Young v. Riley
| Decision Date | 02 November 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 35948,35948 |
| Citation | 59 Wn.2d 50,365 P.2d 769 |
| Parties | George YOUNG and Marta Young, his wife, Appellants, v. Maude RILEY (alias Maude Desmond), William H. Desmond and James Desmond, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
James J. Keesling, Seattle, for appellants.
Charles S. Helm, Seattle, for respondents.
George Young and Marta Young, husband and wife, the plaintiffs in an action for unlawful detainer, appeal from a judgment granting Maude Riley, alias Maude Desmond, 1 a set-off against rent due plaintiffs, and declaring rights under a purported written lease.
The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that a portion of the home in question was orally rented to defendant Maude Riley for one hundred fifty dollars a month, and that there was a default in payment of rent after statutory notice to pay rent or to vacate. The prayer was for a judgment for double the amount of the rent due and for restoration of possession.
The answer pleaded possession under a written lease executed by the appellant wife alone, that respondent's possession had been disturbed by the occupancy of a portion of the home by appellant wife and minor daughter, and that, as a result, respondent had been damaged thirty-five hundred dollars. The prayer in the answer was for dismissal of the complaint and for a judgment of thirty-five hundred dollars.
The court found there was no default in the payment of rent and decreed that the lease was binding upon the appellant husband and the appellant community, and that the respondent had a right to renew the lease for an additional five years and had a valid option to purchase the property. The judgment directs the payment of nine hundred dollars delinquent rent deposited in the court's registry to the appellants but, however, without interest. The basis for the denial of interest was that, while the appellants were entitled to interest, the respondent was entitled to offset her damage.
The court's oral decision, its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and its judgment completely ignore the purpose of the statutory action for unlawful detainer, which is to preserve the peace. 2
The statute affords a summary remedy for obtaining possession of property withheld by tenants who fail to pay rent within three days after the service of statutory notice. Phillips v. Port Townsend Lodge, No. 6, F. & A. M., 8 Wash. 529, 36 P. 476. The right and remedy alike are statutory, and the procedural remedy is an integral part of the right itself. 3 RCW 59.12. In an unlawful detainer action, the court sits as a special statutory tribunal to summarily decide the issues authorized by statute and not as a court of general jurisdiction with the power to hear and determine other issues. State ex rel. Seaborn Shipyards Co. v. Superior Court, 102 Wash. 215, 172 P. 826. RCW 59.12.170 provides that, upon a finding of default in the payment of rent, '* * * the judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease, agreement or tenancy.'
It is settled by an unbroken line of decisions that in such proceeding the defendant may not assert a set-off or counterclaim. Woodward v. Blanchett, 36 Wash.2d 27, 216 P.2d 228; Chung v. Louie Fong Co., 130 Wash. 154, 226 P. 726; Phillips v. Port Townsend Lodge, No. 6, F. & A. M., supra; Ralph v. Lomer, 3 Wash. 401, 28 P. 760.
Whether there was a default or not in the payment of rent after the service of the statutory notice was the primary question for determination. The court found that there was no default in the rent at the time of the service of the statutory notice.
However, the uncontroverted evidence is: The May rent, which was paid when due, was returned to the respondent who retained it. On June 17, 1960, the rent for May and June in the sum of three hundred dollars was unpaid. On that day, June 17, 1960, respondent Maude Riley was served with the statutory notice to pay rent or to vacate the premises within three days. She did neither. Instead, on June 21, 1960, her attorney wrote to the appellants' attorney that the rent would not be paid but that it would be retained to cover the respondent's claimed damage. Thus it is that, at the time of the service of the notice to pay rent or to vacate the premises within three days, and at the end of such period, the respondent was in default in the payment of rent.
On July 28, 1960, one month's rent in the sum of one hundred fifty dollars was deposited in the registry of the court, at which time there was due rent for the which time there was due rent for the months of May, June and July in the total sum of four hundred fifty dollars. Thereafter, on September 22, 1960, an additional one hundred fifty dollars was deposited in the registry of the court, and on October 26, 1960, the sum of six hundred dollars was likewise deposited. No interest due appellants was included in any of the deposits. Such deposits...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Port of Longview v. International Raw Materials, Ltd.
...over a unlawful detainer action may decide issues related to rightful possession of the subject property. See Young v. Riley, 59 Wash.2d 50, 52, 365 P.2d 769 (1961). Although the court does not sit as a court of general jurisdiction to decide issues unrelated to possession of the subject pr......
-
Josephinium Associates v. Kahli
...at 1044. 16. RCW 59.12; Heaverlo v. Keico Indus., Inc., 80 Wash.App. 724, 728, 911 P.2d 406 (1996). 17. See, e.g., Young v. Riley, 59 Wash.2d 50, 52, 365 P.2d 769 (1961). 18. Munden v. Hazelrigg, 105 Wash.2d 39, 45, 711 P.2d 295 (1985) (citing cases). 19. Heaverlo, 80 Wash.App. at 728, 911 ......
-
Munden v. Hazelrigg
...detainer action." Granat v. Keasler, 99 Wash.2d 564, 570, 663 P.2d 830 (1983); First Union Mgt., Inc. v. Slack, supra; Young v. Riley, 59 Wash.2d 50, 365 P.2d 769 (1961). An exception to the general rule is made when the counterclaim, affirmative equitable defense, or set-off is "based on f......
-
Crafts v. Pitts, No. 23956-0-III (WA 2/7/2006)
...380, 383, 864 P.2d 435 (1993). In most cases, defendants are not even permitted to assert offsets and counterclaims. Young v. Riley, 59 Wn.2d 50, 365 P.2d 769 (1961). Equitable defenses to the landlord's assertion of the right to possession are nowadays begrudgingly allowed. Motoda v. Donoh......
-
§17.12 - Termination
...there was "an unbroken line of decisions that in such proceeding the defendant may not assert a set-off or counterclaim." Young v. Riley, 59 Wn.2d 50, 52, 365 P.2d 769 (1961); see also Sundholm v. Patch, 62 Wn.2d 244, 382 P.2d 262 (1963); Ralph v. Lomer, 3 Wash. 401, 28 P. 760 (1891). The d......
-
Table of Cases
...7.6(4) York v. Stone, 178 Wash. 280, 34 P.2d 911 (1934): 5.5(3) Young v. Nelson, 121 Wash. 285, 209 P. 515 (1922): 17.9(1) Young v. Riley, 59 Wn.2d 50, 365 P.2d 769 (1961): 17.4(5), 17.12(2)(c)(i) Yukon Inv. Co. v. Crescent Meat Co., 140 Wash. 136, 248 P. 377 (1926): 17.2(2)(c)(i) Z _______......
-
§17.4 - Tenant's Right of Possession and Enjoyment
...prima facie case. The right granted in Foisy to offset rent appears contrary to a long line of prior Washington cases. See Young v. Riley, 59 Wn.2d 50, 365 P.2d 769 (1961). The covenant in question is only of habitability, not a broader covenant of fitness. Olson v. Scholes, 17 Wn.App. 383,......