Young v. Superior Court of Solano Cnty.
| Citation | 79 Cal.App.5th 138,294 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 |
| Decision Date | 26 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | A162850 |
| Parties | Clemon YOUNG, Jr., Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SOLANO COUNTY, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
Courtney Reed, Deputy Alternate Public Defender, Solano County Office of the Alternate Defender, for Petitioner.
Cooley and Randall R. Lee for Ash Kalra, California State Assemblymember, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Mary K. McComb, State Public Defender, Elizabeth Eng, Deputy State Public Defender, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
Emi MacLean, Grayce Zelphin, and Shilpi Agarwal, for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California and Equal Justice Society, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit and Bridget Billeter, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.
Under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1) (the Racial Justice Act or the Act), "[t]he state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin." ( Pen. Code,1 § 745, subd. (a).) We are called upon in this writ proceeding to address as a matter of first impression the discovery provision of the Racial Justice Act, which allows a defendant, "[u]pon a showing of good cause," to obtain evidence from the prosecution relevant to a potential violation of the Act. ( § 745, subd. (d).)
Based on evidence presented at his preliminary hearing, Young argued below that racial profiling in a traffic stop led to his arrest for the offense of possession of Ecstasy for sale. He also pointed to publicly available statistics showing that, statewide, blacks are more likely to be searched during the course of traffic stops than other citizens. On this showing, he brought a motion under the Racial Justice Act seeking discovery relating to charging decisions in cases he claims are comparable to his. For the past five years, he sought the names and case numbers of others who were charged with or could have been charged with possession of Ecstasy for sale; the same information for a broad range of related drug offenses; the police reports relating to the suspects involved and their criminal histories; and the dispositions in all of these cases. Upon compelled disclosure of this information, Young wishes to show that the District Attorney "has more frequently charged Black defendants like Mr. Young, Jr. with possession for sale" than defendants of other races. (See § 745, subd. (a)(3).)
Proceeding cautiously and noting the lack of available appellate precedent to guide its application of section 745, subdivision (d), the trial court denied the motion. The court's only articulated reason for the denial was that Young's good cause showing appeared to rest on nothing more than his race. Before us, on writ review, the Attorney General reiterates this rationale, though in slightly different form. He argues that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, since Young's race is the only "logical link" between, on the one hand, the allegation of racial profiling (a charge he claims is pertinent to whether there was a violation of section 745, subdivision (a)(1) ), and on the other hand, the allegation of racially biased prosecution (a charge he claims is pertinent to whether there was a violation of section 745, subdivision (a)(3) ), good cause for discovery relating to prosecutorial bias is lacking.
We will disagree, vacate the denial order, and remand with directions. The trial court's reason for denying Young's motion was incorrect as a factual matter. The grounds for the motion went beyond "simply" Young's race, and the Attorney General's reformulation of that mistaken premise, to the extent his "logical link" argument has any bearing on good cause, goes to the breadth and scope of allowable discovery, not to whether discovery should be allowed at all. Borrowing from the minimal threshold showing that is required to trigger an obligation to provide so-called Pitchess discovery ( Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b) ; see Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305 ), we hold that Young may claim entitlement to discovery under section 745, subdivision (d) if he makes a plausible case, based on specific facts, that any of the four enumerated violations of section 745, subdivision (a) could or might have occurred. ( § 745, subd. (a)(1)–(4).)
But a showing of plausible justification is merely a threshold consideration. "The trial court, in deciding whether the defendant shall be permitted to obtain discovery of the requested material, must consider and balance a number of [other] factors" ( City of Alhambra v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1118, 1134, 252 Cal.Rptr. 789 ( Alhambra )), "[s]pecifically ... (1) whether the material requested is adequately described, (2) whether the requested material is reasonably available to the governmental entity from which it is sought (and not readily available to the defendant from other sources), (3) whether production of the records containing the requested information would violate (i) third party confidentiality or privacy rights or (ii) any protected governmental interest, (4) whether the defendant has acted in a timely manner, (5) whether the time required to produce the requested information will necessitate an unreasonable delay of defendant's trial, [and] (6) whether the production of the records containing the requested information would place an unreasonable burden on the governmental entity involved" ( ibid. , fn. omitted).
Whether Young can satisfy this multifactor test of good cause remains to be seen. We decline his invitation to reverse outright and issue a writ directing the entry of an order granting his discovery requests as framed. Instead, we vacate the order denying discovery and direct the trial court to give Young's motion further consideration. While we provide some general guidance, we leave to the trial court the specific application of the plausible justification standard we adopt here, taking other pertinent factors into account. Described broadly, the court's task will be to engage in a discretionary weighing of the strength of Young's factual showing, the potential probative value of the information he seeks, and the burdens of gathering the requested "records or information" for disclosure. ( § 745, subd. (d).) Should the court conclude that discovery is warranted, we can say no more at this point than that the scope of compelled discovery must be tailored to demonstrated need.
In August 2019, the People filed a felony complaint charging Young with possession of a controlled substance (Ecstasy) for sale ( Health & Saf. Code, § 11378 ).
In May 2021, Young filed a motion to "compel disclosure of relevant data" pursuant to the Racial Justice Act. The motion sought disclosures relevant to whether the People's decision to charge him with felony possession of a controlled substance was based on his race in violation of section 745, subdivision (a)(3) of the Racial Justice Act. Specifically, it requested the following categories of information:
In order to establish good cause for this information, Young cited statewide data showing that black drivers are more likely than drivers of other races to be subject to a police traffic stop and vehicle search. Young also pointed to the circumstances of the traffic stop leading to his arrest, which, according to him, had the hallmarks of racial profiling—a pretextual traffic stop for an infraction, the use of excessive, unprovoked force, and a search of his entire car.
Centering his discovery motion on alleged racial profiling in connection with his arrest, Young argued that his subsequent prosecution was likely tainted by racial discrimination as well. The Solano County District Attorney opposed the motion, arguing there was no showing of good cause for the requested disclosures. The district attorney claimed that the treatment of black motorists in general by law enforcement has no bearing on the charging decision in Young's case. According to the district attorney, Young bore the burden of showing that prosecutorial discretion was exercised with intentional and invidious discrimination in his particular case, and no such showing was made.
The trial court denied Young's motion. The court explained it was ...
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