Young v. State
| Decision Date | 02 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-PC-1217 |
| Citation | 143 N.E.3d 965 |
| Parties | Jerry W. YOUNG, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorneys for Appellant: Stephen T. Owens, Public Defender of Indiana, Liisi Brien, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Caroline G. Templeton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Jerry Young appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. We vacate and remand in part and affirm in part.
[2] Young presents two issues for our review, which we restate as:
[3] The underlying facts, as stated in Young's direct appeal, are as follows:
Young v. State , 57 N.E.3d 857, 858-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied (2017).
[4] On direct appeal, this Court found the trial court erred by merging Young's convictions for rape and criminal deviate conduct and by applying two enhancements to the single conviction. We thus remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment of conviction for the lesser-included offense of Class B felony criminal deviate conduct. In addition, the trial court was instructed to attach Young's habitual offender enhancement to his rape conviction and to attach his repeat sexual offender enhancement to his criminal deviate conduct conviction. The two enhanced sentences were to be served concurrently for an aggregate sentence of eighty years. See id. On remand, the trial court followed our sentencing directive.
[5] In June 2017, Young filed his pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which he later amended by counsel. A hearing on Young's petition was held in September 2018, after which the court took the matter under advisement and allowed the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On May 7, 2019, the court issued its order denying Young's petition. This appeal ensued.
[6] To the extent the post-conviction court has denied relief, the petitioner appeals from a negative judgment and faces the rigorous burden of showing that the evidence, as a whole, leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Harris v. State , 762 N.E.2d 163, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied . A post-conviction court's findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error — that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Kistler v. State , 936 N.E.2d 1258, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied . In this review, findings of fact are accepted unless they are clearly erroneous, and no deference is accorded to conclusions of law. Id.
[7] Young contends that his stipulation to the repeat sexual offender and habitual criminal offender sentencing enhancements constitutes a guilty plea and that this plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because he did not personally waive his right to a jury trial.
[8] First, we must determine whether Young's acknowledgement concerning the habitual enhancements was a guilty plea or merely a stipulation. The post-conviction court concluded that Young's stipulation was "essentially a guilty plea." Appealed Order p. 11, ¶ 23.
[9] In Garrett v. State , 737 N.E.2d 388 (Ind. 2000), the defendant claimed that his stipulation to the existence of prior offenses during the habitual offender phase of his trial amounted to a guilty plea, and thus it was error for the trial court to accept the stipulation without advising him on various rights he would waive by pleading guilty. See Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969) (). Our Supreme Court discussed the distinction between a factual stipulation and a guilty plea and stated: "A stipulation that seeks to establish certain facts does not constitute a guilty plea." Garrett , 737 N.E.2d at 392. Noting that Garrett's stipulation did not establish that he was an habitual offender but rather merely established the fact that the prior offenses existed, the Court concluded that the stipulation did not amount to a guilty plea. Consequently, the trial court was not required to advise Garrett as to the rights he would waive by pleading guilty.
[10] Here, in its order denying Young's petition, the post-conviction court reproduced, in its entirety, the parties' Stipulation on Prior Convictions. The following paragraphs of the stipulation are germane to our review:
Appealed Order, pp. 7-8 (emphasis added).
[11] In addition, the transcript from Young's trial shows that after the jury reached its verdict on the principal charges, the court sent the jurors back into the deliberation room. This colloquy then ensued:
Trial Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 128-29.1 The court was in recess for about four minutes; when it reconvened, the conversation continued as follows:
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Phelps v. State
...a defendant pleads guilty to an enhancement, he must personally waive his right to a jury trial on the enhancement. Young v. State , 143 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. Here, the State concedes there was an invalid waiver of rights, and we agree. Even assuming Phelps's ......