Youth Authority v. State Personnel Bd.

• Citation: 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 514,104 Cal.App.4th 575
• Decision Date: 18 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. C036202.,C036202.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY, Plaintiff and Appellant, STATE PERSONNEL BOARD, Defendant and Respondent; v. Randy Henderson, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

128 Cal.Rptr.2d 514

104 Cal.App.4th 575

CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY, Plaintiff and Appellant, STATE PERSONNEL BOARD, Defendant and Respondent; v. Randy Henderson, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

No. C036202.

Court of Appeal, Third District.

December 18, 2002.

Certified for Partial Publication.^*

Howard Schwartz, Piedmont, and Marguerite D. Seabourn for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Elise S. Rose and Karen J. Brandt, Sacramento, for Defendant and Respondent.

Christine Albertine, Rancho Cucamonga, and Benjamin C. Sybesma, West Sacramento, for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

SIMS, J.

Appellant California Youth Authority (CYA) dismissed real party in interest Randy Henderson from his job as a Senior Youth Correctional Counselor, for neglect of duty and other charges arising from the disappearance and homicide of a subordinate employee, Youth Correctional Counselor Ineasie Baker. CYA believes Baker was killed by a ward (who has been charged with her murder), and Henderson failed to investigate after hearing her arguing with the ward.

Henderson contested his dismissal, and, after hearing evidence, an administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a Proposed Decision allowing CYA to dismiss Henderson. However, the State Personnel Board (SPB) did not adopt the ALJ's Proposed Decision but instead issued its own decision revoking Henderson's dismissal.

CYA appeals from the trial court's denial of CYA's petition for a writ of administrative mandamus seeking to overturn the SPB's decision.¹ CYA contends SPB's findings are not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record, and, in measuring the evidence, this court must pay special deference to findings of the ALJ based on witness credibility. We requested supplemental briefing on the potential applicability of a statute not cited by the parties—Government Code section 11425.50, which requires a reviewing court to give great weight to certain credibility determinations in administrative adjudications. (Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.)

In the published portion of the opinion, we shall conclude section 11425.50 applies to credibility determinations by an ALJ in SPB administrative adjudications of employment disciplinary actions (§ 19570 et seq.), but the ALJ in this case did not make the type of credibility determinations that would trigger section 11425.50. Thus, in reviewing the administrative record for substantial evidence, we shall not give special weight to the credibility determinations of the ALJ.

We shall also conclude that, in evaluating the substantiality of the evidence in this appeal, we shall consider all relevant evidence in the administrative record, including evidence that fairly detracts from the evidence supporting the agency's decision.

In an unpublished portion of the opinion applying these rules, we shall conclude that substantial evidence supports the SPB's determination. We shall therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Henderson began working for CYA in 1978 and in 1989 achieved the classification of Senior Youth Counselor (now known as Senior Youth Correctional Counselor). At the time in question, he was assigned to the "C/D Company" at CYA's Heman G. Stark Youth Training School (the facility) in Chino, California.

On August 9, 1996, Youth Counselor Baker, who was also assigned to C/D Company at the facility, worked a 5:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. shift, as shift coordinator. Henderson worked the 1:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. shift that day. He was Baker's relief, but he did not make verbal or visual contact with her that day. He did, however, hear Baker's voice, the circumstances of which are in dispute.

The following day, August 10,1996, Baker's family phoned the facility around 4:00 a.m. and again at 7:20 a.m, because Baker never returned home on August 9.

Evidence was adduced at Henderson's administrative hearing regarding conversations which were held throughout the day (August 10, 1996) in which staff discussed the situation and during which Henderson stated he had heard Baker's voice around 1:00 p.m. on August 9. According to Henderson, he was walking down the hall toward his office when he heard Baker's voice speaking loudly, which was not unusual for her. According to Henderson, that was the only time he heard Baker's voice that day. According to some other participants in the August 10 conversations, Henderson commented on August 10 that when he heard Baker's voice on August 9, he was in the control center, and when he made the comments on August 10 he demonstrated that when he heard Baker's voice on August 9 he leaned over to look down the hallway, did not see anything, and went back to his paperwork. The witnesses also said Henderson said he heard Baker arguing with someone and her voice stopped abruptly in midsentence.

It is undisputed, however, that whatever Henderson said on August 10 did not cause any immediate reaction among those participating in the conversations (though some later testified they thought to themselves at the time that Henderson should have investigated).

Also on August 10, 1996, it was discovered that Baker's car was still in the parking lot. It was then discovered that she had not picked up her overtime check, her purse was still in supervisor Rivera's office, and her chewing gum was discovered outside her locker. A ward had fresh scratches on his face.

At about 8:45 a.m, the facility was placed on "lockdown," and a search commenced. Baker was not found.

On August 11, 1996, her dead body was found in a trash dump site in Pomona, California.

In April 1997, CYA sent to Henderson a Notice of Adverse Action dismissing him from his position as a Senior Youth Counselor effective April 15 11997, for the following causes under the following subdivisions of section 19572:

"(d) Inexcusable neglect of duty.

"(e) Insubordination.

"(f) Dishonesty.

"(m) Discourteous treatment of the public or other employees.

"(o) Willful disobedience.

"(t) Other failure of good behavior either during or outside of duty hours which is of such a nature that it causes discredit to the appointing authority or the person's employment."

The Notice of Adverse Action alleged as follows:

Henderson failed to relieve Baker properly at the end of her shift on August 9, 1996, by failing to make verbal and visual contact with her. Henderson failed to investigate Baker's well-being in response to circumstances which should have caused him to investigate, in that (1) after Baker failed to report to work on August 10, 1996, Henderson commented to others that he had heard Baker engaged in a verbal confrontation with a ward the previous day and her voice had stopped in mid-sentence; and (2) within one-half hour of the end of Baker's shift on August 9, 1996, two employees had inquired as to her whereabouts because they had not seen her leave through the recreation yard as was her usual routine.

The Notice of Adverse Action also alleged Henderson was dishonest during an administrative interview with CYA investigators on December 26, 1996, in that he denied hearing or saying he heard the verbal confrontation between Baker and a ward. It alleged Henderson failed to write an incident report as directed and was dishonest in denying that a supervisor told him to write an incident report. The Notice alleged that when a supervisor instructed Henderson to maintain an accurate accounting of his on-duty staffs whereabouts at all times, he refused to be responsible and refused to keep track of "grown folks." It was also alleged that Henderson offered to bet another employee $100 that search dogs would not find any evidence in the room of the ward who at that time was suspected of being involved in Baker's disappearance.

In response to the Notice of Adverse Action, Henderson requested an administrative hearing before an ALJ.

[104 Cal.App.4th 482]

After the administrative hearing, the ALJ in November 1998 issued a Proposed Decision to sustain CYA's dismissal of Henderson. The ALJ determined Henderson inexcusably neglected his duty by failing to make visual or verbal contact with Baker at the end of her shift and by failing to investigate after he heard Baker's voice abruptly stop while speaking to a ward, particularly after two workers asked where she was because they had not seen her leave. The ALJ also concluded Henderson was dishonest in the investigative interview, and he was insubordinate and willfully disobedient in failing to comply with his supervisor's instructions. Thus, the ALJ's Proposed Decision was to sustain CYA's dismissal of Henderson.

However, SPB at its November 17, 1998, meeting rejected the ALJ's Proposed Decision and asked the parties to brief various issues, including (1) whether any written directive required Henderson to make contact with Baker at the beginning of his shift, (2) whether any written directive required Henderson to investigate when he heard Baker involved in an argument, and (3) what is the appropriate penalty.²

Both parties submitted written argument and presented oral argument before SPB on April 6,1999.

The SPB issued a decision revoking Henderson's dismissal.

SPB thereafter denied CYA's petition for rehearing.

In April 2000, CYA filed in the trial court a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc, § 1094.5) requesting the court to find SPB's decision unsupported by substantial evidence and to command SPB to set aside its decision.

The trial court denied the writ petition, stating that after "full consideration of the evidence," it ruled "[SPB] wrote a very careful and good decision. There is substantial evidence to support [SPB's] findings of credibility and fact." The court accordingly entered judgment in favor of Henderson.

CYA appealed.

We shall first discuss the appropriate standard of review to be applied by this court.

We shall then recite the raw evidence adduced at the administrative...