Young v. State
| Decision Date | 05 September 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 1178S273,1178S273 |
| Citation | 409 N.E.2d 579,274 Ind. 107 |
| Parties | Jerome YOUNG, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant (Appellant) was convicted of two counts of Armed Robbery and one count of Inflicting Physical Injury During the Commission of a Robbery. He was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty (20) years upon Count I Robbery and to life imprisonment upon Count III, Inflicting Injury. His direct appeal presents four issues, to-wit:
(1) Did the trial court err in overruling the defendant's motion in limine as to certain evidence and in subsequently admitting such evidence, over objection grounded upon a claim of irrelevance?
(2) Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the verdicts?
(3) Was the verdict on Count III contrary to law, as not being upon the offense charged?
(4) Did the trial court err in sentencing the defendant upon both Counts I and III?
The evidence adduced at trial and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom disclosed that the defendant and Kevin Hill entered the Quality Inn North Motel in Indianapolis at approximately 2:30 a. m. on July 1, 1977. They jumped over the Clerk's counter and the defendant demanded that the Clerk, Leslie Cherry, "give him all the money." Hill went to an office behind the counter and confronted Tom Schneider, a security guard for the Motel. Both the defendant and Hill were armed with sawed-off weapons. Schneider encountered Hill physically, disarmed him and restrained him but immediately released him under threat from the defendant that he would kill Cherry. Thereupon, Hill struck Schneider on the head with the barrel of the sawed-off shotgun and took Schneider's pistol from the desk where it lay. The defendant and Hill then fled with the Motel's money and Schneider's pistol. Schneider pursued and saw them enter a late model white Thunderbird automobile and drive away. Schneider looked for the automobile license number, but there was no license plate affixed to the vehicle at the customary place.
It is not the office of a motion in limine to obtain a final ruling upon the ultimate admissibility of evidence. Lagenour v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 441, 450, 376 N.E.2d 475. The Court's denial of defendant's motion in limine, therefore, is not here subject to our review. However, the evidence sought to be excluded was properly objected to at the time it was offered at trial and was admitted over such objection. The correctness of that ruling is here challenged and reaches the same issues presented by the limine motion.
The accomplice's home had been searched with his permission. The search produced several items which were admitted over the defendant's objection but they were irrelevant. These items were a hack saw, shotgun shells, twenty-two caliber rifle ammunition, a rifle stock and a portion of a twenty-two caliber rifle barrel.
Subsequent to the robbery, a stolen, white 1974 model Thunderbird automobile was found in the parking lot of the apartment complex where Hill resided. No regular license plate was affixed to it, but inside the rear window, a cardboard temporary dealer's plate was displayed. The cardboard license plate bore the defendant's fingerprints.
Paraphernalia taken from Hill's apartment was of the type utilized in the robbery. Its presence in Hill's home supported testimony that he was one of the robbers. Evidence that was relevant as to Hill was per se relevant as to the defendant, inasmuch as it was shown that the robbery was a joint undertaking.
The paper license plate was relevant because it connected Defendant to a vehicle that answered the description of the one employed in the robbery.
Relevance is the logical tendency to prove a material fact. The absence of a
direct link goes only to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. Lamar v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 689, 366 N.E.2d 652; Fultz v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 626, 358 N.E.2d 123. The defendant's argument that the exhibits were not sufficiently connected with him or to the crimes charged is without merit, as is the argument that Hill had been previously convicted and was not then on trial.
To support his claim that the evidence was insufficient as to the armed robbery conviction, Count I, Defendant contends that there was no evidence that he was armed and further argues that the Motel Clerk, Cherry, had made only an in-court identification of him. In so doing, Defendant fails to recognize that he is asking us to reweigh the evidence. Although Cherry testified that she saw only the barrel of the gun held in a paper sack by the defendant, in context this was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable man could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon. Likewise, that Cherry had been unable to identify the defendant from prior photographic displays went only to the weight of her in-court identification. On appeal, this Court will not weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Robinson v. State, (1976) 266 Ind. 604, 362 N.E.2d 1218, cert. den., (1977) 434 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 527, 54 L.Ed.2d 463. Only the evidence most favorable to the State and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom will be considered to determine if there existed sufficient evidence of probative value to support the determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Baum v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 421, 345 N.E.2d 831.
With respect to Defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient upon the charge of inflicting injury, Count III, the defendant points out that the evidence was that Hill, not he, injured the security guard and that their presence at the commission of a felony does not make one an accessory.
Cline et al. v. State, (1969) 253 Ind. 264, 267, 252 N.E.2d 793.
As to both Counts I and III, the defendant further argues that his alibi evidence was not...
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