Young v. Young, Opinion No. 2009-UP-161 (S.C. App. 4/1/2009), Opinion No. 2009-UP-161.
| Decision Date | 01 April 2009 |
| Docket Number | Opinion No. 2009-UP-161. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Bob W. Young, Appellant, v. Carol Jennings Young, SCDSS, Anthony Roper, Pamela Durham, and Phyllis M. Roper, Of Whom: Carol Jennings Young is, Respondent. |
Appeal From Pickens County Timothy L. Brown, Family Court Judge.
AFFIRMED
David A. Wilson, of Greenville, for Appellant.
R. Scott Dover, of Pickens, for Respondent.
In this domestic matter, Husband asserts the family court abused its discretion in (1) approving and adopting the settlement agreement, (2) awarding an equal allocation of marital property, and (3) awarding fractional interests in the parties' Florida property. We affirm.
Bob W. Young (Husband) and Carol Jennings Young (Wife) were married on November 9, 1974. The parties were married for thirty years and have no children.
Husband and Wife separated on or about May 4, 2004. Husband filed a complaint on July 15, 2004, and an amended complaint on August 6, 2004, seeking separate support and maintenance, equitable division, attorney's fees, and other relief. On August 31, 2004, Wife filed an answer and counterclaim seeking a divorce, equitable division, attorney's fees, and other relief.
A final hearing was held before the Honorable Timothy L. Brown on April 10, 2006. At the call of the case, Husband made a motion to amend his pleadings to include one year of continuous separation as an alternative ground for divorce as well as a request for attorney's fees. Counsel for Husband then placed into the record a partial agreement of the parties as to all issues with the exception of the percentages of the distribution of the marital estate, attorney's fees, and divorce. Among the issues stipulated in the partial agreement was a waiver of alimony. Counsel for Husband also noted that the parties agreed Husband would remain in the marital home but that the home would be placed for sale at an agreed upon price. Thereafter, Husband's counsel stipulated as to the valuations of various personal items, bank accounts, and retirement accounts. Husband's counsel also indicated the parties agreed Wife would share 25% interest in any earnings relative to Husband's corporation, Vortex, Inc.
Husband's counsel further informed the court that Husband and Wife agreed their Florida property, which consists of a commercial building and billboard in Miami, FL, would not be sold but would continue to be owned jointly by the parties, and that the proceeds and liabilities would be divided subject to the percentage determined by the court. Husband's counsel stated that the Florida property had severe maintenance issues and liabilities but that it was generating a total of $4,900.00 per month in income. Later during the hearing, counsel for both parties reconfirmed the agreement that the Florida property would not be sold but would continue to be owned jointly by the parties. Husband's counsel reasoned that this situation was favorable because the sale of the property may trigger an environmental issue rendering the property worthless.
Following these stipulations, the court noted that the equitable apportionment issues were not fully resolved but that it would factor in the stated stipulations to the full agreement. However, the court stated that it would make no commitment to accept the agreement; the court further indicated that testimony must be offered as to whether the agreement was fair and as to whether it was entered into freely, knowingly, and voluntarily. After the court's remarks, Husband's counsel stated that he was prepared to stipulate that neither party was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and that the agreement was arrived at freely and voluntarily without any coercion.
Thereafter, testimony from Husband and Wife was taken. Both parties assented that the agreement as stipulated by counsel was entered into freely, knowingly, and voluntarily. Husband testified that his net worth at the time of the marriage was $ 800,000.00 to $1,000,000.00 and that his net worth at the time of the hearing was approximately $238,286.00. Wife testified to her role as homemaker and her direct contributions to Husband's business, such as attending seminars and arranging social functions. Wife also testified that she was directly involved in the Husband's real estate development in North Carolina, for which she contributed her skills as a licensed interior decorator in addition to overseeing all the day to day workings of the development.
By final order and divorce decree dated May 23, 2006, the court granted Husband a divorce on the ground of one year of continuous separation. In apportioning the marital estate, the court approved the agreement of the parties and divided the marital assets evenly with the exception of Husband's ownership interest in Vortex, Inc., which was divided 75/25 in favor of Husband. As to the Florida property, the court ordered the parties to retain joint ownership of the property and to maintain a joint account for the rental proceeds. The order further provided that Husband would assume primary responsibility for the joint account and for providing an accounting of all funds received and all expenses authorized to be paid by him in association with the maintenance and upkeep of the property. Any funds remaining in the joint account after the payment of expenses would then be divided evenly between the parties. The court also ordered $5,000.00 in attorney's fees to be paid from the rental income from the Florida property to each party's attorney.
Husband timely filed a motion to alter or amend, which was granted in part as to the allocation of marital debts and several valuation errors. The court also reduced Wife's award of attorney's fees by $1,000.00. This appeal followed.
In appeals from the family court, this court has the authority to find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Ray v. Ray, 374 S.C. 79, 83, 647 S.E.2d 237, 239 (2007). Despite this broad scope of review, the appellate court is not required to disregard the findings of the family court judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony. Wooten v. Wooten, 364 S.C. 532, 540, 615 S.E.2d 98, 102 (2005).
Husband first asserts the family court erred in adopting the settlement agreement. Specifically, Husband asserts the agreement contains vague, ambiguous, and indefinite terms and is not procedurally or substantively reasonable. We disagree.
Rule 43(k), SCRCP, provides that "[n]o agreement . . . in an action shall be binding unless reduced to the form of a consent order or written stipulation signed by counsel and entered in the record, or unless made in open court and noted upon the record." Rule 43(k), SCRCP. To comply with the requirements of Rule 43(k), the order or written stipulation must set forth the terms of the settlement. Galloway v. Regis Corp., 325 S.C. 541, 545, 481 S.E.2d 714, 715-16 (Ct. App. 1997). However, such an agreement is still subject to review by the family court to determine its fairness. Jackson v. Jackson, 279 S.C. 618, 620, 310 S.E.2d 827, 828 (Ct. App. 1983).
Agreements regarding alimony, child support, or property issues must be presented to the family court for approval. McKinney v. McKinney, 274 S.C. 95, 97, 261 S.E.2d 526, 527 (1980) (). As such, "[w]hen approving a settlement agreement, [the family court] must, first, determine if assent to the agreement is voluntarily given, and, second, determine if the agreement is `within the bounds of reasonableness from both a procedural and substantive perspective.'" Blejski v. Blejski, 325 S.C. 491, 497-98, 480 S.E.2d 462, 466 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Burnett v. Burnett, 290 S.C. 28, 347 S.E.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1986)).
In the instant case, we find the family court's approval of the agreement was appropriate. At the commencement of the hearing, counsel entered into the record a partial agreement reached between the parties. The partial agreement provided for, among other things, the sale of the marital home and joint ownership of their Florida property. Specifically, with regard to the marital residence, Husband's counsel stipulated that Husband would have "four months to shop the house sale" and "all the terms and price of sale will be subject to the approval of both." As to the Florida property, Husband's counsel stated that the parties agreed the property would not be sold but would "continue to be owned by the parties." Wife's counsel further confirmed that "[w]e did agree to that, that it would remain jointly held by the parties in the percentages determined by Your Honor for [the] future, forever, and that the profits or any profits received from there will be divided in the same manner." These terms of the partial agreement reached by the parties were entered into the court's record and acknowledged in open court prior to the parties' testimony.
After the partial agreement was placed into the record, both parties were questioned as to the fairness of the agreement and whether it was entered into freely and voluntarily. Husband and Wife testified that they freely and voluntarily entered into the agreement. Husband further testified that the agreement was fair and reasonable and that it was his desire that the agreement, subject to percentage, be approved by the court. While Husband asserts that he never assented to the terms of the agreement concerning the marital residence and the Florida property, the record reveals that the disputed terms are the precise terms stipulated by counsel that Husband testified were fair and reasonable. Accordingly, based on the evidence in...
To continue reading
Request your trial