Young v. Young
| Decision Date | 08 May 1953 |
| Citation | 65 So.2d 28 |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
| Parties | YOUNG v. YOUNG. |
Robert H. Givens, Jr., Miami, for appellant.
Angus M. Stephens, Jr., and William W. Bailey, Miami, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a final decree of the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, dated May 19, 1952. It is contended by appellant that the learned Chancellor erred in granting a decree of divorce in favor of the appellee and in setting aside an order entered May 28, 1951, which, so it is argued was a final judgment. This order which appellant insists is a final judgment reads as follows:
'This Cause coming on to be heard before me and the Court having been fully advised in the premises, and it appearing to the Court that the plaintiff is in default to the defendant in payments theretofore ordered by this Court under the terms of an Order dated October 27, 1950, in the amount of $840.00, and it appearing that the plaintiff has made no effort to pay the same, it is thereupon
'Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the defendant herein Ruth Elizabeth Young, do recover of and from the plaintiff herein, Franklin K. Young, the sum of $840.00, representing payments in arrears through May 25, 1951.
'Done and Ordered this 28th day of May A.D. 1951.
/s/ J. N. Morris,
Circuit Judge.'
In connection with appellant's contention that the evidence was not sufficient to justify the entry of the divorce decree, we are constrained to the view, and must hold, that there is in the transcript of testimony competent substantial evidence which sustains the finding of the Chancellor that the appellee was entitled to a decree of divorce.
The contention is made that the order of May 28, 1951, was a final judgment for the payment of money and that since no appeal was taken therefrom within 60 days from and after the entry thereof the judgment became absolute and that the Chancellor was without jurisdiction thereafter to set it aside.
Counsel for appellant asserts unequivocally that the order bearing date of May 28, 1951, was not an interlocutory order but was a final judgment. He states 'There is nothing whatever in that judgment to suggest that it is an interlocutory decree or that it might be subject to modification or revocation, or that a final decree had not yet been entered.' We cannot agree with this contention for several reasons. In the first place, the so-called final judgment shows on its face that it was entered upon the default of appellee to make payments to appellant as ordered by the Chancellor 'under the terms...
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Dent v. Dent, 2D03-699.
...authority over interlocutory orders and may change, modify or set aside such orders until the entry of a final judgment. Young v. Young, 65 So.2d 28 (Fla.1953); Whitaker v. Wright, 100 Fla. 282, 129 So. 889 (1930); Stock, 693 So.2d at 1086; Danner v. Danner, 206 So.2d 650 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)......
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Wayno v. Wayno, 5D99-303.
...opinion. A trial judge has inherent authority to alter or rescind interlocutory orders prior to entry of final judgment. Young v. Young, 65 So.2d 28 (Fla.1953); Whitaker v. Wright, 100 Fla. 282, 129 So. 889 (1930). This authority certainly extends to a court's interlocutory approval of an a......
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Burton v. Burton
...in default from the payment of all accrued installments of temporary alimony. Duss v. Duss, 1926, 92 Fla. 1081, 111 So. 382; Young v. Young, Fla.1953, 65 So.2d 28. It follows that the trial court also had power to order a reduction prospectively of temporary alimony, even though the defenda......
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Posner v. Posner, 67-632
...lost jurisdiction to so act. See Mitchell v. Mason, 90 Fla. 201, 106 So. 430; Duss v. Duss, 92 Fla. 1081, 111 So. 382, 384; Young v. Young, Fla.1953, 65 So.2d 28, 29. The decisions which hold that when a final judgment in a divorce suit contains an allowance for alimony and child support wi......