Young v. Sterling Leather Works

• Decision Date: 19 November 1917
• Docket Number: No. 100.,100.
• Citation: 102 A. 395,91 N.J.Law 289
• Parties: YOUNG. v. STERLING LEATHER WORKS.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

102 A. 395

91 N.J.Law 289

YOUNG.

v. STERLING LEATHER WORKS.

No. 100.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 19, 1917.

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Suit by Edward Young, by Marguerite Young, his next friend, against the Sterling Leather Works, a corporation. Prom a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Judgment affirmed.

See, also, 96 Atl. 1016.

John V. Laddey, of Newark, for appellant.

Kalisch & Kalisch and Isidor Kalisch, all of Newark, for appellee.

KALISCH, J. The plaintiff below, a minor, sued the defendant below, in the Supreme Court, to recover damages for injuries sustained by the former while in the employment of the defendant, and through the defendant's negligence. Judgment was entered for the defendant, and from that judgment the plaintiff appeals to this court.

The written stipulation entered into by counsel for the respective parlies, as appears of record, embraces the facts which present the legal questions for decision, the facts being, in substance, as follows: Edward Young, the plaintiff, at the age of 15 years, entered into the employment of the defendant, after the Workmen's Compensation Act became effective. No notice was given to or by the plaintiff, or by or to the parent or guardian of the plaintiff, to the effect that the provisions of section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act were not intended to apply. The plaintiff's mother, his only parent, with whom he lived, knew of his working at the defendant's leather manufacturing plant. She saw some of his pay envelopes and saw him at the defendant's plnnt on one or two occasions. At the time the plaintiff sustained his injury he was 16 years old. The accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. The accident was caused by the negligence of the defendant, in the absence of willful negligence on part of the plaintiff.

Counsel for respondent contends that upon the foregoing facts the plaintiff was precluded from bringing and maintaining his action at law against the defendant, but was required to proceed under section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as directed by that act, in order to recover compensation for an injury received arising out of and in the course of his employment.

Counsel for the appellant contends, first, that the title of the Workmen's Compensation Act is in violation of article 4, § 7, par. 4, of the Constitution of New Jersey; second, that the act is unconstitutional in so far as its provisions are attempted to be enforced against minors; third, that even though the act is constitutional as to minors, the minor may disaffirm the statutory contract or obligation, at will.

The general features of the act were impugned as unconstitutional in Sexton v. Newark Dist. Tel. Co., 84 N. J. Law, 85, 86 Atl. 451, in the Supreme Court, and there held to be constitutional, which judgment was affirmed by this court in 86 N. J. Law, 701, 91 Atl. 1070.

The question as to the validity of the act because of infirmity in its title was not raised or decided in the Sexton Case. The title of the act reads:

"An act prescribing the liability of an employer to make compensation for injuries received by an employe in the course of employment: establishing an elective schedule of compensation and regulating the procedure for the determination of liability and compensation therefor."

Counsel for appellant contends that the above title is violative of that clause of the Constitution declaring that "every law shall embrace but one object and that that shall be expressed in the title." The basis of attack upon the validity of the title is:

"That the act in question, so far from prescribing the liability of an employer to make compensation for injuries received by an employe, in the case of a minor, seeks to bind him without any election on his part, which is not the object which the act designs to fulfill and is not expressed in the title."

This objection is wholly unsubstantial. There is no provision in the act which seeks to bind a minor without his election. The act prescribes how that election may be lawfully exercised in the case of a minor. The term "employe," in the title of the act, includes minors as well as adults.

It is clear, therefore, that the subject of minor employes is germane to the general object of the act. It would be giving an absurd construction to the constitutional provisions invoked to require that a mention of the design of each provision of an act, constituting a constituent part of the whole, should appear in the title. This would not only lead to titles of confusing lengths, but also to useless repetitions. On this topic, In re Haynes, 54 N. J. Law, 6, on page 24, 22 Atl. 923, 924, Beasley, C. J., said:

"It has always been held that these statutory titles, with regard to their construction, are to be liberally treated, so as to validate the law to which they appertain, if such course be reasonably practicable. In such a connection hyper-criticism is utterly out of place, the only requirement being that the title of the statute shall express its object in a general way so as to be intelligible to the ordinary reader."

And in Quigley v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 80 N. J. Law, 486, 490, 79 Atl. 458, 460, Gummere, C. J., speaking for the Supreme Court, says:

"It is not necessary that the particular cases to which the act is entitled to apply should he set out in the title. The constitutional provision only requires that the title of the statute shall express its object in a general way, so as to be intelligible to the ordinary reader * * * not that it shall be an index or abstract of the contents thereof."

And on page 492 of SO N. J. Law, on page 461 of 79 Atl., he says:

"Matters which are not foreign to the object of a statute, but are manifestly cognate to it, need not be expressly mentioned in the title." Warner v. Hoagland, 51 N. J. Law, 62, 10 Atl. 166; Boorum v. Connelly, 66 N. J. Law, 197, 48 Atl. 955, 88 Am. St. Rep. 469.

Counsel for appellant further contends that paragraph 9, of section 2 of the act, is unconstitutional, in that the measure of protection accorded by the act to adults is denied to minors.

Paragraph 9 reads:

"Every contract of hiring made subsequent to the time provided for this act to take effect shall be presumed to have been made with reference to the provisions of section 2 of this act, and unless there be as a part of such contract an express statement in writing, prior to any accident, either in the contract itself or by written notice from either party to the other, that the provisions of section 2 of this act are not intended to apply, then it shall be presumed that the parties have accepted the provisions of section 2 of this act and have agreed to be bound thereby. in the employment of minora, section 2 shail be presumed to apply unless the...