Younkin v. Zimmer
| Decision Date | 15 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 313813. |
| Citation | 304 Mich.App. 719,848 N.W.2d 488 |
| Parties | YOUNKIN v. ZIMMER. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
MacDonald & MacDonald, PLLC, Flint (by Robert J. MacDonald), for Lawrence Younkin.
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Matthew Schneider, Chief Legal Counsel, and Thomas D. Warren, Assistant Attorney General, for Michael Zimmer and Steven Hilfinger.
Before: M.J. KELLY, P.J., and MARK J. CAVANAGH and FORT HOOD, JJ.
In this suit for mandamus, defendants, the Executive Director of the Michigan Administrative Hearing System (the Hearing System), Michael Zimmer, and the Director of the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs (LARA), Steven Hilfinger, appeal by right the trial court's writ of mandamus compelling them to cause their agencies to hold hearings on workers' compensation claims arising out of injuries occurring in Genesee County within that same locality. The primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly interpreted MCL 418.851 to preclude Zimmer and Hilfinger from transferring all hearings on workers* compensation claims arising in Genesee County to Dimondale, Michigan. We conclude that the trial court did not err when it determined that the Legislature limited the geographic area within which a hearing on workers' compensation claims may be held and that the transfer of the hearings to Dimondale exceeded that limitation. Because Zimmer and Hilfinger lacked the authority to order the hearings be held in a locality other than the locality where the injury occurred, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued a writ of mandamus compelling Zimmer and Hilfingerto order their agencies to comply with the geographic limitations stated in MCL 418.851. For these reasons, we affirm.
Plaintiff Lawrence Younkin worked for General Motors at its assembly plant in Flint. At some point, Younkin injured his back while working and was determined to be totally and permanently disabled. Younkin then filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with the workers' compensation office in Flint.
In September 2012, Zimmer circulated a notice outlining new efforts to streamline and reorganize the Hearing System, which included the offices that handle workers' compensation claims. Zimmer stated that he was closing the Flint office that handles workers' compensation claims and transferring those claims to the office located in Dimondale. It was his goal, he wrote, “to have the transfer complete with hearings beginning in the new locations in December 2012.” Thus, after the transfer, both the administrative handling of claims arising in Flint and the hearings on those claims would be conducted at the office in Dimondale.
In October 2012, Younkin sued Zimmer and Hilfinger over the decision to close the Flint office and transfer the proceedings to Dimondale. Younkin alleged that his injuries made it difficult for him to attend hearings in Dimondale. Then, citing MCL 418.851, he alleged that the Legislature had for more than 100 years required all hearings on workers* compensation claims be held in the locality where the injury occurred. Because Dimondale was not the locality where his injury occurred, he contended that Zimmer and Hilfinger had no authority to order his hearing held in Dimondale. Younkin also alleged that there were numerous other similarly situated individuals who would be harmed in the same way by the unlawful decision to order all hearings on workers' compensation claims arising in Genesee County to be held in Dimondale. For these reasons, Younkin asked the trial court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Zimmer and Hilfinger to “comply with MCL 418.851 and perform their ministerial duties to ensure that hearings in cases arising out of injuries occurring in Genesee County shall be held in the locality of injury as statutorily required.”
On October 22, 2012, the trial court entered an order compelling Zimmer and Hilfinger to appear and show cause why the court should not issue a writ of mandamus.
In answer to Younkin's complaint, Zimmer and Hilfinger argued that MCL 418.851 cannot be read literally. Rather, relying on the decision in Crane v. Leonard, Crossette & Riley, 214 Mich. 218, 183 N.W. 204 (1921), they maintained that the trial court should interpret the statute to merely require that the hearing be held in a place that is convenient for the parties and their witnesses. They also argued that they were under no legal duty to refrain from closing unnecessary facilities and reassigning magistrates. Because they had the discretion to make these changes, they concluded that their decision was outside the scope of a writ of mandamus. Finally, they argued that Younkin's core complaint is that it is not convenient for him to attend a hearing in Dimondale, which implicates equity rather than law and, therefore, cannot be the subject of a writ of mandamus.
The trial court held a hearing on Younkin's request for a writ of mandamus in November 2012. After hearing the parties' arguments, the trial court examined MCL 418.851 and noted that it provided “that hearings shall be held ‘at the locality where the injury occurred.’ ” From this, it determined that the statute imposed a clear legal duty to hold all hearings on workers' compensation claims in the locality where the injury occurred: “shall means shall, and does not provide discretion.” It then concluded that the term “locality” did not include a place that was “four counties away” from the place of injury. Indeed, it found that Dimondale would not constitute a locality for any claim arising in Genesee County. Accordingly, the trial court granted Younkin's request for a writ of mandamus, but initially indicated that it would limit the writ to Younkin's own hearing. The trial court, however, recognized that Younkin had requested a writ that applied to all claims arising in Genesee County and invited the parties to brief whether it had the authority to issue such a writ on the basis of Younkin's complaint.
Zimmer and Hilfinger submitted a brief on the scope of the trial court's order of mandamus later that same month. In their brief, they argued that the trial court's order should be limited. They maintained that the trial court could not use the order to compel them to hold every ancillary proceeding in the locality, could not compel them to keep the Flint office open, and, because Younkin did not plead his complaint as a class action, the trial court could not extend the order to all hearings concerning claims arising in Genesee County.
In an opinion addressing the scope of its order, the trial court agreed that it would not “direct or participate in [Zimmer's and Hilfinger's] discretionary judgment concerning how [they] will comply with the requirements of MCL 418.851” because that was a matter “within their discretion.” It therefore indicated that its order would not affect “decisions about the allocation of resources to provide services such as scheduling of hearings, assignment of staff, file organization and storage and location of offices.” However, it concluded that it had the discretion to issue a writ that applied to all claims arising in Genesee County, which would be subject to the transfer to Dimondale. The court explained that Zimmer and Hilfinger's request to have the order apply only to Younkin amounted to a request for the “court's permission to ignore the statute and break the law” as to the other claimants. Because it was not in the habit of “directing parties to ignore the laws of this state,” the trial court concluded that it would order Zimmer and Hilfinger to “rescind the directive that cases arising out of Genesee County be transferred to a hearing site in Dimondale.”
The trial court entered its writ of mandamus on November 20, 2012. The trial court ordered Zimmer and Hilfinger, in their official capacities, to “comply with MCL 418.851 and to perform their ministerial duties to ensure that hearings in cases arising out of injuries occurring in Genesee County shall be held in the locality of injury, regardless of the type of hearing.” The court also ordered them to “rescind their directive that workers' compensation cases arising out of injuries occurring in Genesee County be transferred to a hearing site in Dimondale, Michigan.”
Zimmer and Hilfinger now appeal in this Court.
Zimmer and Hilfinger argue on appeal that the trial court erred when it determined that Younkin established the right to relief in the form of a writ of mandamus and also erred by granting relief beyond ordering Younkin's hearing to be held in the locality. This Court reviews a trial court's decision to enter a writ of mandamus for an abuse of discretion. Casco Twp. v. Secretary of State, 472 Mich. 566, 571, 701 N.W.2d 102 (2005). This Court reviews de novo whether the “trial court correctly selected, interpreted, and applied the relevant statutes.” Kincaid v. Cardwell, 300 Mich.App. 513, 522, 834 N.W.2d 122 (2013).
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that courts will use to enforce duties created by law “where the law has established no specific remedy and where, in justice and good government, there should be one.” State Bd. of Educ. v. Houghton Lake Community Sch., 430 Mich. 658, 666–667, 425 N.W.2d 80 (1988). The decision to grant mandamus is one of grace and is governed by equitable principles. Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. Detroit, 368 Mich. 276, 279, 118 N.W.2d 258 (1962). In order to warrant mandamus, the plaintiff must establish that he or she has a “ ‘clear legal right to performance of the specific duty sought to be compelled’ and that the defendant has a ‘clear legal duty to perform such act....’ ” In re MCI Telecom. Complaint, 460 Mich. 396, 442–443, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999), quoting Toan v. McGinn, ...
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Younkin v. Zimmer, Docket No. 149355.
...The trial court granted mandamus relief, and in a divided and published opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Younkin v. Zimmer, 304 Mich.App. 719, 848 N.W.2d 488 (2014). To obtain a writ of mandamus, the plaintiff must show that he or she has a clear legal right to the performance of the......