Young v. Young, 3832
| Decision Date | 24 July 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 3832,3832 |
| Citation | 472 P.2d 784 |
| Parties | William Richard YOUNG, Appellant (Defendant below), v. Melba B. YOUNG, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Donald E. Chapin, Casper, for appellant.
George M. Apostolos, of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Barton & Massey, Casper, for appellee.
Before GRAY, C. J., and McINTYRE, PARKER, and McEWAN, JJ.
The defendant in a divorce action, William Richard Young, questions the property settlement and alimony provision which was made by the district court. The plaintiff and appellee is the wife, Melba B. Young.
Appellant does not attack the divorce itself. The only assignments of error asserted on appeal are:
1. That the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the assets of the parties; and 2. That the awarding of alimony to the plaintiff was in derogation of applicable law.
Appellant states in his brief that he is fully cognizant of the decision of this court in marital cases and of our adherence to the principles set forth by Justice Kimball in Lovejoy v. Lovejoy, 36 Wyo. 379, 256 P. 76, 79. It is therefore conceded in this case, as it was conceded in the Lovejoy case, that:
1. In making a division of property under the statute the trial court exercises a discretion.
2. There are no hard and fast rules to control the trial court's action.
3. The statute does not require an equal division; and a just and equitable division is as likely as not to be unequal.
4. The decision of the trial court should not be disturbed, except on clear grounds, as that court is usually in a better position than the appellate court to judge of the respective merits and needs of the parties.
Our review of the settlement made by the district court in granting a divorce to the Youngs convinces us there was no abuse of discretion in the property settlement; and that the award of alimony as made was equitable and authorized by law.
When we give proper meaning to the first principle of appellate review-that the trial court exercises a discretion-it results in a variance in settlements. For example, one trial court may tend to award more to the wife while another trial court may award more to the husband. Keeping in mind that each trial court has a discretion and that just and equitable divisions are likely to be unequal, we might very well affirm where more is awarded to the wife and also affirm in another case where more is awarded to the husband.
The prior decisions of our court must therefore be viewed as giving recognition to the discretion of the respective trial courts and not as an expression of opinion as to how settlements should be made. We mention this because appellant claims an analysis and reconciliation of former decisions by our court shows a consistent historical policy to allow the husband to retain, unfettered by participation on the part of his wife, all of the assets which the husband uses in making a living.
We fail to find in any of the cases cited by appellant any support for his claim that there has been a policy to allow all assets which the husband uses in making a living to be retained by him. A trial court might very well consider it equitable and proper to award to a husband assets used by him in making a living, if the wife was otherwise properly provided for either in property or alimony.
That is not to say, however, that a trial court is required to follow such a method of settlement when it considers another mode of settlement more just and equitable.
In granting a divorce to Mrs. Young, the district court awarded her the family residence which was appraised at $27,500 but which was subject to a mortgage of $15,000. She was also awarded an automobile; the furniture in the house; one-half of the parties' cash; one-third of the parties' mineral and royalty interests including interests in oil and gas leases; and one-third of the shares of capital stock.
Appellant was awarded a new Jeepster; a boat with two motors and boat trailer; his own personal goods; one-half of the parties' cash; two-thirds of the oil, gas and mineral interests; and two-thirds of the stock. He was ordered to pay $150 per month for the support of a minor daughter, who was placed in the custody of the mother, and alimony to plaintiff at the rate of $400 per month for five years. The custody of a minor son was granted to the father.
According to values which the parties seem to have mutually accepted, the net value of assets left to the wife amounted to $47,031.69, excluding the value of the automobile, furnishings and personal effects. On the other hand, the value of assets awarded to the husband amounted to $59,577.19, excluding the value of his motor vehicle, boat and boating equipment, furnishings and personal effects.
The defendant, an oil geologist, shows that the major portion of his income in recent years has come from trading in stocks and dealing in oil and gas properties. He argues that the award of plaintiff of one-third of the stock owned by the parties and one-third of the oil, gas and mineral interests owned by the parties hampers his ability to earn; and that he should either be awarded a larger share of the stock and mineral interests or in the alternative that he should not be required to pay alimony.
There clearly is an element of speculation in trading in stocks and in dealing in oil and gas leases and mineral rights. Inasmuch as the trial court could not be sure Young would continue to be...
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