Young v. Seattle Transfer Co.

• Decision Date: 10 November 1903
• Citation: 33 Wash. 225,74 P. 375
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: YOUNG v. SEATTLE TRANSFER CO.

74 P. 375

33 Wash. 225

YOUNG v. SEATTLE TRANSFER CO.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 10, 1903

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; W. R. Bell, Judge.

Action by J. W. Young against the Seattle Transfer Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Metcalfe & Jurey, for appellant.

Ballinger, Ronald & Battle, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This was an action begun in the superior court of King county by respondent, J. W. Young, for the recovery of the value of a trunk and contents alleged to have been stored in the month of August, 1898, with appellant, Seattle Transfer Company. The answer was a general denial, except as to the incorporation of appellant, the character of its business and the demand for the trunk. The cause was tried to a jury in the superior court, a verdict was rendered in favor of respondent against appellant for $240, and judgment was entered on the verdict for that amount and costs, from which it appeals to this court.

At the trial, after respondent rested, appellant moved for a nonsuit, which was denied. Appellant thereupon submitted its evidence, and after the rendition of the verdict moved the court for a new trial, which was overruled. Appellant excepted to each ruling in denying its request for a nonsuit and its motion for a new trial. The assignment of error presents the sole question in the case, was there evidence to support the verdict of the jury? Under the issues, as formulated by the pleadings, the burden of proof was cast upon respondent to show by some testimony that the Seattle Transfer Company undertook to receive and place in storage for a consideration in one of its warehouses at the city of Seattle respondent's trunk and contents, and that in pursuance of such agreement appellant did receive said goods for that purpose. The evidence bearing on these propositions, adduced at the trial on behalf of respondent and appellant, may be summarized as follows: Respondent and one Ramsay, in February, 1898, jointly occupied a room at the Yesler residence in Seattle. Respondent, intending to go to Alaska, placed certain of his wearing appearel in said trunk then in the Yesler residence, in the custody of Mr. Ramsay to remain in the room they were jointly occupying until Mr Ramsay should desire to move from said place, in which event he was instructed by respondent to store the trunk with appellant company; that some time during the month of August 1898, Ramsay, intending to remove from the Yesler residence, attempted to communicate with the appellant about the storage of the trunk on two different occasions. At the trial the circumstances regarding such communications were related by Ramsay in his direct examination in the following language: 'I rang up the Seattle Transfer Company, and told them to send up and get Mr. Young's trunk at the Yesler home, where we were rooming, and take it down, and put it in storage for Mr. Young; and somehow they didn't send up for the trunk that day, so when I went back to my room that night I found the trunk hadn't been sent for; so the following day I telephoned again to the Seattle Transfer Company, and told them I would like for them to send up and get that trunk right away; that I wanted to move, and would like for them to take care of it; and they said they would send a man up to attend to it that day, so when I went back home that evening I found the trunk had been called for and taken away.' This witness also testified in this connection, in response to questions propounded by respondent's counsel, in the following manner: 'Q. You don't know, of course, who it was at the other end of the line that you were talking to? A. No, I do not. Q. How did you---- Just explain to the jury what you did, now, about reaching the office of the Seattle Transfer Company. A. Well, I did in that case the same as I would do in any other--just simply looked up the number in the directory, and rang up and inquired if that was the Seattle Transfer Company. Q. What reply did you get? A. They replied it was. So then I requested them to send up and get the trunk.' Ramsay, on cross-examination, testified that he telephoned from Newhall's store down town in Seattle each time; that he did not recognize the voice of the person addressed at either time; that he did not recollect the number of the telephone he called up, and did not know who took the trunk away from the house. Mrs. Emma Gagle, who lived at the Yesler residence at that time, testified: 'I know that the trunk was taken from the Yesler residence. I don't know the party's name who took it, but I do know it was an expressman. I don't know where the trunk was taken.' No check or receipt for the trunk was ever asked for or received by Ramsay or Mrs. Gagle from the appellant or expressman who removed the trunk. The respondent at that time was in Alaska. In the spring of the year 1900 Young wrote Ramsay from Alaska, requesting him to go to the transfer company and get his trunk, pay the storage charges, and send it to him. Ramsay, pursuant to such request, went to the office of appellant, and after diligent search the company was unable to find any trace of the trunk or its contents, either by consulting its books or by searching through its warehouse. Respondent testified that he left Seattle for Alaska in February, 1898, corroborated Mr. Ramsay with regard to leaving the trunk and contents with him, and authorizing him to store same with appellant; and testified, further, that he never at any time saw the trunk in the possession of the transfer company; that he personally had had no agreement with the company concerning the trunk, but had left the matter in Ramsay's hands; that on his return from Alaska he went to the office of appellant, and had a conversation concerning the trunk with Mr. Shaubut, in charge of the baggage department of the transfer company. Respondent testified: 'We went down into the storage room to see if witness could pick out the trunk, and were unable to find it. Mr. Shaubut claimed that the company did not have it.' The date of this conversation and search was not definitely fixed by Mr. Young, but Mr. Shaubut, testifying on behalf of appellant, said it was about one year prior to the trial of the cause, thereby fixing the date about June 12, 1901. On behalf of appellant, the testimony tended to show that no record was ever made with reference to the trunk; that thorough search was had, and no trace of it or its contents could be found; that the company in the month of August, 1898, did an extensive storage and transfer business; that mistakes had sometimes occurred in handling merchandise; that the three witnesses examined on behalf of appellant, who were at that time agents and officers of the transfer company, had no knowledge or recollection of the communications over the telephone alleged to have been made...