Young v. State

• Decision Date: 15 December 1915
• Docket Number: (No. 3860.)
• Citation: 181 S.W. 472
• Parties: YOUNG v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 472

181 S.W. 472

YOUNG v. STATE.

(No. 3860.)

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

December 15, 1915.

Rehearing Denied January 12, 1916.

Appeal from Red River County Court; Geo. Morrison, Judge.

J. W. Young was convicted of unlawfully practicing medicine, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Travis T. Thompson, of Clarksville, for appellant. C. C. McDonald, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HARPER, J.

Appellant was convicted of unlawfully practicing medicine, and his punishment assessed at a fine of $175, from which judgment he prosecutes this appeal.

Appellant moved to quash the information and complaint because they did not allege that he had not recorded a certificate or diploma in the county of his residence. It is always better to follow the language of the statute, but this is not absolutely essential, if language of equivalent import and meaning is used. Mathews v. State, 36 Tex. 675; Fowler v. State, 38 Tex. 559; Caldwell v. State, 2 Tex. App. 53; Sansbury v. State, 4 Tex. App. 99; Bigham v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 244, 20 S. W. 577. The information and complaint in this case allege that appellant practiced medicine "without having first obtained from an authorized board of medical examiners a certificate of professional qualifications, and without having a diploma from some accredited medical college." If appellant had obtained a certificate or diploma and failed to record it in the county of his residence, he would be guilty, and if he had such certificate or diploma, it would be necessary to allege that he had not recorded it in the county of his residence before a conviction would be authorized. But when the information alleges he had never obtained a certificate or diploma, this language necessarily implies and charges that he had not recorded authority in the county of his residence. Article 462 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1895, provides:

"Words used in the statute to define an offense need not be strictly pursued in the indictment; it is sufficient to use other words conveying the same meaning, or which include the sense of the statutory words."

The court did not err in striking out the plea of former jeopardy or acquittal. This information alleges that on or about the 12th of March, 1915, and thence continuously up to the date of filing the complaint in this cause, which was April 27th, appellant did unlawfully engage in the practice of medicine, and did prescribe for and visit Mrs. Thad Pines, etc. This covered a specific time from March 12th to April 27th. The other information also covered a specific time, from May 10, 1915, to May 12, 1915, and alleged appellant engaged in the practice of medicine, and did treat one W. W. Prior. They were separate and distinct offenses alleged, and occurred at separate and distinct times. The state had to...