Young v. Travelers' Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 March 1888
• Parties: YOUNG v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

13 A. 896

80 Me. 244

YOUNG

v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO.¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 8, 1888.

Motion and exceptions from supreme judicial court, Penobscot county.

Action to recover indemnity under an accident policy of insurance. The verdict was in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant alleged exceptions and filed a motion for new trial. The opinion states the facts.

Chas. P. Stetson, for plaintiff. F. H. Appleton and H. R. Chaplin, for defendant.

LIBBEY, J. The plaintiff seeks to recover on an accident insurance policy issued to him by the defendant corporation. The main questions involved are (1) whether the plaintiff by the accident to him was wholly disabled and prevented from the prosecution of any and every kind of business pertaining to the occupation under which he was insured; (2) whether he gave the notice and furnished the proof required by the policy to give him a right of action. The language of the policy upon which the first question arises is as follows: If the insured, "at any time within the continuance of this policy, shall have sustained bodily injuries effected through external, violent, and accidental means, within the intent and meaning of this contract and the conditions hereunto annexed, and such injuries alone shall have occasioned death within ninety days from the happening thereof; or if the insured shall sustain bodily injuries, by means as aforesaid, which shall, independently of all other causes, immediately and wholly disable and prevent him from the prosecution of any and every kind of business pertaining to the occupation under which he is insured, then, on satisfactory proof of such injuries, he shall be indemnified against loss of time thereby, in a sum not exceeding twenty-five dollars per week, for such period of continuous total disability as shall immediately follow the accident and injuries as aforesaid, not exceeding, however, twenty-six consecutive weeks from the time of the happening of such accident." The occupation under which the plaintiff was insured was that of a billiard-saloon keeper. The contention between the parties is whether, to maintain his action, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that the injuries he sustained by the accident wholly disabled him from the doing of any and every kind of act necessary to be done in the prosecution of his business, or it is sufficient if he proves that the injury received from the accident wholly disabled him from the doing of all substantial and material acts necessary to be done in the prosecution of his business. The plaintiff admitted that he could do some acts necessary to be done in the business of billiard-saloon keeper, but claimed, and introduced evidence tending to prove, that he was wholly disabled from doing many of the material acts necessary to be done in that business. Upon this point the presiding justice instructed the jury as follows: "Now, the reasonable construction which must be put upon the language here used is that it must have meant that, if the plaintiff was so disabled as to be incapable of doing any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation as a billiard-saloon keeper, then he would be wholly disabled from the prosecution of every kind of business pertaining to such occupation, and entitled to the stipulated compensation. Otherwise, if he was not so disabled he would not be entitled; and therefore, gentlemen, I instruct you as matter of law that the meaning of the language here used is, not that he must be so disabled as to prevent him from doing anything whatsoever pertaining to his occupation, or any part of his business pertaining to his occupation, as billiard-saloon keeper, but that he must be so disabled as to prevent him from doing any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation. There may be a difference between being able to perform any part of his business, and any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation."

We think that there is no error in this instruction. A contract of insurance is to receive a reasonable construction, so as to effectuate the purpose for which it was made. In cases of doubt it is to be liberally construed in favor of the insured, that in all proper cases he may receive the indemnity contracted for. At the same time legal effect should be given to all the language used, for the purpose of guarding the company against fraud and imposture. The object to be accomplished by this contract was indemnity to the plaintiff for loss of time from being wholly disabled from prosecuting his business by an injury received as specified in the policy. He was not able to prosecute his business unless he was able to do all the substantial acts necessary to be done in its prosecution. If the prosecution of the business required...