Youngblood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist.

• Decision Date: 14 September 1961
• Citation: 15 Cal.Rptr. 904,56 Cal.2d 603,364 P.2d 840
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 364 P.2d 840 N. E. YOUNGBLOOD, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT, Defendant and Appellant. * L. A. 26339.

Page 904

15 Cal.Rptr. 904

56 Cal.2d 603, 364 P.2d 840

N. E. YOUNGBLOOD, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LOS ANGELES COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT, Defendant and Appellant. ^*

L. A. 26339.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Sept. 14, 1961.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 11, 1961.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Lloyd S. Davis, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for defendant-appellant.

N. E. Youngblood, Beverly Hills, in pro. per., and Marvin Gross, Los Angeles, for plaintiff-respondent.

P. M. Barceloux, Burton J. Goldstein, Goldstein, Barceloux & Goldstein and Reginald M. Watt, Chico, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff-respondent.

WHITE, Justice.

This is an appeal by the Los Angeles County Flood Control District from a judgment for the plaintiff, N. E. Youngblood, in an action for damages due to erosion of a portion of plaintiff's residential property.

The action was commenced against the City of Los Angeles, Max Rosenberg and Sons and the flood control district. A judgment for the defendants was entered following the granting of a motion for a nonsuit, but on an appeal that judgment was reversed as to the flood control district only, with instruction that the plaintiff be permitted to amend his complaint on retrial. Youngblood v. City of Los Angeles, 1958, 160 Cal.App.2d 481, 325 P.2d 587. The complaint was amended, and with the flood control district as the only defendant, the trial proceeded. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff in the amount of $9,000, with interest in the sum of $5,013.75 running from the date of the damage to the property. The present appeal is from that judgment.

It appears that a natural watercourse, usually dry, adjoins plaintiff's property. The complaint alleges that the defendant had constructed and maintained 'a partially completed double pipe and wire revetment in said waterway' some 50 feet downstream from plaintiff's property. It was further alleged in effect and a finding was made in the following language: 'It is true that during the rainfall of January 1952, and on or about January 15, 1952, the revetment which was built, managed and maintained by the defendant Los Angeles County Flood Control District became clogged with debris either in the revetment channel itself or with debris which accumulated in front of the revetment and adjacent thereto, and as a proximate result thereof water was diverted from the natural waterway and waterflow onto plaintiff's land, causing erosion and loss of soil; all to plaintiff's damage in the sum of $9000.00.' No other allegations of causation, or findings thereon, were made.

The action herein is one in inverse condemnation predicated on article I, section 14 of the Constitution, which provides in part that 'Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. * * *' (Emphasis added.) Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal.2d 276, 282, 289 P.2d 1, 5. Basically, the question presented at the trial of the instant case was whether there had been a taking or damaging by the defendant public agency such as entitled the plaintiff to compensation. The defendant is not absolutely liable, of course, where private lands are damaged by flood waters, which lands lie along a natural watercourse within its control. Certainly the defendant is liable for a taking or damaging of land if it constructs a watercourse for a public purpose in a negligent manner and such construction is a proximate cause of the property owner's loss. And where the maintenance or operation of an improvement was faulty in the sense of a 'failure to appreciate the probability that, functioning as deliberately conceived' a damaging or appropriation would result, as distinguished from 'negligence in the routine operation having no relation to the function of the project as conceived,' it has heretofore been held actionable within article I, section 14 of the Constitution. Bauer v. County of Ventura, supra, 45 Cal.2d 276, 286, 289 P.2d 1, 7; cf. Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457. Also, when waters are diverted by a public improvement from a natural watercourse onto adjoining lands the agency is liable for the damage to or appropriation of such lands where such diversion was the necessary or probable result even though no negligence could be attributed to the installation of the improvement. Clement v. State Reclamation Board, 35 Cal.2d 628, 220 P.2d 897; House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal.2d 384, 153 P.2d 950.

The basis for liability in the foregoing instances is a taking or damaging for a public use by the public agency. Bauer v. County of Ventura, supra, 45 Cal.2d 276, 284, 289 P.2d 1. As indicated, the taking or damaging may be deliberate or intentional, or may be done under circumstances wherein the diversion of waters was the natural or probable result of the improvement and could or should have been foreseen. But in any event the taking or damaging must be for the public use and by a public agency to be actionable. Had not the public agency in some manner taken or damaged the property involved then it could not be liable under any theory of the law. The recent decisions of this court have thus recognized this concept in its declarations that if a property owner would have no cause of action against a private citizen on the same facts, he can have no claim for compensation against the state under section 14. People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Symons, 54 Cal.2d 855, 861, 9 Cal.Rptr. 363, 357 P.2d 451; Bauer v. County of Ventura, supra, 45 Cal.2d 276, 283, 289 P.2d 1; Clement v. State Reclamation Board, supra, 35 Cal.2d 628, 220 P.2d 897; House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., supra, 25 Cal.2d 384, 153 P.2d 950; O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood, etc., Dist., 19 Cal.2d 61, 63, 119 P.2d 23; Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19, 24, 119 P.2d 1; San Gabriel Valley Country Club v. Los Angeles, 182 Cal. 392, 188 P. 554, 9 A.L.R. 1200; Lamb v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 73 Cal. 125, 14 P. 625. Section 14 'is designed not to create new causes of action but only to give the private property owner a remedy he would not otherwise have against the state for the unlawful dispossession, destruction or damage of his property. The state is therefore not liable under this provision for property damage that is damnum absque injuria.' Bauer v. County of of Ventura, supra, 45 Cal.2d 276, 282-283, 289 P.2d 1, 5.

As heretofore stated, in the instant case a prior judgment was reversed on appeal, and certain language in that opinion of the appellant tribunal is relied upon as establishing that the defendant is liable herein under the pleadings and findings in the instant trial. In the first trial the plaintiff pleaded a cause of action based on liability for the removal of a tree from the watercourse and the subsequent effect of the flood waters on plaintiff's lands. At the close of his case plaintiff sought leave to amend his complaint to predicate liability on the diversion of the flood waters from the natural watercourse, which pleading would then conform to the proof offered by plaintiff. The denial of this motion was one of the grounds of reversal. As to that ground the reviewing court held: 'We have concluded that the removal of the tree is not the event which creates liability (if any there be) upon the Flood Control District. It plainly appears that the waters would have met and, creating a whirlpool, have eaten away plaintiff's land if the tree had not fallen. Upon the facts disclosed by this record the district would be prima facie liable in inverse condemnation because its uncompleted revetment diverted the waters from their natural flow onto plaintiff's land and to its damage. It is immaterial whether the construction of the revetment was negligent or the design defective or well conceived; when it directly caused damage to plaintiff's land the District became liable. This is the doctrine of Bauer v. County of Ventura, supra, 45 Cal.2d 276, 289 P.2d 1; Ward Concrete Products Co. v. Los Angeles County Flood, etc., Dist., supra, 149 Cal.App.2d 840, 309 P.2d 546, and other cases.' Youngblood v. City of Los Angeles, 160 Cal.App.2d 481, 487, 325 P.2d 587, 590.

The plaintiff purported to amend his complaint to state a cause of action based upon the law as stated by the District Court of Appeal in its opinion. He alleged specifically in the only allegations causally connecting conduct on the part of defendant to plaintiff's damages:

'IV

'On or about January 15, 1952, there existed a partially completed double pipe and wire revetment in said waterway to a point about 50 feet south of plaintiff's property, which revetment had been enginerred and constructed by the defendant Los Angeles County Flood Control District, and was managed, maintained and controlled by said defendant.

'V

'During the rains of January 1952, and on or about January 15, 1952, said revetment became clogged with debris, and as a proximate result thereof water was diverted onto plaintiff's land, causing erosion and loss of soil, and to his damage. * * *'

Consistent with the allegations, and as hereinbefore noted, the trial court found that the revement 'became clogged with debris *...