Yuma County Attorney v. McGuire
Decision Date | 27 February 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 11867,11867 |
Citation | 111 Ariz. 437,532 P.2d 157 |
Parties | YUMA COUNTY ATTORNEY, Petitioner, v. The Honorable John A. McGUIRE, Judge of the Superior Court, and Thomas Franklin Lutz, Respondents. |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Wm. Michael Smith, Yuma County Atty. by John N. Nelson, Deputy County Atty., Yuma, for petitioner.
John A. McGuire, in pro. per.
Nelson & Moran by Garth Nelson, Yuma, for respondent Lutz.
The Yuma County Attorney filed a petition for special action and this court accepted jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that the respondent judge erred in supporessing evidence seized in a warrantless search. The simple issue as stated by the petitioner and concurred in by respondents is:
'May a spouse give consent to the search of their home when each spouse exercises control and dominion over the house and the other spouse is not present but is a suspect to a crime.'
It is difficult to fault the judge for ruling as he did for this question was answered negatively by the Supreme Court in State v. Pina, 94 Ariz. 243, 383 P.2d 167 (1963). Obviously we accepted jurisdiction to take a second look at the problem.
The specific facts in this case concern the alleged burglary of the Venus Adult Theatre in Yuma, Arizona. The police suspected that Thomas Franklin Lutz had some connection with the burglary and two officers proceeded to his home. Lutz was not at home, but when Mrs. Lutz came to the door, she was advised that her husband was a suspect in a burglary. The officers asked if they could come in and search for some pornographic materials that had been taken in the alleged burglary. Mrs. Lutz consented to the search and took them to a back bedroom closet where the materials were found. A pair of boots was also taken to be matched to boot prints at the scene of the alleged crime.
Was this search unreasonable or illegal? We are reluctant to overrule a case which has been the law in Arizona for over twelve years, State v. Pina, Supra, but that case is overbroad in holding that '(o)bviously a third person cannot waive another's basic constitutional rights against unlawful searches and seizures unless specifically authorized.' 94 Ariz. at 247, 383 P.2d at 169.
A quote from United States v. Wilson, 447 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Polk v. United States, 404 U.S. 1053, 92 S.Ct. 723, 30 L.Ed.2d 742 (1972), sets forth the principle and numerous authorities on this point.
'It belabors the obvious to point out that in the parlance of the day, Dawson and Polk were 'living together' in a common-law status. The record indicates that Dawson had unrestricted accessibility to the apartment. Indeed, the totality of this 'arrangement' is evidenced by Dawson having her 447 F.2d at 5--6.
The United States Supreme Court has considered this problem in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974).
We are aware that as to a marital relationship the argument may be used that to permit a spouse to consent to a search would be destructive of that relationship. We do not see the need to have a special rule of law here. Our position is well stated by the following quotation from Commonwealth v. Sebastian, 500 S.W.2d 417 (Ky.1973):
The respondent Lutz's motion to suppress having brought about the delay in the criminal proceedings, it is ordered that said period of delay is an excluded period. Rule 8, 1973 Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S.
The order granting the motion to suppress is vacated in Yuma County Criminal Action No. 7421, State of Arizona v. Thomas Franklin Lutz.
As I understand the majority, their reasons for overruling State v. Pina, 94 Ariz. 243, 383 P.2d 167, since they give no others, are those set forth in the quotation from Commonwealth v. Sebastian (Ky.), 500 S.W.2d 417, 419 (1973), that 'the more acceptable position, especially in view of the modern trend toward equalization of the rights and obligations of men and women, is that a wife's voluntary consent to a search of a home makes admissible as evidence against a husband the fruits of a search.' No reason is stated in Commonwealth v. Sebastian why this position is more acceptable, other than a modern trend toward the equalization of rights of men and women. How the rights of men and women are thereby equalized is not explained. If the statement is intended to mean that it is more enlightened to allow a wife to invite the police into the home to search for evidence with which to prosecute her husband criminally, then, indeed, I dissent. I do not believe criminal justice requires that one spouse invite an invasion of the home by police officers without a warrant who then may indiscriminately search for evidence upon which to base a criminal charge against the other spouse.
The decision in Pina was bottomed on sound social policy. Marriage and the home...
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