and the accompanying supplies necessary for its operation, but she was not allowed to retrieve these items. Shemeca obtained a document titled "Inventory of Personal Property Removed Pursuant to Court Order" ("Inventory"), which lists the items removed from the Residence. (Id). Huff, who is employed by Nick's Packing, signed the Inventory. (Filing No. 28 at 1, 6.)
When Shemeca went to Nick's Packing on October 5, 2016, she was provided a written statement indicating that she had incurred $3,075.88 in storage fees in six (6) days. (Filing No. 28 at 6.) Moreover, Nick's Packing refused to release any of the items on the Inventory to the Plaintiffs, regardless of payment, because Conway and Main Street informed Nick's Packing that the items belonged to the Youngs. (Filing No. 28 at 6.)
Plaintiffs have asserted five separate causes of action in their Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs' fourth and fifth causes of action, however, both allege violations of the FDCPA. The Court provides a summary of each cause of action to facilitate its discussion on the merits.
Plaintiffs' first allegation is that Deputy Smith and Conway deprived them of "certain rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States of America." (Filing No. 28 at 7.) Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that their right to be free from unreasonable seizure was violated by Deputy Smith and Conway's acts and/or omissions. Plaintiffs claim that Deputy Smith acted on specific directions prepared by Conway and therefore Conway acted as a "state actor" because of the "degree of her participation with Deputy Smith." (Id.)
Plaintiffs' second allegation is that Nick's Packing violated Indiana Code § 35-43-5-3(a)(2), which prohibits any person from "knowingly or intentionally mak[ing] a false or misleading written statement with intent to obtain property, employment, or an educational opportunity." (Filing No. 28 at 8.) Plaintiffs allege that Nick's Packing made a written statement that the Plaintiffs' property was being held in twelve (12) separate "vaults" at a price of $250.00 per "vault" and demanded payment of $3,000.00 for said "vaults." (Id. at 8). Plaintiffs assert that, in reality, the property was being held at an off-site storage facility at a rate of $212.00 per month.
Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants are responsible for the conversion of their property as the Writ did not authorize any Defendant to remove Plaintiffs' property from the Residence. (Filing No. 28 at 9.) Rather, Plaintiffs allege, the Writ specifically referenced "Dennis P. Young and Katherine L." (Filing No. 28 at 9.)
Plaintiffs allege two causes of action against Conway under the FDCPA. First, they allege that Conway, as a debt collector, did not provide them adequate written notice under the FDCPA.See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. (Filing No. 28 at 10-11.) Plaintiffs also claim that Conway made a false representation and deceptive statement during the collection of the debt in stating that the Plaintiffs were in unlawful possession of the Residence. (Filing No. 28 at 11-12.)
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. The burden of proof is on the Plaintiffs, the parties asserting jurisdiction. United Phosphorus Ltd. V. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). "The plaintiff has the burden of supporting the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint by competent proof." Int'l Harvester Co. v. Deere & Co., 623 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1980). In deciding whether a plaintiff has carried this burden, "the district court must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, unless standing is challenged as a factual matter." Reid L. v. Ill State Bd. Of Educ., 358 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2004). Furthermore, "[t]he district court may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists." Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1995) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
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