Youngerman v. Youngerman (In re Youngerman's Estate)

• Decision Date: 10 December 1907
• Citation: 114 N.W. 7,136 Iowa 488
• Parties: IN RE YOUNGERMAN'S ESTATE. YOUNGERMAN v. YOUNGERMAN.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

136 Iowa 488

114 N.W. 7

IN RE YOUNGERMAN'S ESTATE.

YOUNGERMAN

v.YOUNGERMAN.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 10, 1907.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; James A. Howe, Judge.

The appellant filed a claim against the estate of Miene Youngerman, deceased, to recover under a contract by which the testatrix had agreed during her lifetime to pay for tuition, books, and clothing of the claimant for a course at a technical institution of learning, alleging that a portion of the expenses incurred by him in reliance on the contract remained unpaid. The claimant also asked a balance alleged to be due and unpaid out of a legacy made to him in the will of decedent. The defendant took issue with claimant as to the indebtedness to claimant under the contract or will, and asked a construction of the will, together with the contract, and that the court declare the contract so far as executed to be a satisfaction and discharge in full of the legacy. A motion to transfer the case to the equity docket for trial was sustained, and the court, after hearing the evidence, decreed that the obligations of the estate to the claimant under the provisions of the contract and the will had been fully discharged, save that, on the completion of another year's study in the institution referred to in the contract, a further sum of $500 would become due to the claimant under the provisions of said contract and will, providing that the legitimate expenses for tuition, books, and clothing of claimant in said institution or some other similar institution for the ensuing year should amount to that sum. From this decree the claimant appeals. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.A. D. Pugh, for appellant.

Bowen, Brockett & Weldy, for appellee.

McCLAIN, J.

On August 5, 1902, the decedent, grandmother of claimant executed her will subsequently probated of which the defendant is executor, providing that this claimant and three other grandsons be paid each the sum of $2,000, at the rate of $500 per annum for four years, for the purpose of giving them an education in some institution of learning higher than the high school, to be used only for that specific purpose, and, that if at the time of testatrix's decease any one or more of said grandchildren should have partially completed their education in such higher institution of learning, then a pro rata share should be given; that is, the sum of $500 per year for the balance of the time necessary to complete a four years' course. On September 22, 1903, claimant, being about to enter upon a course of higher education in a technical institution, the testatrix made a contract with the father of claimant and for claimant's declared benefit, by which she agreed that, in consideration of the father depositing in the bank subject to the order and check of claimant the sum of $1,200 to be used by claimant in paying his board and room in said institution, she would pay from time to time, as needed, for the tuition, books, and clothing of claimant during the time he should be in school as aforesaid and further agreed, in case of her death prior to the time claimant should have finished his course, that her heirs and executors should carry out her part of such contract. Prior to the death of the testatrix, April 26, 1905, she had paid to claimant for his tuition, books and clothing in the said institution referred to the sum of $776.80, which it is agreed was the full amount which she was under obligation by the terms of her contract to pay to him on account of his attendance in said institution for two full years, ending in June, 1905. The defendant has paid to claimant $500 on account of similar expenses during the third year of his attendance on said institution, and the court decreed that under the terms of the contract an additional sum not exceeding $500 for similar expenses during the fourth year of his attendance should be paid, and that this payment should constitute a full satisfaction of the legacy to claimant in the will. The theory of appellee, which was adopted by the court in rendering its decree, was that the performance of the provisions of the contract constituted a satisfaction of the legacy, while the claim of appellant is that he is entitled to the benefit of the will and the contract in his behalf. Under appellant's contention, he was entitled by the provisions of the will on the death of testatrix to the sum of $1,000--that is $500 per year for each of the remaining two years of a four years' course--and by the terms of the contract to have paid out of the estate his expenses for tuition, books, and clothing at said institution for three years, it being shown by the evidence that, while the regular course upon which he entered was a four years' course, yet, by reason of inadequate preparation, it would be necessary for him to attend said institution for an additional year in order that his course should be completed. The evidence shows without substantial conflict that the expenses for tuition, books, and clothing at said institution had been since the death of testatrix and would continue to be $500 per year until the completion of said course at the end of five school years from the time of his entrance in September, 1903. The contention for appellant is that the provisions of the will and contract constituted separate and independent obligations, and he is entitled to the sum of $2,500, of which $500 have been paid by defendant leaving $2,000 still to be paid, of which $500 is ordered to be paid under the decree. As the decree was entered at the end of appellant's third school year, we are not called upon to determine how much shall be paid him if we shall find that the contract is an independent provision for his benefit, and not a satisfaction of the legacy in his favor, but we are required to construe the contract, in any event, for the purpose of determining whether it covers three or only two school years from the death of testatrix.

1. The first question for determination is whether the contract was made in satisfaction of the provisions of the will; that is, whether the legacy has been adeemed pro tanto by payments under the contract, and will be fully satisfied when the contract has been performed by payment of expenses of appellant in the institution which he is attending for such further time as is provided for in the contract. Where the testator stands in loco parentis to a legatee, a subsequent payment to the legatee or a contract made for his benefit seems usually to be presumed to be an ademption or satisfaction of the legacy pro tanto on the theory that double portions to a child are not intended. Lord Chichester v. Coventry, L. R. 2 H. L. 71; In re Tussaud's Estate, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 363; In re Estate of Hall, 132 Iowa, 664; 110 N. W. 148;Wallace v. Du Bois, 65 Md. 153, 4 Atl. 402;Carmichiel v. Lathrop, 108 Mich. 473, 66 N. W. 350, 32 L. R. A. 232. But here no such presumption arises, for the testatrix did not stand nor assume to stand in loco parentis to the appellant, and the provision for the appellant was not as for a child or other relative naturally entitled to share in her estate, but a specific provision for his benefit in a particular way. Testatrix provided generally for her children to whom her estate would have descended in the absence of a will, and the father of appellant, who in the absence of a will would have been entitled to share in her estate, was still living. Therefore testatrix did not stand in loco parentis to appellant, and the specificprovision for his education made in the will was not...