Young v. State

Decision Date20 November 1972
Citation487 S.W.2d 305
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
PartiesJohn Henry YOUNG, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Tennessee, Defendant in Error.

James E. Beckner, Morristown, for plaintiff in error.

David M. Pack, Atty. Gen., John B. Hagler, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for defendant in error.

OPINION

JOHN W. WILSON, Special Justice.

The parties will be designated as in the trial court; that is, John Henry Young as defendant, and State of Tennessee as State.

The defendant, on his plea of not guilty, was tried and convicted in the Criminal Court of Hamblen County upon each count of an indictment containing two counts, charging in the first count that defendant forcibly took from the person of Fred Moser one set of keys to the Hamblen County Jail by use of a deadly weapon in violation of T.C.A. § 39--3901. In the second count it is alleged that defendant escaped from the Hamblen County Jail while being held there on a felony charge in violation of T.C.A. § 39--3807.

The jury fixed the punishment at ten years on the first count (armed robbery) and at one year on the second count (escape). Motion for new trial was duly filed and overruled, the defendant sentenced, and an appeal prayed and granted.

The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, with one Judge dissenting. The majority opinion took the view that there was an intent to commit two separate and distinct crimes. The dissenting opinion took the view that there was only an intent to commit one crime; i.e., escape from jail.

We granted certiorari and the matter has been argued before the Court.

On July 8, 1970, at approximately 10:30 A.M., Hamblen County Deputy Sheriff Fred Moser was returning a prisoner to the cell which was occupied by defendant. Deputy Moser unlocked the cell door, allowing the prisoner to enter, when defendant produced a loaded .32 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver and pointed this weapon at his jailer. Defendant and a cellmate, Cecil Leveday, stepped outside the cell. Loveday took Officer Moser's set of keys for the jail, ordered the jailer to get into the cell, and locked the door to the cell with the keys that he had obtained from the Deputy.

At this point Loveday dropped the set of keys on the floor outside the cell. Defendant and Loveday then walked from the cell area. Approximately ten seconds later, Loveday returned ot the cell, picked up the keys and then left again.

At the time of the escape defendant was being detained on felony charges. Both defendant and Loveday were captured on the day of the escape. The gun that defendant used to effectuate his flight was found under a bush near the place of his capture.

After leaving the jail Loveday threw away the keys in a field adjoining the Hamblen County Jail. The set of keys was not found at the time of Loveday's and defendant's recapture. Several months after the escape a citizen found the keys in a field and returned them to the Hamblen County Sheriff's Department. In the meantime, an expenditure of approximately $300.00 was necessary in order to change the jail locks with new keys.

The prime question we have here is whether the evidence preponderates against the verdict finding that the defendant was guilty of armed robbery; that is, with an intent separate and apart from the offense of escaping from jail.

The public policy of this State against the imposition of two convictions and two punishments arising out of a single transaction is embodied in the following passage:

'Even if it be conceded that two convictions and two punishments may be had in any case upon separate counts, the practice is not approved, and, certainly it must be clear that the offenses are wholly separate and distinct. Our own cases appear to prohibit the practice where the offenses grow out of one transaction and involve but one criminal intent.'

See Dowdy v. State (1928) 158 Tenn. 364, 13 S.W.2d 794; Patmore v. State (1925) 152 Tenn. 281, 277 S.W. 892; English v. State (1966) 219 Tenn. 568, 411 S.W.2d 702.

Our robbery statute, T.C.A. § 39--3901, requires a 'felonious taking'. When considering the proper application of this term the following rule quoted in 77 C.J.S. Robbery § 22, pp. 462--463, is particularly in point. It is:

'In the absence of a statute to the contrary, there can be no robbery without a criminal, felonious, larcenous, or, under an express statute, a fraudulent, intent. The animus furandi, or intent to steal, is essential to the crime. In other words, there must be a criminal intent of a character including the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • State v. Black
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • June 16, 1975
    ...the Court of Criminal Appeals went back to the 'same evidence' rule and permitted two convictions to stand. In Young v. State, 487 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn.1972), this Court based its ruling on a single continuous intent, and permitted only one In Russell v. State, 499 S.W.2d 945 (Tenn.Cr.App.1973)......
  • United States v. Mitchell
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • February 28, 2014
    ...Despite the slight difference in language, this earlier version of robbery nonetheless is a crime of intent. See Young v. State, 487 S.W.2d 305, 307 (Tenn.1972) (finding that robbery requires the specific intent of permanently depriving the owner of the property taken; therefore, it is in t......
  • Harrell v. State
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
    • October 2, 1979
    ...can be no robbery without a felonious intent or the specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property taken. Young v. State, 487 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn.1972). The appellants assign error that the trial judge erred in declining to instruct the jury their special request number two, ......
  • Greer v. State
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
    • May 10, 1976
    ...the existence of a single continuous intent to escape, and that both convictions could not stand, under the authority of Young v. State, 487 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn.1972). As it did in Black, the Tennessee Supreme Court refused to overrule Young expressly even though the facts in Young were virtua......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT