Young v. State, 97-2362
| Citation | 720 So.2d 1101 |
| Decision Date | 12 October 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-2362,97-2362 |
| Parties | 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2347 Richard YOUNG, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Nancy Daniels, Public Defender, and Fred Parker Bingham II, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Denise O. Simpson, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Appellant, Richard Young, appeals his conviction and sentence for lewd and lascivious conduct upon a minor. He raises two claims of juror misconduct and one claim that the prosecutor engaged in improper closing argument. We reverse.
During voir dire, the State and appellant asked questions that elicited responses from several of the potential jurors as to their own experiences with sexual abuse. The trial judge then asked one question:
In this case the allegations are that the child was molested--that's the term that is being used. And it's important to know whether any member of the jury has had any experiences which might deprive Mr. Young of the presumption of innocence. And it's very important that we have impartial jurors. So can all of you tell me whether there is anything that has happened in your life--including being molested--that would make it difficult for you to give Mr. Young the presumption of innocence here?
In response to this question another potential juror said that she had been molested as a child. Both parties exercised five of their six peremptory strikes, and the final jury included four men and two women. Neither of the two women had replied to the questions about personal experiences with sexual abuse.
Following the trial, in which the jury found appellant guilty of committing a lewd act upon a minor, one of the jurors attempted to contact the trial judge, the clerk, and the defense attorney. Counsel for appellant filed an amended motion for new trial alleging his belief that juror misconduct had occurred, and requested an evidentiary hearing. At a hearing ordered by the trial court, the juror testified that one of the two female jurors had revealed, immediately upon entering the jury room for deliberations, that she had been just like the victim in the case, and that she had already made up her mind. When asked to explain a few minutes later, she said "that was me at one time," referring to what the victim had experienced. The juror also testified that he and another juror agreed to find appellant guilty only after another juror indicated that this was probably appellant's first offense and that he would likely receive a light sentence. At the conclusion of the testimony and arguments, the trial court ruled that the alleged misconduct did not render the trial unfair and declined to pursue the matter further.
We find merit in appellant's first claim of juror misconduct. A prospective juror has a duty to answer fully and truthfully all questions asked during voir dire, "neither falsely stating any fact, nor concealing any material matter...." De La Rosa v. Zequeira, 659 So.2d 239, 241 (Fla.1995). Any juror who conceals a material fact that is relevant to the controversy is guilty of misconduct, and this misconduct is prejudicial to at least one of the parties, because it impairs his or her right to challenge the juror. See id. In this case, appellant made a prima facie showing of juror misconduct through the testimony of the juror at the post-trial hearing. Once a party shows that a juror concealed information during questioning that is relevant and material to serving on the jury in that case and that the non-disclosure was not caused by the party's own lack of diligence, inherent prejudice to the party is presumed, and the party is entitled to a new trial. See Lowrey v. State, 705 So.2d 1367 (Fla.1998); De La Rosa, supra. Here, "[i]t is abundantly clear from the transcript of the voir dire proceedings that no person sufficiently perceptive and alert to be qualified to act as a juror could have sat through voir dire without realizing that it was ... her duty to make known to the parties and the court" her own sexual abuse. Mobil Chemical Co. v. Hawkins, 440 So.2d 378, 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), review denied, 449 So.2d 264 (Fla.1984).
We find that the issue of alleged misconduct was preserved for review. The record shows that after the testimony by the juror was heard, the state argued that the misconduct did not meet the standard required for a new trial, but that if the court were going to consider the testimony in connection with the ...
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