Youngson v. Bond

• Decision Date: 03 June 1903
• Docket Number: 10,473
• Citation: 95 N.W. 700,69 Neb. 356
• Parties: GEORGE N. YOUNGSON, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF WARREN BOND, DECEASED, APPELLEE, v. HARRIET M. BOND ET AL., APPELLANTS. [*]
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

95 N.W. 700

69 Neb. 356

GEORGE N. YOUNGSON, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF WARREN BOND, DECEASED, APPELLEE, v. HARRIET M. BOND ET AL., APPELLANTS. ^[*]

No. 10,473

Supreme Court of Nebraska

June 3, 1903

APPEAL from the district court for Kearney county: FREDERICK B BEALL, DISTRICT JUDGE. Former judgment of reversal adhered to.

John L McPheeley, William Gaslin and G. L. Godfrey, for appellants.

Ed L Adams, John B. Scott, Claude C. Flansburg and Richard O Williams, contra.

POUND, C. BARNES and OLDHAM, CC., concur.

OPINION

POUND, C.

Upon rehearing, it is contended that this suit is to be regarded as one for construction of the will, and hence is maintainable notwithstanding the principles of law laid down in the former opinion. But we are of opinion that, even upon that ground, it was not within the original jurisdiction of the district court and that the former judgment should be adhered to.

The suit is brought by an administrator with the will annexed, and, in view of the decision in Kennedy v. Merrick, 46 Neb. 260, 64 N.W. 960, would be maintainable only upon the theory that a construction of the will was necessary to enable him to settle the estate. So regarded, we think the suit was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the county court. Williams v. Miles, 63 Neb. 859, 89 N.W. 451; Genau v. Abbott, 68 Neb. 117, 93 N.W. 942. It is well settled that the county court has full and complete equity powers as to all matters within its exclusive jurisdiction. Clothed with these powers, its authority to construe a will, when necessary to enable its officers to settle an estate properly, is as clear as its authority to set aside on equitable grounds an order admitting a will to probate. Is its jurisdiction in such a case exclusive? This, we think, must depend upon the purpose and end of the proceeding. Where a suit in equity is to be regarded as part of the proceedings for settlement of the estate of a deceased person and has no further object than to procure or advance such settlement, it must be brought in the county court. The obvious purpose of the statute is to give all powers necessary to complete and speedy settlement of estates to one court, and to require all proceedings toward that end to be brought in that court in the first instance. To permit a concurrent equity jurisdiction, as to such proceedings, in the district court, in view of the principle that a court of equity which has acquired jurisdiction for one purpose will hold it for all purposes so far as necessary to give complete relief and render a full decree covering the whole controversy, would be very likely to lead us back little by little to the old time suits for administration. For these reasons, we think a suit by an administrator with the will annexed for construction of the will, in order to enable him to administer the estate properly, is not maintainable in the first instance in the district court. Such a suit is in reality a part of the proceedings for settlement of the estate. It is very different from a suit by trustees under a will, after settlement of the estate, to obtain a construction of the provisions of the will relating to their trust. Such a suit is not in any sense a part of the settlement of the estate. The district court has undoubted jurisdiction over such a trust, whether to enforce it, to give directions for its execution, or to appoint new trustees. Hence its power to construe the instrument creating the trust is clear. With respect to the administrator with the will annexed pending settlement of the estate, the case is entirely distinct. The estate is not before the district court for settlement, nor can it come before that court except by appeal. Hence that court ought not to be giving directions to the officer of another court, how to administer an estate in the other court, except as its appellate jurisdiction is invoked.

It is urged that section 16, article 6, of the constitution precludes a county court from construing a devise of lands. We do not think the provision in that section that the county court shall have no jurisdiction "in actions in which title to real estate is sought to be recovered, or may be drawn in question" affects the conclusion already reached in any way. The evident meaning is that the county court shall have no jurisdiction of actions to recover real property or wherein the present title to real property is directly or substantially involved. But the provision does not mean that the county court is to be without jurisdiction where a question of title arises incidentally or collaterally or where the present title is not involved. Many actions which are not in form brought to recover the title to real property, nevertheless, have the effect of settling and adjudicating the present title. Such actions would not be within the letter of the first portion of the constitutional provision and yet are clearly within its reason. The object of the remainder of the provision in question is obviously to cover such cases. This court has construed the constitutional provisions as to jurisdiction of...