Yvonne Poindexter Representative Poindexter v. Joseph Zacharzewski Representative Roney
| Decision Date | 05 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 18-14155-CIV-ROSENBERG/MAYNARD |
| Parties | YVONNE POINDEXTER as Personal Representative of the Estate of BRITNEY POINDEXTER, deceased, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH ZACHARZEWSKI as Personal Representative of the Estate of WALTER RONEY, deceased; JOSEPH A. ZACHARZEWSKI, as Trustee of the WALTER A. RONEY TRUST, and CAROLYN E. EVANS BRUNS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon the above referenced Motion filed by Joseph Zacharzewski ("Defendant") as Personal Representative of the Estate of Walter Roney. D.E. 46. Plaintiff responded on September 27, 2018. D.E. 55. On October 4, 2018, Defendant replied. D.E. 56. Having reviewed the Motion, Response, and Reply, this Court recommends that the Motion be granted for the reasons that follow.
At approximately 7:00 p.m. on February 6, 2018, Walter Roney was driving a 1986 Prevost Vehicle ("RV") with Carolyn Evans Brans in St. Lucie County, Florida. D.E. 24 at ¶12. Mr. Roney was driving westbound in the eastbound lane of Route 70 without headlights when the RV crashed into a 2013 Chevrolet Silverado driven by Santia Feketa. Id. Britney Poindexter was in the front passenger seat of Ms. Feketa's vehicle. Id. Ms. Feketa, Ms. Poindexter, and Mr. Roney died as a result of the crash. Id.
Plaintiff Yvonne Poindexter, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Britney Poindexter, filed her initial complaint on April 26, 2018. D.E. 1. On June 4, 2018, Defendant filed an Answer, D.E. 13, and two Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim.1 D.E. 12, 14. Notably, Defendant did not dispute Plaintiff's entitlement to punitive damages at that time, but alleged instead that punitive damages are not an independent cause of action. D.E. 14 at 1. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on June 13, 2018, D.E. 20, and a Second Amended Complaint on June 14, 2018, D.E. 24.
In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged negligence (Count I), negligent entrustment (Count II), and joint enterprise (Count III) against Defendant as Personal Representative of Mr. Roney's Estate. Id. at ¶¶21-43. Plaintiff also alleged negligence (Count IV), negligent entrustment (Count V), and joint enterprise (Count VI) against Defendant as Trustee of Mr. Roney's Estate. Id. at ¶¶44-76. Plaintiff lastly alleged negligence (Count VII) and joint enterprise (Count VIII) against Ms. Evans Bruns.2 Id. at ¶¶77-82. Plaintiff requests damages under the Florida Wrongful Death Act on behalf of herself, Todd Poindexter as asurvivor, and the Estate of Britney Poindexter. Id. at ¶¶21-60. She also requests punitive damages in Counts I through VI. Id. at ¶¶21-76.
On June 28, 2018, Defendant filed an Answer, D.E. 29, and moved to dismiss Counts IV, V, and VI brought against him as Trustee of Mr. Roney's Estate. D.E. 30. The District Court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss because there was no allegation that the trust was negligent or somehow responsible for Mr. Roney's driving. D.E. 38. Left standing are Counts I, II and III against Defendant as Personal Representative of the Estate and Counts VII and VIII against Ms. Evans Bruns. Counts I, II and III include a request for punitive damages.
On August 31, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel seeking documents relating to Mr. Roney's financial worth on the basis that financial worth evidence is relevant to Plaintiff's punitive damages request. D.E. 42. Defendant objected on the grounds that Florida law prohibits an award of punitive damages against a decedent's estate and therefore Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages or discovery relating thereto. D.E. 44. On September 13, 2018, Defendant filed the present Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Claims for Punitive Damages. D.E. 46. That same day, the undersigned held a telephonic hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. D.E. 47. The undersigned denied Plaintiff's Motion to Compel financial worth discovery "without prejudice with leave to re-file after an Order is issued" on Defendant's Motion to Strike. D.E. 49. On September 13, 2018, the District Court referred Defendant's Motion to Strike, D.E. 49, to the undersigned magistrate judge. D.E. 48.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the Court "may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." FED.R.CIV.P. 12(f). "[A] motion to strike is the appropriate mechanism to pursue removal of the prayer for ... damages in the Complaint." Pucci v. Carnival Corp., 160 F. Supp. 3d 1329,1331 (S.D. Fla. 2016). The decision to strike a request for damages in a pleading is committed to the district court's broad discretion. Id. (citing Porcelanas Florencia, S.A. v. Caribbean Resort Suppliers, Inc., 2007 WL 171590, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 2007)).
Defendant asks the Court to strike Plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages because punitive damages are not recoverable against a deceased tortfeasor's estate under Florida law. The governing case on this issue is Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988), where the Florida Supreme Court addressed facts similar to the present litigation. Robert Lohr was killed in an automobile accident that he caused while he was driving under the influence. Id. at 846. Plaintiff Hattie Mae Byrd was injured in the accident and sued Lohr's estate, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Id. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff granting both compensatory and punitive damages. Id. The appeals court certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of whether punitive damages may be awarded against a deceased tortfeasor's estate. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, reasoning that punitive damages are awarded "solely for punishment," and a "decedent's innocent heirs should not be punished when the wrongdoer is unavailable because of death." Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 846 (emphasis in original).3 Thus, Florida law prohibits recovery of punitive damages from the estate of a wrongdoer who is deceased.
Plaintiff responds that the Court should apply federal law instead of Florida law because the question of punitive damages is procedural, not substantive. See D.E. 55 at 2 (). Plaintiff'sassertion is not correct. Courts have long held that a party's entitlement to punitive damages in a diversity case is determined by state substantive law. See, e.g., Jarzynka v. St. Thomas University of Law, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1269 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (); see also Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000) (); Dunn v. Koehring Co., 546 F. 2d 1193, 1201 (5th Cir. 1977)4 (); Barnes v. Smith, 305 F.2d 226, 231 (10th Cir. 1962) (); Potter v. Dooly Cty., Georgia, 2016 WL 4150005, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 2, 2016), motion to certify appeal denied sub nom. Potter v. Dooly Cty., 2016 WL 6997067 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 29, 2016) ().
Plaintiff relies on the case of Citron v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1259, 1261 (S.D. Fla. 1989) to support her argument that entitlement to punitive damages is a procedural question governed by federal law, but Citron is not applicable here. The issue in Citron was whether Fla. Stat. § 768.72 applies in federal diversity cases. Id. at 1260. Section 768.72 requires a plaintiff to show the court a reasonable basis for punitive damages before seeking punitive damages in a lawsuit. The Citron Court concluded that Fla. Stat. § 768.72 is a pleading (and therefore procedural) requirement that conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which require a plaintiff to set forth a demand for punitive damages in the complaint. Id. at 1261. Applying Erie and its progeny, Citron resolved the conflict by finding Fla. Stat. §768.72 inapplicable in federal court. Id. at 1262. Unlike Citron, the present dispute does not involve the sufficiency of Plaintiff's pleadings or any other procedural matter. It involves the substantive issue of whether punitive damages are available where the alleged wrongdoer has died and the Defendant is the wrongdoer's estate. Courts sitting in diversity cases have repeatedly answered this question with reference to controlling state law. See Jarzynka, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 1269; Toole, 235 F.3d at 1317; Barnes, 305 F.2d at 231; Potter, 2016 WL 4150005, at *3.
Lohr analyzed the public policy considerations and ramifications, and concluded that punitive damages are not available against a deceased tortfeasor's estate under Florida law. Snyder v. Bell, 746 So. 2d 1096, 1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); see also Herendeen v. Mandelbaum, 232 So. 3d 487, 492 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017), review denied, 2018 WL 3239289 (Fla. July 3, 2018) (). Despite Plaintiff's detailed arguments about why this rule should be changed, this Court is constrained by Florida law and is not at liberty to re-weigh the various considerations and reach a different conclusion. This Court is bound by and must apply the law of Florida's highest court....
To continue reading
Request your trial