Young v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 20 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | CV-20-201 |
| Citation | 2021 Ark.App. 391 |
| Parties | COURTNEY YOUNG APPELLANT v. SHELTER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY APPELLEE |
| Court | Arkansas Court of Appeals |
2021 Ark.App. 391
COURTNEY YOUNG APPELLANT
v.
SHELTER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY APPELLEE
No. CV-20-201
Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Division I, IV
October 20, 2021
APPEAL FROM THE PHILLIPS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 54CV-17-324] HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER W. MORLEDGE, JUDGE
David A. Hodges, for appellant.
Matthews, Sanders & Sayes, P.A., by: James T. Sayes, for appellee.
N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, JUDGE
Appellant Courtney Young appeals the January 22, 2020 circuit court order that granted appellee Shelter Mutual Insurance Company's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Young's complaint against Shelter with prejudice. Young contends that the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment to Shelter and should have, instead, granted his motion to nonsuit his complaint without prejudice. We affirm.
Young was injured in an accident when he was a passenger in a Ford Explorer. Young sued both the estate of the deceased driver and Shelter, which provided the insurance coverage for the Explorer. By the end of 2017, Young had settled all of his claims except the claim against Shelter for $5, 000 in medical benefits. On March 7, 2018, Shelter moved for summary judgment and asked that Young's complaint be dismissed. Shelter did not request a hearing on this motion. Shelter appended exhibits demonstrating that Young's health-
insurance provider paid for his medical expenses and the remaining balances were written off as required by federal law; thus, Young owed no money to any medical provider. Shelter contended that under the contractual terms of the insurance policy covering the Explorer, Young was not entitled to any medical benefits from Shelter.
On March 23, 2018, Young requested that the circuit court grant him an extension of time in which to respond to Shelter's motion. Shelter did not object to an extension. On April 11, 2018, the circuit court granted Young forty-five additional days. On May 25, 2018, Young filed a response and supportive brief in resistance to Shelter's motion for summary judgment, asserting that the policy language was ambiguous or void as against public policy. In June 2018 and in August 2018, Shelter filed a request of the circuit court to grant its motion for summary judgment and dismiss Young's complaint with prejudice, referencing medical records and documents provided by the parties in discovery. The matter remained pending on the docket for more than a year.
On December 5, 2019, the Arkansas Supreme Court handed down Crockett & Carter v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co., 2019 Ark. 365, 589 S.W.3d 369. Shelter believed the Crockett holding had rejected the precise medical-benefits issue Young was pursuing against Shelter in the complaint, entitling Shelter to summary judgment and dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.[1] On January 13, 2020, Shelter filed a "Supplement" to its previously filed motion
for summary judgment, attaching the Crockett opinion.[2] On January 21, 2020, Young filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice, and Shelter filed a response in opposition, noting that Young did not dispute Crockett's application and had waived his absolute right to dismissal without prejudice.
On January 22, 2020, the circuit court granted Shelter's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Young's complaint with prejudice. In the order, the circuit court remarked that Shelter had provided the unanimous Crockett decision, Young chose not to respond to Shelter's supplement to its motion for summary judgment, and the court had considered Crockett in making its decision.
Young argues on appeal that the circuit court erred by dismissing his complaint with prejudice. Young's contentions are that he requested a nonsuit before Shelter's summary judgment motion had been "submitted" to the circuit court; he exercised his absolute right to nonsuit before the circuit court granted Shelter's motion for summary judgment; and, even if the summary judgment was properly before the circuit court, Crockett was not exactly on point to support entry of summary judgment. We affirm.
Young correctly states that our supreme court has been resolute in holding that the right to nonsuit outlined by Rule 41 is absolute and may not be denied by the circuit court so long as the right is asserted before the "final submission" of the case to the jury or the court. See Burgie v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 137. A case has not been finally submitted where, even though it has come to a hearing, the argument has not yet closed. White v. Perry, 348 Ark. 675, 74 S.W.3d 628 (2002). If a case is submitted to the circuit court on a motion for summary judgment and an adverse ruling has been announced to the plaintiff, then the case has been "submitted" for purposes of Rule 41. Id.; Bloodman v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 2011 Ark.App. 694, 386 S.W.3d 653 (affirming circuit court's dismissal with prejudice; holding Bloodman's attempt to nonsuit "untimely" when presented after completing her argument and receiving an adverse bench ruling but before order was prepared and filed). Once submitted, the circuit court has discretion to decide whether to grant a voluntary nonsuit. Wright v. Eddinger, 320 Ark. 151, 894 S.W.2d 937 (1995). On appeal, we review the circuit court's decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Bloodman, supra. The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the circuit court abused its discretion. Wright, supra.
Shelter filed its summary-judgment motion in March 2018, and in April 2018, the circuit court granted Young forty-five additional days in which to file his response. This was in keeping with Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), which requires the party resisting a motion for summary judgment to "serve a response and supporting materials, if any, within 21 days after the motion is served," although "[f]or good cause shown, the court may by order reduce or enlarge the foregoing time periods." In May 2018, Young filed a timely response
to Shelter's motion for summary judgment, asserting that the medical-payments provision in the "Coverage C" portion of Shelter's insurance contract was ambiguous or void as against public policy. In June 2018, Shelter filed a reply to Young's response. In August 2018, Shelter asked that the court grant its motion for summary judgment. The matter remained pending for well over a year. No hearing was conducted on this motion.[3] In January 2020, Shelter filed a copy of a December 2019 supreme court opinion, which Shelter believed fully supported the motion for summary judgment. No further argument on the summary-judgment issue was requested by the circuit court or presented by Young.
We reject Young's contentions that the circuit court acted on the motion for summary judgment before his time to respond had expired and that the court was required to grant his motion to nonsuit, filed one day before entry of summary judgment. Young, in fact, filed a formal response to Shelter's motion for summary judgment in May 2018. In January 2020, Shelter provided the circuit court with a 2019 Arkansas Supreme Court opinion as additional support for its motion filed in 2018. Young did not request more time to present additional argument regarding Shelter's pending summary-judgment motion or the supplemental supreme court opinion Shelter had presented. The circuit court did not
request additional argument. The circuit court did not enter summary judgment until January 22, 2020.
We hold that, for purposes of Rule 41, Shelter's motion for summary judgment had been submitted to the court before Young sought to nonsuit. In these circumstances, Young did not have an absolute right to nonsuit his complaint without prejudice. See Hearst v. Baker, 2014 Ark.App. 214. In Hearst, Baker filed a motion for summary judgment.[4] Hearst subsequently filed a motion to nonsuit his case; Hearst did not file a response to Baker's motion within twenty-one days or request an extension in which to respond. We held that the circuit court was within its discretion to dismiss Hearst's case with prejudice, reasoning that once Hearst failed to respond to Baker's motion for summary judgment, "the case was 'submitted' to the court," and Hearst's failure to timely respond meant that "his absolute right to a nonsuit was exhausted." Id. at 1. The same is true here, and Young has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in not granting Young's motion to nonsuit his complaint without prejudice.
Young adds to his argument on appeal by asserting that the Crockett opinion is not identical in every way to his case, so the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment. We disagree.
On appellate...
To continue reading
Request your trial