Yount v. United Fire & Cas. Co.

Decision Date09 June 1964
Docket NumberNo. 51356,51356
Citation256 Iowa 813,129 N.W.2d 75
PartiesLawrence J. YOUNG, Claimant-Appellee, v. UNITED FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Employer-Appellant, United Fire & Casualty Company, Insurance Carrier-Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Simmons, Perrine, Albright, Ellwood & Neff, Cedar Rapids, for employer-appellant.

Clinton E. Shaeffer, Cedar Rapids, for claimant-appellee.

SNELL, Justice.

This is an appeal from a review-reopening decision in a Workmen's Compensation case before the industrial commissioner, affirmed by the district court, and now before us on the employer's appeal.

Prior to June 21, 1961 claimant had been employed as purchasing agent for supplies, stockman and printer by United Fire and Casualty Company. On that date he sustained a crushing injury to his right index finger in a printing press. He was x-rayed and had a splint applied at a hospital. At about 11 P.M. that night because of pain he called his doctor and was re-referred to the hospital outpatient service. The following day claimant went to his doctor's office with the same complaint of severe pain. His finger was examined and considerable swelling of tissue noted. To reduce the swelling and relieve pain claimant was given an injection of proteolytic enzyme, a dosage of 1/2 cc of aqueous chymar.

Pursuant to the doctor's directions claimant waited in the doctor's office 10 to 15 minutes. He then went to his car in a nearby parking lot. He felt dizzy. At claimant's request the attendant helped him back to the doctor's office. The doctor found him in a state of shock. He was extremely apprehensive, nervous, with burning sensations, a fever, and redness of tissues. His pulse was feeble, his respirations rapid and his blood pressure extremely low. Claimant was given oxygen and adrenalin and was taken to the hospital by ambulance. The doctor expressed the opinion that the shock was due directly or indirectly to the administration of chymar at the office.

On the third day of hospitalization a flaccid or relaxed condition on the right side of claimant's face and some weakness in his right side was noticed. The doctor expressed the opinion that claimant had suffered some type of vascular accident precipitated or directly influenced by the condition of shock.

Claimant improved and returned to his former job on July 31, 1961, but in the doctor's opinion there was physical and mental impairment and disability of about 25%.

Claimant was paid compensation to the date of his reemployment.

Claimant was soon relieved for some of his duties and was discharged by his employer in November of 1961 for inability to do satisfactory work. He had another job for four weeks at less pay and some other occasional work.

In May, 1962 claimant sought review-reopening of his claim for compensation. This sequence of hearing, decision and appeals followed.

In addition to diagnosis and treatment by his attending physician whose opinion we have noted, claimant was examined in September, 1961 and again in June, 1962 by Dr. Maurice Van Allen, a neurosurgeon at State University of Iowa. Dr. Van Allen found a functional and industrial disability of about 25% based particularly on loss of mental acuity and efficiency. He diagnosed claimant's trouble as a mild cerebral infarction or 'stroke,' possibly connected with the injection of proteolytic enzyme.

Dr. William E. Wallace, a neurosurgeon, examined claimant and testified for the employer. He expressed the opinion that claimant had an allergic but not an anaphylactic reaction to the proteolytic enzyme injection. He diagnosed claimant's condition as the residual result of a previous cerebrovascular accident or 'so-called stroke' not induced by the injection or any reaction thereto. It was his opinion that claimant's 'stroke' merely coincided with his allergic reaction. He estimated claimant's functional disability at 10 to 15 per cent.

The commissioner found the expert medical testimony to be in conflict but coupled with claimant's testimony sufficient to support a finding that there was a connecting chain of causation between treatment, shock, cerebrovascular damage and resulting disabilities.

The commissioner found specifically 'That on June 21, 1961 the claimant sustained an injury to his right index finger; that as a proximate result of treatment for the finger injury the claimant suffered shock and cerebrovascular damage resulting in permanent disability to the extent of 20% of his body as a whole.'

I. The commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal where the evidence is in dispute or reasonable minds may differ on the inferences fairly to be drawn from the facts. Section 86.30, Code of Iowa, I.C.A.; Wagner v. Otis Radio & Electric Company, 254 Iowa 990, 993, 119 N.W.2d 751, 752. We have such a situation here. One doctor thought there was a direct connection between the treatment and the residual condition. One thought the connection possible. One thought claimant had a stroke that was coincidental but not precipitated by the...

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6 cases
  • Gosek v. Garmer & Stiles Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • May 7, 1968
    ...the claimant is entitled to compensation accordingly. Barz v. Oler, 257 Iowa 508, 512--516, 133 N.W.2d 704; Yount v. United Fire & Casualty Co., 256 Iowa 813, 817, 129 N.W.2d 75; and Rose v. John Deere Ottumwa Works, 247 Iowa 900, 908, 76 N.W.2d IX. We are persuaded the commissioner, and in......
  • Roan Eagle v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Nebraska
    • April 25, 1991
    ...Motor Co, 401 Mich. 607, 258 N.W.2d 465 (1977); Turner v. Guiliano, 350 Mass. 675, 216 N.E.2d 562 (1966); Yount v. United Fire & Casualty Co., 256 Iowa 813, 129 N.W.2d 75 (1964); Matter of Kestenbaum v. Dunrite Painting Co., 10 N.Y.2d 838, 178 N.E.2d 430, 221 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1961); Ortkiese v......
  • DeShaw v. Energy Mfg. Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • December 15, 1971
    ...injury, he is entitled to compensation to the extent of the increased disability, in an appropriate proceeding. Yount v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 256 Iowa 813, 129 N.W.2d 75; Olson v. Goodyear Service Stores, 255 Iowa 1112, 125 N.W.2d 251; Yeager v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 253 Iowa 369,......
  • Woodson v. Bennett
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • June 9, 1964
    ...... Certiorari was denied by the United" States Supreme Court. See 347 U.S. 907, 74 S.Ct. 433, 98 L.Ed. 1065.   \xC2"......
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