Young v. State
| Decision Date | 08 December 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-97-00017-CR,06-97-00017-CR |
| Citation | 10 S.W.3d 705 |
| Parties | (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1999) MUHAMMAD LUTHARIUS YOUNG, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Date Submitted: |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 6th Judicial District Court Lamar County, Texas Trial Court No. 16491
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Before Cornelius, C.J., Grant and Ross, JJ.
O P I N I O N
Opinion by Justice GRANT.
Muhammad Lutharius Young was indicted for the attempted murder of Brad Hilliard. A jury found Young guilty and made an affirmative deadly weapon finding. The trial court assessed punishment at twenty years' imprisonment.
Upon original submission to this Court, Young contended that (1) the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction, and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction on the defense of necessity and for failing to object to inadmissible evidence. We reversed on the basis that Young received ineffective assistance of counsel because the evidence raised the defense of necessity and counsel failed to request an instruction.1 However, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that counsel's performance was not deficient in failing to request an instruction on necessity, and therefore reversed our judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion in Young v. State.2 Because we did not address Young's remaining contentions in our original opinion, we will do so below.
There is evidence that on August 1, 1996, Deputy Sheriff Scott Roebuck attempted to stop a vehicle after it failed to dim its headlights. Deputy Roebuck followed the car, and the driver pulled into the driveway and backyard of Don Hilliard's home. As the officer pulled up to the house, the driver of the car ran away. The remaining occupant of the car, Elijah Woods, identified the driver as Natharius or Lutharius. Deputy Roebuck looked for the driver, but could not find him. Brad Hilliard, Don Hilliard's son, drove up to the house. The deputy informed Brad Hilliard of the situation, and Brad led him inside to his father. Deputy Roebuck and the Hilliards then searched the home and surrounding buildings. Finding no one, the officer left.
Soon after the deputy's departure, the Hilliards saw Young walking down F.M. 79 near their home. Although the Hilliards had not been given a description of the driver, they assumed that Young was the suspect for whom the police were looking. Don and Brad Hilliard got into their truck, pulled onto F.M. 79, and came to a sudden stop directly behind Young. Don Hilliard, a 247-pound white male, jumped out of the truck and approached Young, a small black male. Don Hilliard twice ordered Young to get into the truck, and Young twice refused. Don Hilliard testified that he then told Young that he could do this the easy way or the hard way and thereby "verbally forced" Young into the truck. Young testified that Don Hilliard also physically forced him into the truck.
With Young in the cab of the truck, Don Hilliard initially drove the three men toward town. However, they soon changed directions and drove toward Lake Gibbons, where the Hilliards believed police officers to be. They then again changed directions after passing a police car going the other way. After the third change of direction, Young became more nervous and began asking repeatedly where they were going. The testimony is conflicting as to whether Don Hilliard told Young he was taking him to the police. Young demanded to be let out of the truck several times, but Don Hilliard refused. The Hilliards claim that Young then began to threaten them, told them to stop the car or he would rip out the transmission, said that he did not care about his life or their lives, and said that he would kill them all if they did not stop the truck and let him out. Don Hilliard testified that Young then put his foot on the gas pedal and grabbed the steering wheel. Testifying to the contrary, Young said he was afraid for his life and that he only reached for the driver's door in an attempt to get out of the truck. The truck veered off the road to the right, hitting a ditch, a culvert, another truck, and finally gasoline pumps at a nearby grocery store. When Young got out of the truck, he ran from the Hilliards and flagged a police officer. All three men were taken to local hospitals.
Approximately one month after the incident, on August 26, 1996, Young was arrested and charged with attempted murder. Young was appointed legal counsel in late October, but Young's original counsel withdrew, and on February 7, 1997, new counsel was appointed. On February 24, voir dire began, and two days later a jury convicted Young for the attempted murder of Brad Hilliard.
In his first point of error, Young contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction for attempted murder. Specifically, Young points out that he was forced to get into a truck with two strangers, and that despite several pleas, they refused to release him. Considering the circumstances, Young contends that the evidence only showed his fear and confusion and did not show that he formed the specific intent to kill Brad Hilliard.
A person commits the offense of attempted murder if, with the specific intent to cause the death of an individual, he does an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the death of the individual.3 A specific intent to kill is a necessary element of attempted murder.4
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.5 We will not disregard, realign, or reweigh the evidence.6. The trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight given their testimony.7 The trier of fact may believe or disbelieve any portion of the testimony.8 It is the jury's prerogative to choose between conflicting inferences raised by the evidence.9
In conducting a factual sufficiency review of the evidence, we view all of the evidence, though not in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The verdict is to be set aside only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust.10 Due deference must be given to the jury's assessment of the witnesses' credibility and their resolution of any conflicts in the evidence.11
According to Don Hilliard's testimony, Young told the Hilliards that he would kill them all if they did not let him out of the truck. Young pushed the gas pedal to the floor and put his arm through the steering wheel so that "it looked like he tried to crawl under there because he pulled on the steering wheel with his head going underneath the dashboard." As a result, the truck veered off the road to the right, although Don Hilliard tried to turn the steering wheel back to the left as hard as he could. Brad Hilliard testified to a similar version of the events. However, Brad Hilliard did not see Young step on the gas pedal or grab the steering wheel, but he did see Young with his left arm through the steering wheel after the truck left the road and hit a ditch.
On the other hand, Young testified to a different version of the events. Young denied threatening the Hilliards, pushing the gas pedal to the floor, and hanging his elbow through the steering wheel. Young further denied that he intended to hurt either of the Hilliards. He testified that he was just thinking about getting away from them because he believed his life was in danger. Young testified that he did not know where the Hilliards were taking him, and when he asked, Don Hilliard told him to shut up. After they changed directions for the third time, Young began to panic and repeatedly demanded to be let out of the truck. Don Hilliard refused to release him, so Young reached over to open the driver's door with the intent to jump out of the truck. When Don Hilliard tried to stop Young from opening the door, a struggle ensued and the truck ran off the road as a result. After the wreck, Young ran away from the Hilliards and flagged an officer. The officer also testified that Young flagged him.
Tim Ray, a trooper with the Department of Public Safety for seventeen years, testified that he had investigated hundreds of motor vehicle incidents resulting in death or serious bodily injury. In Trooper Ray's opinion, there was a force being exerted that kept the driver from correcting the truck's path to the left, such as someone grabbing and hanging onto the steering wheel. The Hilliards' truck went in a fairly straight line after it left the road, despite hitting a ditch, a parked truck, and jumping a culvert. He testified that if two people were fighting, as Young claimed, and there was no resistance on the steering wheel, the truck would not have traveled in a straight line, for the slightest thing would have turned the wheel.
When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury, as the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony, could have found that Young had the specific intent to kill Brad Hilliard. The testimony of Trooper Ray, and Don and Brad Hilliard provided evidence that Young acted with the specific intent to kill. Moreover, when viewing all of the evidence, the verdict is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust. The jury could have properly chosen to believe Trooper Ray, and Don and Brad Hilliard, and to disbelieve Young's version of events. Therefore, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support Young's conviction. This point of error is overruled.
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