Young v. Thota
| Decision Date | 20 November 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-05-350-CV.,2-05-350-CV. |
| Citation | 271 S.W.3d 822 |
| Parties | Margaret YOUNG, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of William R. Young, Appellant, v. Venkateswarlu THOTA, M.D. and North Texas Cardiology Center, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Doug Perrin and J. Mark Perrin, The Perrin Law Firm, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Appellant.
J. Wade Birdwell, D. Michael Wallach and Jennifer M. Andrews, Wallach & Andrews, P.C., Fort Worth, TX, for Appellee.
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, GARDNER, and MCCOY, JJ.
Appellant Margaret Young, individually and on behalf of the estate of her deceased husband, William R. ("Ronnie") Young, appeals from an adverse jury verdict on her medical malpractice claim against Venkateswarlu Thota, M.D. and his employer, North Texas Cardiology Center (NTCC), in connection with their treatment during Ronnie's cardiac catheterization. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Appellant is Ronnie's widow. Ronnie died on March 10, 2005. Ronnie had suffered from a blood disorder called Polycythemia Vera (PV) and coronary artery disease, including hypertension and angina. His cardiologist, Dr. Thota, with NTCC (collectively "appellees"), recommended that Ronnie undergo a cardiac catheterization to evaluate his heart condition. The catheterization was scheduled for March 4, 2002 at United Regional Health Care System in Wichita Falls, Texas. Dr. Thota performed the procedure that morning, and Ronnie was discharged that afternoon. At the time, Ronnie was fifty-five years of age.
After Ronnie began feeling poorly at home and fell from his chair around 11:45 p.m., appellant called 911, and Ronnie returned to the hospital's emergency room around 1:15 a.m. Olyn Walker, M.D. ultimately operated on Ronnie that night to repair a tear in his iliac artery and the resulting internal bleeding allegedly caused by the catheterization procedure. During the emergency surgery, Dr. Walker discovered a large hematoma from severe bleeding in the peritoneal cavity. After the surgery, Ronnie was placed on a ventilator, suffered acute renal failure that required dialysis, received multiple blood transfusions, underwent a splenectomy, and underwent surgery to remove his gallbladder once it became gangrenous due to ischemia caused by the bleed. He ultimately lost vision in one eye and suffered numerous strokes and blood clots, all allegedly as a result of the negligent catheterization. Ronnie stayed in the hospital in Wichita Falls for two months and later transferred to Baylor University Medical Center (BUMC) in Dallas, Texas, on May 2, 2002. While at BUMC, he was diagnosed with and treated for thrombocytosis, sepsis, respiratory failure, depression, malnourishment, gout, deep vein thrombosis, and portal vein thrombosis. When he left BUMC, he went to Baylor Specialty Hospital for rehabilitation for an additional two months. Ronnie died on March 10, 2005, about three years after the original procedure, at the age of fifty-eight.
After Ronnie died, appellant brought suit individually and on behalf of his estate against Dr. Thota and NTCC.1 Appellant alleged appellees were negligent in failing to obtain an accurate medical history on Ronnie, in failing to take into consideration any of Ronnie's pre-existing conditions that might have exacerbated potential complications, in failing to properly locate the femoral artery and lacerating the right iliac artery instead during the catheterization, in failing to discover the laceration before discharging Ronnie, and in failing to properly diagnose and treat the tear.
In response, appellees contended that Ronnie's injuries were the result of an unavoidable accident; in other words, they were no one's fault. Alternatively, they contended that his injuries were the result of a new and independent cause or the result of pre-existing conditions or subsequent conditions. Appellees also contended that the occurrence was the result of Ronnie's comparative negligence under chapter 33 of the civil practices and remedies code and asserted a counterclaim against Ronnie for contribution and for his alleged failure to mitigate his damages. Appellees' defenses and counterclaims generally focused on their claims that Ronnie's injuries were a result of his pre-existing conditions, as well as Ronnie's failure to follow his discharge instructions.
The trial court submitted issues on appellees' negligence and Ronnie's contributory negligence and further gave the jury inferential rebuttal instructions on new and independent cause and unavoidable accident.2 In a ten to two verdict, the jury found that only Ronnie was negligent and awarded neither Ronnie's estate nor appellant any damages.
In four issues, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's answers to Question One, complains that the trial court erred by submitting Ronnie's contributory negligence to the jury within this question, and contends that the trial court erred by submitting jury instructions on unavoidable accident and new and independent cause.
First, we address those issues claiming jury charge error. We address the propriety of the trial court's charge regarding Ronnie's contributory negligence first because that issue is potentially dispositive of the appeal and could give appellant the greatest relief. See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1; see generally VanDevender v. Woods, 222 S.W.3d 430, 433 n. 9 (Tex.2007); West v. Robinson, 180 S.W.3d 575, 576-77 (Tex. 2005); Profitlive P'ship v. Surber, 248 S.W.3d 259, 262 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); id. at 263 (Walker, J., concurring and dissenting).
Rule 277 requires a trial court, whenever feasible, to submit a cause in broad-form questions. Tex.R. Civ. P. 277. Rule 278 requires a court to submit instructions and definitions to the jury as are necessary to enable the jury to render a verdict. Tex.R. Civ. P. 278; Goose Creek Consol. ISD v. Jarrar's Plumbing, Inc., 74 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pets. denied). Inferential rebuttal questions are not to be submitted to a jury; only instructions and definitions may be given. Tex.R. Civ. P. 277. We review claimed jury charge error for an abuse of discretion. In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex.2000); Goose Creek, 74 S.W.3d at 499; see also Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex.1990). If the pleadings and evidence raise the issue, a party is entitled to a jury question, instruction, or definition on the matter. Tex.R. Civ. P. 278; Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Williams, 85 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Tex.2002).
In her issues, appellant focuses on charge error that she claims occurred in the first jury question and the challenged definitions. Question One asked, as to both appellee, Dr. Thota, and Ronnie:
Did the negligence, if any, of those named below, proximately cause the injury in question, if any?
"Negligence," when used with respect to the conduct of Venkat Thota, M.D., means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a cardiologist of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a cardiologist of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.
"Ordinary care," when used with respect to the conduct of Venkat Thota, M.D., means that degree of care that a cardiologist of ordinary prudence would use under the same or similar circumstances.
"Proximate Cause" when used with respect to the conduct of Venkat Thota, M.D., means that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any new and independent cause, produces an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a cardiologist using ordinary care would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.
"New and independent cause," when used with respect to the conduct of Venkat Thota, M.D., means the act or omission of a separate and independent agency, not reasonably foreseeable by a cardiologist exercising ordinary care, that destroys the causal connection, if any, between the act or omission inquired about and the injury in question and thereby becomes the immediate cause of such injury.
"Negligence," when used with respect to the conduct of [Ronnie] Young means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.
"Ordinary care," when used with respect to the conduct of [Ronnie] Young means that degree of care that a person of ordinary prudence would use under the same or similar circumstances.
"Proximate cause," when used with respect to the conduct of [Ronnie] Young means that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, produces an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using ordinary care would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.
An injury may be an "unavoidable accident," that is, an event not proximately caused by the negligence of any party to it.
Answer "Yes" or "No".
Venkat Thota, M.D.: [NO]
[Ronnie] Young: [YES]
[Emphasis added.]
The next jury question conditionally asked about Dr. Thota's and Ronnie's comparative (percentage) negligence but was not answered because of the jury's answer to the first question.
In part of her second...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Chesser v. Lifecare Mgmt. Servs. L.L.C.
...472 (Tex.1995) (quoting Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Bailey, 151 Tex. 359, 250 S.W.2d 379, 385 (1952)); Young v. Thota, 271 S.W.3d 822, 836–37 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied). The purpose of an unavoidable-accident instruction is to advise the jurors, in the appropriate case, that t......
-
Thomas v. Uzoka
..."merely increase[d] or add[ed] to the extent of the loss or injury occasioned by another's negligence." See Young v. Thota, 271 S.W.3d 822, 829 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. filed) (quoting Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex.1992)). Therefore, under a traditional common-law analysi......
-
Vien v. Mark
...proof on this issue and must show the extent to which damages were increased by the failure to mitigate. Young v. Thota, 271 S.W.3d 822, 830 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied); see Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Miller, 274 S.W.3d 779, 788 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.). The court ......
-
Vien v. Mark
...proof on this issue and must show the extent to which damages were increased by the failure to mitigate. Young v. Thota, 271 S.W.3d 822, 830 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied); see Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Miller, 274 S.W.3d 779, 788 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.). The court ......
-
Frequent Evidentiary Battles
...painted, this issue was not in contention, and thus no exception to the subsequent remedial measures rule was permitted. Young v. Thota , 271 S.W.3d 822, 829-30 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 366 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. 2012). An injured person may not recover damages that co......