Youngblood v. Lathen

• Decision Date: 18 February 1884
• Citation: 20 S.C. 370
• Parties: YOUNGBLOOD v. LATHEN.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

20 S.C. 370

YOUNGBLOOD

v.LATHEN.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Feb. 18th, 1884.

1. Certain lands of a bankrupt were excepted from the sale of his property by order of the United States District Court, but no formal assignment of such land as a homestead to the bankrupt was made by the United States Court, or by any State court, or ever filed for record with the clerk of court. Afterwards, the bankrupt sold a part of this land and then died intestate. Held, that the purchaser was entitled to this land, and that it could not be claimed by the widow of the bankrupt as a part of the homestead, nor by his heirs for partition.

2. The United States Court in bankruptcy does not assign a homestead, but only excepts from sale and conveyance such property as is exempt under the State law, leaving the title of such excepted property in the bankrupt, which he may afterwards sell if he pleases.

Before KERSHAW, J., Lancaster, February, 1883.

Action for partition by Mary J. Youngblood against Nancy Lathen, John F. Lathen, Harriet M. McMillan, Elizabeth A. Robinson and Sarah A. Robinson, commenced in 1882. The opinion states the case.

The Circuit decree was as follows:

The constitution of this State (Art. I., § 20,) declares that “a reasonable amount of property shall be exempted from seizure and sale for the payment of any debts or liabilities, except for the payment of such obligations as are provided for in this constitution.” Article II., section 32, declares “that the family homestead of each family residing in this State *** shall be exempt from attachment, levy or sale on any mesne or final process issued from any court,” &c. The revised statutes of the United States, section 5045, re-enacting former acts, provides that “in no case shall the property hereby excepted pass to the assignee or the title of the bankrupt thereto be impaired or affected by any of the provisions of this title,” &c. Among the exceptions referred to is the following: ***“Such other property, not included in the foregoing exceptions, as is exempt from levy and sale, upon execution or other process, or order of any court by the laws of the State in which the bankrupt has his domicile at the time of the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, to an amount allowed by the constitution and laws of each State as existing in the year 1871,” &c.

It is contended, that if the estate of the bankrupt remained as declared in the section quoted, unimpaired or unaffected by the provisions of the bankrupt law, then he simply held his land by the former title, free from the debts provable against him in bankruptcy. In other words, that he had such title as he would have had if there had been no proceedings in bankruptcy and he was clear of debt. But this reasoning is certainly fallacious. The thing excepted in bankruptcy is that which is exempted by the constitution and laws of the State from liability to process for the collection of debts, to wit, the family homestead. The bankrupt court, having assumed jurisdiction, superseded the process of the State courts and settled the debts of the bankrupt and allowed him the same benefits which he would have been entitled to if the property had been subjected to the process of the State courts. In order to do this the homestead has been judicially ascertained and allotted to the bankrupt. It then acquired the specific character impressed upon a homestead by the State laws after assignment.

If that were not the case, then the exempted property never could have acquired that character, because, the debts being discharged in bankruptcy, there would be no proceedings in the State courts to enforce said debts, and consequently no proceedings to assign a homestead. The estate of homestead has been said to be not a new estate, nevertheless after its assignment it acquires certain new characteristics or incidents which largely qualify it. Among them is that it shall be the family homestead; which, though vested in the head of the family, is in him as the representative of the family; the family being the object of the protection afforded by the constitution in this respect. The subject of protection is the family, the head of the family being referred to as its representative. In re Kennedy, 2 S. C. 227;Howze v. Howze, Id. 229;Ex parte Strobel, Id. 311. The widow and children of the debtor, and even the widow without children, is entitled to this protection. 3 S. C. 227. The head of a family is but a trustee and the family the beneficiaries. Moore v. Parker, 13 S. C. 490.

Such being the nature of the estate, as affected by the constitution and laws concerning the homestead exemption, it follows that from the time it acquired that character by the assignment of a court having jurisdiction, it became inalienable by the head of the family, at least so far as its alienation could affect the interests of the members of the family who are the beneficiaries of the trust. The widow, if she survive the children, in this case would be the sole beneficiary, and hence the children are not entitled to partition until her death. This would have been the result even in the absence of the statutory inhibitions of alienation. A reference to these will also lead to the same conclusion. 15 Stat. 371, §§ 4 and 5; Gen Stat., § 1997. The act of March 13th, 1872, prescribing the mode in which the homestead may be sold by the head of the family, preserving at the same time the interests of the family, very strongly sustains the view here taken. 15 Stat. 229.

It follows, from what has been said, that the attempted alienation is void, and that plaintiff is not entitled to partition of the said lands. It is adjudged and decreed that the complaint be dismissed, and that plaintiff, Mary J. Youngblood, and defendant John F. Lathen, pay the costs in equal shares, to be adjusted by the clerk and entered in the judgment.

Mr. M. J. Hough, for appellant.

Mr. R. E. Allison, contra.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MR. JUSTICE MCGOWAN.

This was an action for partition of lands among the heirs of the intestate, C. H. Lathen, under the following circumstances: The intestate, C. H. Lathen, seized and possessed of two small tracts of land-one containing 140, and the other 130 acres-went into bankruptcy in the United States Court in 1873, and was there adjudged a bankrupt and discharged in 1874. Under some claim that, under the laws of South Carolina, he was entitled to homestead in the tracts of land above described, the United States Court declined to have them sold for the payment of debts; but it seems that no actual assignment of homestead was ever made by the United States or State court, or returned for record in the clerk's office of Lancaster, as required by law. All that appears is a certificate made for use in the bankrupt court as follows:

“The real estate to be set apart to C. H. Lathen as his exempted property, under the provisions of the homestead laws of South Carolina, lying in Lancaster, on which petitioner resides, containing 305 acres more or less, we have appraised and returned at $950.

(Signed)

“JOHN J. GRAHAM,

“JAMES CROCKETT,

“DAVID M. CROCKETT,

“ Appraisers.”

Matters stood in this imperfect condition until July, 1878, when the intestate, C. H. Lathen, conveyed the smaller tract (130 acres) to his son, John F. Lathen, who was put into possession, and still retains it under his father's deed. In November, 1878, C. H. Lathen, the father, died intestate, leaving a widow, Nancy, one son, John F. Lathen, and several daughters, viz., Mary J. Youngblood, Harriet M. McMillan, and others. All the children are of full age, and have married and left their parents. At the death of her husband, the widow, Nancy, was left alone on the 140-acre tract, of which she still retains the possession.

Mrs. Youngblood, one of the daughters, commenced this action for partition of both the tracts of land, claiming that, upon the death of her father, C. H. Lathen, both tracts descended to...