Young v. State
Decision Date | 08 May 1998 |
Citation | 724 So.2d 69 |
Parties | Charles Lee YOUNG v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Michael Crespi, Dothan, for appellant.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and J. Elizabeth Kellum, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Charles Lee Young, was convicted of one count of burglary in the first degree, a violation of § 13A-7-5; two counts of robbery in the first degree, violations of § 13A-8-41; one count of attempted rape in the first degree, a violation of § 13A-4-2 and § 13A-6-61; one count of attempted sodomy in the first degree, a violation of § 13A-4-2 and § 13A-6-63; one count of sodomy in the first degree, a violation of § 13A-6-63; and one count of kidnapping in the first degree, a violation of § 13A-6-43. Young received seven sentences of life imprisonment without parole. In addition, Young was ordered to pay $1,000 in restitution and $200 to the victims compensation fund.
This case involves uncontradicted evidence of a horrifying assault on two elderly victims. M.K.E. and V.E. were assaulted and robbed in their Dothan home in June 1996. At the time, the elderly wife and husband were 79 and 82 years old, respectively. Evidence presented at trial tended to show the following.
When the couple returned home from shopping, they were met by an armed assailant, who was subsequently identified as Young. Young held a gun in V.E.'s face and demanded money. V.E. gave Young the $43 he had in his wallet. Young demanded more money and plundered the house in search of more.
After searching the house for more money, Young ordered both victims to undress. Young tried to vaginally penetrate M.K.E., but was unsuccessful. Next, Young attempted to orally sodomize her. He then forced M.K.E. at gunpoint to lean forward. Young then anally sodomized the 79-year-old woman. When M.K.E. screamed in pain, V.E. raised up and was told to lie down or he would be killed.
Leaving M.K.E. collapsed on the floor, Young held V.E. at gunpoint and forced him to drive to the bank. When the two arrived at the drive-through teller, bank personnel became suspicious and asked V.E. to come inside. As V.E. and Young approached the bank, a bank teller pulled V.E. inside and slammed the door to prevent Young from entering. V.E. told the bank personnel about the situation, pleaded with them not to call the police, and withdrew $300. He then ran to the car and returned home, afraid that Young was on his way back to the couple's home to further harm M.K.E.
After V.E. and Young had left the house, M.K.E. called the police. By the time V.E. returned home, the police had arrived. Upon searching the neighborhood for the assailant, the police spotted Young, who was armed, a chase ensued, and Young was arrested. V.E. identified Young as the perpetrator.
Young argues that the State failed to prove a prima facie case of kidnapping in the first degree.
When an appellate court reviews a conviction for sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, the appellate court "must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution." Faircloth v. State, 471 So.2d 485, 489 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd, 471 So.2d 493 (Ala.1985). A conviction will not be disturbed on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence "unless, allowing all reasonable presumption for' its correctness, the preponderance of the evidence against the judgment is so decided as to clearly convince the reviewing court that it was wrong and unjust." Jackson v. State 516 So.2d 726, 753 (Ala. Crim.App.1985).
Section 13A-6-43, Ala. Code 1975, sets forth the elements of kidnapping in the first degree as follows:
The indictment in this case states that Charles Lee Young did abduct V.E. with the intent to hold him, for ransom or reward, in violation of § 13A-6-43, Ala. Code 1975. Therefore, the State had to prove (1) that Young abducted V.E. and (2) that Young intended to hold V.E. for ransom or reward. Through the testimony of V.E. and bank personnel, the State proved that Young abducted V.E. and that V.E. was held "for ransom or reward" because his release was conditioned upon his withdrawing money from his bank account. V.E.'s testimony that Young demanded money, that he plundered the house for money, and that he continually threatened and abused M.K.E. and V.E. with demands for money is further evidence of Young's intent to hold V.E. for "ransom or reward."
Accepting as true all evidence introduced by the State, according the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and considering all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, Faircloth, supra, we would conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction.
Young contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury as to the definition of "ransom or reward."
"The trial court has broad discretion in formulating its jury instructions, provided those instructions accurately reflect the law and the facts of the case." Raper v. State, 584 So.2d 544, 545 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991). "A trial court's oral charge to the jury must be construed as a whole, and must be given a reasonable—not a strained—construction." Williams v. State, 710 So.2d 1276 (Ala.Crim.App.1996). "A trial judge may explain to the jury the legal terms involved in his instructions where his explanation does not qualify, limit, or modify them." Brackin v. State, 417 So.2d 602, 605 (Ala.Crim.App. 1982).
The trial court instructed the jury on kidnapping in the first degree as follows:
(R. 374-76.) Young argues the trial court should not have included the dictionary definitions of those terms in its instructions to the jury. We disagree.
The instructions accurately reflected both the kidnapping statute and the facts of the case. Within its discretion, the trial court attempted to explain the legal terms "ransom or reward" contained in the statute. This charge does not qualify, limit, or modify the words "ransom or reward." Therefore, there was no reversible error.
Young asserts that the State failed to prove a prima facie case of robbery in the first degree in two separate counts and, therefore, that it violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Although a double jeopardy claim should be raised by way of pretrial motion under Rule 15.2, Ala.R.Crim.P., it was properly raised and preserved for our review by Young's motion for a judgment of acquittal. See Kellett v. State, 577 So.2d 915 (Ala.Crim. App.1990)
. This motion was specifically directed to the second count of robbery because both robbery charges arose from one transaction. (R. 400.)
The constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy protects a defendant from being subjected to multiple punishments for the same offense. This guarantee bars the conviction of a defendant for two separate counts of first-degree robbery where the evidence adduced at trial tended to show that the defendant committed only one act of robbery against one victim. Moore v. State, 709 So.2d 1324 (Ala.Crim.App.1997).
In the present case, the court differentiated the two counts of robbery as follows:
(R. 416.)
The State presented evidence of one, but not two separate robberies. The evidence tended to show that Young committed one continuous act of robbery against V.E., using a deadly weapon while committing a theft. The fact that Young forced V.E. into another room does not create a second robbery. The trial court erred in instructing the jury that it did. See Rolling v. State, 673 So.2d 812, 815 (Ala.Crim.App.1995)
. Accordingly, we affirm Young's conviction and his sentence as to the first count of robbery in the first degree, CC-96-846. We reverse the trial court's judgment as to the second count of robbery in the first degree and remand this cause to the trial court with instructions that it vacate Young's conviction and sentence as to the second count, CC-96-849.
Young claims the trial court's instructions to the jury on the offenses of attempted sodomy and attempted rape were...
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