Yurecka v. Zappala
| Decision Date | 28 December 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-2468.,05-2468. |
| Citation | 472 F.3d 59 |
| Parties | Marie M. YURECKA, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of William J. Yurecka, Deceased, and as Natural Guardian of M.M. Yurecka and K.W. Yurecka, Minors; Brian R. Yurecka, Appellants v. Jeffrey ZAPPALA; Arlene Piccioni-Zappala, Defendants-/Third-Party Plaintiffs v. Ronald M. Rockwell; Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission; Ronald C. Rockwell, Third-Party Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Paul T. Sheppard, Esquire (Argued) Hinman, Howard & Kattell, Binghamton, NY, for Appellants.
Louis E. Bricklin, Esquire (Argued) Lawrence R. Berger, III, Esquire Bennett, Bricklin & Saltzburg, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellees.
Before McKEE and AMBRO, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,* Judge.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Marie Yurecka, individually and as administratrix of the Estate of William Yurecka, and as natural guardian of M.M. Yurecka and K.W. Yurecka, and Brian Yurecka appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The District Court granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Jeffrey Zappala and Arlene Piccioni-Zappala on the ground that the rescue doctrine does not support the Yureckas' claims arising from two automobile accidents on the Pennsylvania Turnpike, the second of which caused the death of William Yurecka. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the rescue was ongoing at the time of the second accident, and reverse and remand for further proceedings.
This action arises from two automobile accidents that occurred on the Pennsylvania Turnpike on the evening of May 12, 2002. The following facts are undisputed.
While driving north on the Turnpike in heavy rainfall, William Yurecka, his wife Marie Yurecka, and their three children saw a white Toyota 4-Runner pass their vehicle and travel out of sight. The Toyota 4-Runner was driven by Jeffrey Zappala, and seated in the front passenger seat was his wife, Arlene Piccioni-Zappala. The Yureckas later noticed the Toyota 4-Runner lying overturned off of the right side of the highway. They decided to stop to provide assistance, as both Mr. and Mrs. Yurecka were trained and certified in first aid by the Red Cross. The Yureckas pulled to the side of the highway, parked their minivan with the "hazard lights" flashing, exited the vehicle and walked downhill toward the 4-Runner.
As the Yureckas approached the Zappalas' vehicle, which was visibly totaled as a result of the accident, the Zappalas managed to climb out through the rear of their vehicle.1 Although the Zappalas said that they were "all right" and appeared externally uninjured, they followed the Yureckas to their minivan, where the Yureckas made room for them to sit under the minivan's rear hatch to provide shelter from the heavy rain. Mr. Yurecka walked to a nearby emergency call box to phone the police and then returned to the minivan to assist the Zappalas. The Yureckas' three children remained inside the passenger compartment.
While the Zappalas sat beneath the rear hatch of the Yureckas' minivan, the Yureckas verbally comforted them, provided them with warm blankets and a pair of shoes for Mrs. Zappala, who had lost hers in the accident, and stayed with them to monitor for possible shock and other injuries while the Zappalas waited for police to arrive.
Approximately seventeen minutes later, while the Zappalas waited inside the Yureckas' minivan, a third vehicle, driven by Third-Party Defendant Robert Rockwell, lost control on the wet highway. His vehicle swerved and hydroplaned into the Yureckas' parked vehicle. Mr. Yurecka, who had been standing near the rear corner of the minivan, was hit by the Rockwell vehicle and dragged north into the left lane of the Turnpike. The police arrived after Mr. Yurecka was hit, and he was transported to the hospital, where he died as a result of multiple traumatic injuries from the collision.
In May 2004, the Yureckas brought an action for wrongful death, survival claims, and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the Zappalas in the Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, Court of Common Pleas. The case was then removed to the Middle District of Pennsylvania on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The Yureckas' claims were based on the Zappalas' negligence in causing the first accident, which prompted the Yureckas to come to their rescue, placing Mr. Yurecka in the way of harm that ultimately led to his death. The Zappalas argued that any rescue was completed at the time of the subsequent accident, and that the rescue doctrine no longer applied.
The District Court agreed, granting a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the rescue doctrine did not apply at the time of the second accident.2 The Court also found, however, that the Zappalas were driving at an unsafe speed at the time of their accident, and that the Yureckas had been rescuers at the time they stopped to provide assistance. Yurecka v. Zappala, No. 04-CV-1352, slip op. at 3, 12 (M.D.Pa. Apr. 20, 2005). On April 20, 2005, the District Court granted the motion for summary judgment on all counts of the complaint in favor of the Zappalas. The Yureckas appeal.
We have jurisdiction to review a final decision of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Fertilizer Inst. v. Browner, 163 F.3d 774, 777 (3d Cir.1998). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the District Court to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. Id.; see also Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). All facts must be viewed "`in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,'" Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)), and the burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
A federal court sitting in diversity is required to apply the substantive law of the state whose laws govern the action. Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 378 (3d Cir.1990). In the absence of any clear precedent of the state's highest court, we must predict how that court would resolve the issue. Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 524, 528 n. 3 (3d Cir.1997). In making such a prediction, we should consider "`relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending convincingly to show how the highest court in the state would resolve the issue at hand.'" Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buffetta, 230 F.3d 634, 637 (3d Cir.2000) (quoting McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir.1980)).
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not clearly defined the scope of Pennsylvania's rescue doctrine, other existing case law indicates that a rescuer plaintiff may recover for injuries suffered in the course of a rescue if it can be shown that: 1) the defendant negligently caused the dangerous situation; 2) the person requiring rescue was in imminent peril or the rescuer reasonably believed that such peril existed; and 3) the rescuer's actions during the rescue were not reckless. See Pachesky v. Getz, 353 Pa.Super. 505, 510 A.2d 776, 780-83 (1986). Altamuro v. Milner Hotel, Inc., states that "[i]n applying the rescue doctrine, [the court] must first determine the negligence vel non of the [defendant]." 540 F.Supp. 870, 875 (E.D.Pa.1982). The Pennsylvania Superior Court has also recognized that "the situation precipitating the `rescue' must warrant a reasonable belief that the peril facing the object of the rescue was urgent and imminent." Bell v. Irace, 422 Pa.Super. 298, 619 A.2d 365, 369 (1993). This approach reflects the broadly accepted rescue doctrine principle that "a plaintiff remains in the course of a rescue attempt where the plaintiff acts under a reasonable belief that the endangered party's peril continues." Sweetman v. State Highway Dept., 137 Mich.App. 14, 357 N.W.2d 783, 790 (1984); see also Wagner v. Intl. Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437, 438 (1921); Estate of Keck By and Through Cabe v. Blair, 71 Wash.App. 105, 856 P.2d 740, 746 (1993). Finally, Pachesky states that rescuer plaintiffs may recover for injuries suffered in the course of a rescue if they acted "`in the exercise of ordinary care for their own safety under the circumstances, short of rashness and recklessness.'" Pachesky, 510 A.2d at 781 (quoting Walker Hauling Co. v. Johnson, 110 Ga.App. 620, 139 S.E.2d 496, 499 (1964)).3
The Zappalas do not dispute for summary judgment purposes that Mr. Zappala was negligent in causing the first accident, and have not alleged that the Yureckas acted recklessly in carrying out the rescue. Rather, the Zappalas contend that there was no imminent peril at the time of the second accident, and that the Yureckas had no reasonable belief that such peril existed. Therefore, the decisive issue in this case is the second element of the rescue doctrine test: whether there existed either continued peril or a reasonable belief of such peril in the minds of the rescuers at the time of Mr. Yurecka's fatal injury.
Under the rescue doctrine, peril is defined as risk of "suffering serious injury or death." Bell, 619 A.2d at 369. The peril must be "imminent and real, and not merely imaginary or speculative." Holle v. Lake, 194 Kan. 200, 398 P.2d 300, 304 (1965). Reasonable belief of such peril requires "more than a suspicion of danger," but does not require actual injury or unmistakable...
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