Younger v. State, 410,1987

• Decision Date: 29 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. 410,1987,410,1987
• Citation: 539 A.2d 194
• Parties: Thomas B. YOUNGER, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. . Submitted:
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 194

539 A.2d 194

Thomas B. YOUNGER, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee.

No. 410,1987.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: Jan. 29, 1988.

Decided: Feb. 23, 1988.

Superior Court, New Castle County.

AFFIRMED.

Before CHRISTIE, Chief Justice, and WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices.

ORDER

HOLLAND, Justice.

This 23rd day of February, 1988, it appears to the Court as follows:

(1) The appellant, Thomas B. Younger ("Younger"), was convicted of two counts of first degree rape, one count of attempted first degree rape, and three counts of first degree kidnapping. Younger's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal to this Court. Younger v. State, Del.Supr., 496 A.2d 546, 553 (1985).

(2) In the present case, Younger has appealed pro se from a denial by the Superior Court of a motion for post-conviction relief.

(3) The record reflects that the Superior Court denied Younger's motion, stating: "This motion contains the same issues that have already been raised in prior similar motions and ruled upon by this Court. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court where the same issues were fully briefed, argued and decided in that Court's Opinion affirming your conviction."

(4) Younger has filed an opening brief in this Court.

(5) The State has moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a).

(6) The State's motion to affirm asserts that the Superior Court correctly denied portions of Younger's motion as repetitive, e.g., the admissibility of Younger's confession. The State is correct in this assertion. This claim by Younger was considered by this Court on direct appeal and found to be without merit. Younger v. State, 496 A.2d at 549. Therefore, we affirm the Superior Court's decision to deny a reconsideration of that issue in a post-conviction proceeding.

(7) The State's motion also argues that, although Younger's claim in the post-conviction motion that "the prosecution did not turn over to the defense exculpatory evidence" is not repetitive, Younger has not demonstrated cause for failing to raise that claim on direct appeal or actual prejudice resulting from the alleged violation of his rights. See Oney v. State, Del.Supr., 482 A.2d 756, 758 (1984) (per curiam); Johnson v. State, Del.Supr., 460 A.2d 539, 540 (1983).

(8) To the extent that portions of Younger's motion are not repetitive, "a cause and prejudice" analysis must generally be applied, in the first instance, by the Superior Court. However, we will review Younger's contention on appeal in the interest of justice and judicial economy.

(9) Younger's motion for post-conviction relief alleged that his conviction was "obtained by the unconstitutional failure of the prosecution to disclose to the defendant evidence favorable to the defendant."

(10) Younger's claim appears to be that the State violated its duty of disclosure as established in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The Brady rule involves the discovery, after trial, of information which was unknown to the defense. Michael v. State, Del.Supr., 529 A.2d 752, 755 (1987). In reviewing an alleged Brady violation, courts must first determine if the nondisclosure violated Brady, and second, if there is a violation, the nature of the error. Id. This analysis can only be applied if the...