Young v. Smith

• Decision Date: 04 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2010–CA–00079–SCT.,2010–CA–00079–SCT.
• Citation: 67 So.3d 732
• Parties: Bobbi J. YOUNG and Lynda L. Carter, Next of Kin of Clarence S. Young, Deceased.v.Dr. Robert H. SMITH and Baptist Memorial Hospital–DeSoto, Inc.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

67 So.3d 732

Bobbi J. YOUNG and Lynda L. Carter, Next of Kin of Clarence S. Young, Deceased.

v.Dr. Robert H. SMITH and Baptist Memorial Hospital–DeSoto, Inc.

No. 2010–CA–00079–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Aug. 4, 2011.

William Robert Bruce, attorney for appellants.David W. Upchurch, Joshua Shey Wise, Robert K. Upchurch, Tupelo, Janelle Marie Lowrey, Walter Alan Davis, Oxford, attorneys for appellees.EN BANC.RANDOLPH, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. Bobbi J. Young and Lynda L. Carter, Next of Kin of Clarence S. Young, Deceased (“Young”), appeal an Order of the Circuit Court of DeSoto County, Mississippi, which granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Robert Smith and his employer, Baptist Memorial Hospital–DeSoto (“BMH–D”).¹ The trial court certified the summary judgment for Smith and BMH–D as final for the purpose of appeal pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Young argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the “Motion to Withdraw Admissions” which was filed, without explanation or excuse, nearly seven-and-one-half years after said admissions were otherwise “conclusively established....” Miss. R. Civ. P. 36(b). This Court concludes that the circuit court's ruling was well within its discretion under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 36. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 36. We further affirm the circuit court's finding that no genuine issue of material fact remains regarding Young's claims against Dr. Smith and BMH–D, as well as the circuit court's grant of summary judgment as to Dr. Smith and BMH–D. ²

FACTS³

¶ 2. On August 22, 2001, Young filed a “wrongful death, medical malpractice claim” against health-care providers, including Dr. Smith and BMH–D. Young I, 999 So.2d at 369–70. On October 11, 2001, Dr. Smith propounded “Requests for Admission” to Young, which included the following:

1. Please admit that with regard to the care and treatment provided to [Young] by [Dr. Smith] you have no qualified medical expert who is expected to testify at the trial of this case that [Dr. Smith] deviated from the applicable standard of care for an emergency room physician.

2. Please admit that you have no qualified medical expert who is expected to state an opinion at trial that any alleged deviation from the applicable standard of care on the part of [Dr. Smith] proximately caused or contributed to the death of [Young].

(Emphasis added.) Pursuant to Rule 36(a), a “written answer or objection” to these requests for admission was due “within thirty days after service of the request.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 36(a). But during this period, Young filed no “written answer[s] or objection[s,]” ⁴ nor did Young request additional time to respond. Id. Rather, Young did not respond to the request. In December 2001, having received no “written answer[s] or objection [s],” Dr. Smith and BMH–D filed “Motions for Summary Judgment,” arguing that the requests were deemed admitted by operation of law. Id. (absent a timely “written answer or objection,” the “matter of which an admission is requested ... is admitted....”). Thus, they contended that Young's admission that they did not have a “qualified medical expert” regarding Dr. Smith's alleged conduct meant that no genuine issues of material fact remained as to Young's claims against Dr. Smith and BMH–D.

¶ 3. On December 21, 2001, seventy-one days after service of the “Requests for Admission,” Young filed responses which denied the requested admissions; identified Dr. David E. Hansen as one of Young's medical experts; and “filed a motion for summary judgment against the individual doctors[,]” with an attached affidavit from Dr. Hansen which “stated that the doctors had been negligent in their care of [Clarence] Young, and had they provided timely and proper care, it was probable that Young would have survived.” Young I, 999 So.2d at 370. Inexplicably, Young failed to file a motion to withdraw or amend the admissions which, by that point in time, were “conclusively established” by operation of law. Miss. R. Civ. P. 36(b) (“[a]ny matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.”).

¶ 4. For several years thereafter, proceedings were delayed due to the insolvency of a liability insurance carrier for one of the defendants and the prior appeal to this Court. The prior appeal contested the grant of summary judgment. Young I, 999 So.2d at 368. On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. See id. at 373. This Court determined that “[b]y holding that [Young's] supplemental expert designation violated the scheduling order, the trial court erroneously equated a discovery deadline with a deadline for supplementation of an expert opinion.” Id. at 372. This Court concluded that “[t]he trial court erred by refusing to consider Dr. Hansen's supplemental affidavit in determining whether there was a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Id.

¶ 5. In Young I, this Court chose not to address substantively the separate issue of “whether [Young's] failure to respond to Dr. Smith's requests for admissions warranted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Smith and his employer, BMH–D[,]” stating that because “the trial court has never ruled on this issue, we decline to address this assignment of error.” Id. at 371, 373. Following denial of the defendants' motion for rehearing, this Court's mandate was issued on February 17, 2009.

¶ 6. Upon remand, on February 19, 2009, BMH–D filed a “Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment” based upon Young's failure to timely respond to the requests for admissions.⁵ On March 10, 2009, nearly seven-and-one-half years after the admissions were deemed admitted, Young filed a “Motion to Withdraw Admissions.” At the July 16, 2009, hearing on the “Renewed Motions for Summary Judgment,” Young explained the failure to provide timely responses to the October 2001 “Requests for Admission,” as follows, “[w]e simply didn't have our expert opinion at the time that the Requests for Admissions were propounded.” To this point, counsel for BMH–D responded:

if that were the case, they could have moved for more time to respond; they could have responded as they were and then amended them when they got their expert opinions in, but they didn't do that. They just simply didn't respond. And then when they did respond, it took them years to even move to withdraw them....Having offered no legitimate explanation or excuse to support the untimely motion to withdraw, Young leapfrogged to contesting the lack of prejudice to Dr. Smith and BMH–D. Counsel for Dr. Smith responded that the consequence of failing to comply with Rule 36 is an admission by operation of law, regardless of the defendants' conduct.⁶

¶ 7. After taking the matter under advisement for consideration, on September 9, 2009, the circuit court issued a five-page “Opinion.” The analysis began by quoting the pertinent portions of Rule 36. The learned circuit judge found, as follows:

Rule 36 is to be enforced according to its terms. Educational Placement Services v. Wilson, 487 So.2d 1316 (Miss.1986). When a party does not respond or object to requests for admissions within the time period allowed by this Rule and does not seek an extension of time for responding, a court does not abuse its discretion in striking untimely responses or refusing withdrawal of matters deemed admitted in untimely filed admissions. Sawyer v. Hannan, 556 So.2d 696 (Miss.1990).

If the plaintiff fails to communicate to the trial court a reason for the delay or a belief that they should have been allowed to delay their response, and the court can find no compelling circumstances to justify allowing an untimely reply to avoid admissions, the [c]ourt does not abuse its discretion in not allowing the admissions to be withdrawn. Earwood v. Reeves, 798 So.2d 508, 514 (Miss.2001).

Requests are deemed admitted if the answers or objections are not served within 30 days of service. There appears to be no issue that [Young] did not file responses to the admissions within thirty days. The requests for admissions go to the heart of [Young's] claims. [Young] asked to withdraw the admissions over seven years from when they were served. [Young] gave no explanation as to why they had not sought withdrawal of their responses which were deemed admitted thirty days after they were served until the Defendants filed their motions for summary judgment. The [c]ourt also can find no compelling circumstances to justify allowing an untimely reply to avoid admissions. Therefore, the motion to withdraw the admissions will be denied.

(Emphasis added.) As to Young's argument that Dr. Smith and BMH–D had waived their right to bring the “Renewed Motions for Summary Judgment,” the circuit court found:

[Rule] 36 provides that requests for admissions are deemed admitted by operation of law if a party does not respond within the required time. The party seeking the admissions are [sic] not required to take any affirmative action in this regard.... The [c]ourt does not find the cases regarding affirmative defenses being waived as persuasive or analogous. Also, [Rule] 56(b) provides that a motion for summary judgment can be made by the Defendant at any time. Therefore, the [c]ourt finds that the motions were timely filed and the arguments were not waived just because they were not asserted earlier. [ ⁷] The [c]ourt finds it noteworthy that the Supreme Court did not make any finding that the argument was waived when they declined to rule on the issue.

(Emphasis in original.) The circuit court ultimately concluded that the “Renewed Motions for Summary Judgment” filed by Dr. Smith and BMH–D “should be granted.”

¶ 8. Thereafter, the circuit court entered an “Order Granting Motions for Summary Judgment” and a “Final Judgment” in favor of Dr. Smith and BMH–D, dismissing Young's claims against both with...