Young v. State

• Decision Date: 11 March 1902
• Citation: 40 S.E. 1000,114 Ga. 849
• Parties: YOUNG v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

40 S.E. 1000

114 Ga. 849

YOUNG v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

March 11, 1902

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The verdict in this case was not without sufficient evidence to support it.

2. It is not, in order to render dying declarations admissible in evidence upon a trial for murder, essential for the state to show that the declarant affirmatively said he was in a dying condition, or used language of like import. If he was in fact in articulo mortis, and the circumstances were such as to indicate that he must have known that this was so, it is proper to allow the declarations to be proved, and instruct the jury to determine for themselves whether or not the statements made by the deceased were "conscious utterances in the apprehension and immediate prospect of death."

Error from superior court, Effingham county; P. E. Seabrook, Judge.

Clifford Young was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and brings error. Affirmed.

D. H Clark, for plaintiff in error.

Livingston Kenan, Sol. Gen., for the State.

LUMPKIN P.J.

Upon an indictment for murder the plaintiff in error, Young, was convicted of the offense of voluntary manslaughter, and excepted to the overruling of a motion for a new trial. This motion complains that the verdict was contrary to the evidence, and assigns error upon the refusal of the court to exclude proof of certain declarations of the deceased, the contention of the accused being that "these declarations of the deceased were admitted without sufficient evidence that he was then in articulo mortis, or in any way realized the near approach of death."

1. As to the general grounds of the motion, it is sufficient to say that a careful examination of the brief of evidence shows that there was ample testimony to sustain the verdict returned by the jury.

2. The special ground of the motion is also without merit. It was unequivocally shown that at the time the deceased made the declarations proof of which was objected to at the trial he was in a dying condition, and all the circumstances disclosed by the evidence conclusively showed that he must have been aware that such was the fact. It does not appear that he made any affirmative statement as to his condition, or that he said anything indicating a knowledge on his part that the approach of death was near. The precise point insisted upon by counsel for the accused is that, in order to render a dying declaration admissible, it must...