Young v. Travelers Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 26 December 1933 |
Docket Number | No. 887.,887. |
Citation | 68 F.2d 83 |
Parties | YOUNG v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Philip Kates, of Tulsa, Okl., for appellant.
Richard K. Bridges, of Tulsa, Okl. (H. W. Randolph, John A. Haver, Randolph Shirk, and Randolph, Haver, Shirk & Bridges, all of Tulsa, Okl., of counsel, on the brief), for appellee.
Before LEWIS and BRATTON, Circuit Judges, and SYMES, District Judge.
This action is on a policy issued by appellee to Orlando Halliburton insuring his life against loss in the sum of $7,500 resulting from bodily injuries, effected directly and independently of all other causes through accidental means. Suicide, sane or insane, is excepted from the risk. Appellant is the sister of the insured, and she was named as beneficiary. The complaint charges that insured on the afternoon of October 14, 1931, died as a result of an accidental fall from a window on the seventh floor of the Mincks Hotel in the city of Tulsa. The answer denies that insured's death was accidental, and alleges suicide. That is the only issue.
In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hatten (C. C. A. 8) 17 F.(2d) 889, 890, the court, after stating that the burden was on plaintiff to show accidental death, said:
See, also, Frankel v. New York Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 10) 51 F.(2d) 933; Wirthlin v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 10) 56 F. (2d) 137, 86 A. L. R. 138.
On the first trial plaintiff recovered. The second trial resulted in a verdict for defendant. When the second trial came on it was shown by defendant that one of its witnesses who testified at the first trial resided in the state of Texas more than 200 miles from Tulsa, Oklahoma, where the case was pending; that the witness had promised to attend the trial and defendant had sent him $100 to defray his expenses, but that he was then detained in jail in Texas charged with the commission of a felony and was, therefore, unable to be present; whereupon defendant asked the court to continue the cause until his evidence could be taken or permit the defendant to introduce the testimony of the witness given at the first trial which had been preserved in stenographic form by the court reporter. The court denied the continuance and permitted the introduction of the testimony given at the first trial by the witness. This is assigned as error.
The question has had consideration, but the adjudications are not in harmony. The Eighth Circuit in Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Myers (C. C. A.) 80 F. 361, held that evidence so taken was admissible on second trial where the witness is beyond the reach of process and his personal attendance could not be secured. The same court in Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 F. 457, on further consideration concluded that the statute on the subject, there reviewed, prohibited the admission of evidence so taken. This was followed by that court in Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. Allen, 137 F. 705, and Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Newsome, 174 F. 394.
The same question was ruled on in Toledo Traction Co. v. Cameron (C. C. A.) 137 F. 48, 59, by the Sixth Circuit. Judge Severens, who wrote the opinion in that case, convinces us that evidence so taken, under the facts in this case, is admissible; that the first section of the statute (R. S. § 861, U. S. Code, title 28, § 635 28 USCA § 635) was intended only as a broad declaration of the common law rule; and that the exceptions noted in that section by reference were additional modes for taking evidence not within the common law rule. He said:
He then points out the admissibility of such evidence at common law, citing thereto: 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 163; Wharton on Evidence, §§ 177, 178. See, also, Wigmore on Evidence (2d Ed.) § 1413, note 1; Smythe v. Inhabitants of New Providence Tp. (C. C. A. 3) 263 F. 481; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Ennis (C. C. A. 9) 236 F. 17. Clearly the opinion of the Supreme Court in Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713, 5 S. Ct. 724, 28 L. Ed. 1117, chiefly relied on by the Eighth Circuit, dealt with a witness (a party to the cause) who resided within the jurisdiction of the court, and there was no reason why the general rule of procedure at common law declared by the statute supra should not be followed.
Appellant also excepted to a portion of the court's charge to the jury relative in part to the testimony of the absent witness wherein the court said:
In taking exception appellant's counsel said:
"I want to except to that portion of the instructions on Graham's testimony that he jumped, or ask the court to explain it by an instruction on his testimony on cross examination that he was unable to state whether he jumped or not."
To the exception and request the court responded:
There was other discussion relative to this part of the court's instructions. It is true, as the court stated, that the witness testified he saw the insured jump from a window on the seventh floor of the Mincks Hotel, in his direct examination, but the witness with equal positiveness stated more than once on cross examination that he did not see insured jump. The window of insured's room was about eighty feet above the sidewalk. Graham came up in a car and parked it across the street from the hotel. He testified he looked up at the hotel, Later he said on cross examination, "the screen was out." This testimony was not only self-contradictory on the question whether insured jumped but also on other material points. Immediately after the tragedy the hotel proprietor examined the room and the screen in the window was up. Graham did not testify that insured stood on the window sill. At different times he said...
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