A.Z. v. Santa Maria Joint Union High School District

• Decision Date: 13 July 2021
• Docket Number: 2d Civil B306374
• Parties: A.Z., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SANTA MARIA JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

A.Z., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SANTA MARIA JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

2d Civil No. B306374

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division

July 13, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara No. 19CV00978 Jed Beebe, Judge

Hoyt E. Hart II, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

MC Law Group and Molly Thurmond, Cyrus Khosh-Chashm, for Defendant and Respondent.

YEGAN J.

When appellant was a fifteen-year-old high school student, she suffered traumatic brain injury. The school district, despite an effort to provide her a free appropriate education allegedly failed to do so. She sues only for monetary damages alleging a violation of her federal civil rights guaranteed by the “Americans with Disability Act” and the “Rehabilitation Act of 1973.” At no time did she exhaust her administrative remedy to require the school district to cure its alleged “failure” to adequately provide her with a free appropriate education. This is fatal to the instant lawsuit. We are compelled to affirm.

A.Z appeals from the judgment entered in favor of Santa Maria Joint Union High School District (District) after the trial court had sustained District's demurrer without leave to amend. When the judgment was entered in April 2020, appellant was 19 years old. She claims that, as the result of a fall in 2015, she suffered a traumatic brain injury (TBI). Her complaint consists of a single cause of action alleging that she suffered permanent injury because, in violation of federal law, District failed to provide educational services tailored to meet her TBI.

The Complaint

Appellant was a student at Earnest Righetti High School within the District. The complaint alleged that in August 2015 she “was diagnosed” with a TBI.^[1] District “was notified of the TBI... and... identified [her] as disabled and issued her first section 504 plan, without having conducted any assessment or evaluation.” Section 504 (29 U.S.C. § 794) is part of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The section “protects handicapped persons of all ages from discrimination in a variety of programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance.” (Smith v. Robinson (1984) 468 U.S. 992, 1017 overturned by statute on another ground as stated in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools (2017) ____ U.S. ____, [137 S.Ct. 743, 746, 750] (Fry).) Section 504 has been interpreted “as requiring a recipient of federal funds that operates a public elementary or secondary education program to provide a free appropriate public education [FAPE] to each qualified handicapped person in the recipient's jurisdiction.” (Ibid.; see Mark H. v. Lemahieu (9th Cir. 2008) 513 F.3d 922, 930.)

The complaint continued: District “failed to comply with... statutory mandates in preparing [appellant's] section 504 plans in that it performed no assessment or evaluation.” Her “section 504 plans... recommended accommodations negligently based on the “best guess” of unqualified personnel as to what the general class of students with TBI would need. This approach did not and cannot comply with the mandates for assessment and evaluation because students with TBI will present with different needs for support based on what part of the brain is affected, time since injury, associated symptoms, and how the injury has impacted the student's ability to think and learn.”

“Due to District's deliberate refusal to meet [appellant's] disability mandated and medically ordered academic modifications..., appellant fell behind and had to transfer to Delta High School during her Junior year to try to catch up.... [She] did not catch up. Prior to her senior year, [appellant] was finally evaluated by [a] neuropsychologist who documented the cluster of symptoms typical of TBI even two years post injury, and made a report from which appropriate modifications could be designed.... [But] District washed it[s] hands of [appellant] by simply graduating her early without qualified testing results....”

The complaint alleged only a single cause of action - denial of appellant's civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It stated: District “failed and refused to comply with disability accommodation mandates required by the ADA [Americans with Disabilities Act] and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.” District “was negligent in that it failed to comply with the standards of care mandated by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 504, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act [(IDEA - 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq.)].” “As a direct and proximate result of District's failure and refusal to comply with... statutory mandates, [appellant's] documented disabilities were exacerbated and her TBI recovery stunted. Consequently, [she] has suffered, and will continue to suffer, permanent physical, mental, and emotional injury. Upon graduation in 2018, [she] was unable to manage basic math, could not manage her own money, and was unable to drive. Due to the worsened condition of her disabilities, [she] is unemployable and will require medical and supportive care for the rest of her life....” In its prayer for relief, the complaint seeks special and general damages according to proof.

Trial Court's Ruling on Demurrer

In its order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, the trial court ruled: “The gravamen of this case is for permanent injury allegedly caused by [District's] failure to comply with statutory mandates of the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (‘IDEA'). The IDEA provides relief solely for the denial of a free appropriate public education (‘FAPE'). The administrative exhaustion requirements set forth in the IDEA apply in any action based on the denial of a FAPE.... [Appellant] has not exhausted the required administrative remedies, and her claims against [District] cannot proceed until such time as she has done so.”^[2]

The IDEA “offers federal funds to States in exchange for a commitment to furnish a [FAPE] to children with certain disabilities, [citation], and establishes formal administrative procedures for resolving disputes between parents and schools concerning the provision of a FAPE.” (Fry, supra, 137 S.Ct. at p. 746.)

Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools

In Fry, supra, 137 S.Ct. 743, the United States Supreme Court clarified the scope of the IDEA's exhaustion requirement. This requirement is set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (section 1415(l)), which provides in relevant part: “‘Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the [ADA], title V of the Rehabilitation Act [including § 504], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA], the [IDEA's administrative procedures] shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under [the IDEA].'” (Fry, supra, at p. 750 [bracketed material in original].)

“The IDEA... protects only ‘children'... and concerns only their schooling. [Citation.]... [T]he statute's goal is to provide each child with meaningful access to education by offering individualized instruction and related services appropriate to her ‘unique needs.'” (Fry, supra, 137 S.Ct. at p. 755.) “In short, the IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services, while [the ADA] and § 504 promise non-discriminatory access to public institutions.” (Id. at p. 756.) “Under the IDEA, an ‘individualized education program,' called an IEP for short, serves as the ‘primary vehicle' for providing each child with the promised FAPE. [Citations.]... Crafted by a child's ‘IEP Team'-a group of school officials, teachers, and parents-the IEP spells out a personalized plan to meet all of the child's ‘educational needs.'” (Id. at p. 749.)

The Supreme Court stated: “Section 1415(l) requires that a plaintiff exhaust the IDEA's procedures before filing an action under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or similar laws when (but only when) her suit ‘seek[s] relief that is also available' under the IDEA. We first hold that to meet that statutory standard, a suit must seek relief for the denial of a FAPE, because that is the only ‘relief' the IDEA makes ‘available.' We next conclude that in determining whether a suit indeed ‘seeks' relief for such a denial, a court should look to the substance, or gravamen, of the plaintiff's complaint.” (Fry, supra, 137 S.Ct. at p. 752, fn. omitted.)

The Supreme Court explained: “[Section] 1415(l)'s exhaustion rule hinges on whether a lawsuit seeks relief for the denial of a free appropriate public education [FAPE]. If a lawsuit charges such a denial, the plaintiff cannot escape § 1415(l) merely by bringing her suit under a statute other than the IDEA-as when, for example, the plaintiff[]... claim[s] that a school's failure to provide a FAPE also violated the Rehabilitation Act. Rather, that plaintiff must first submit her case to an IDEA hearing officer, experienced in addressing exactly the issues she raises. But if, in a suit brought under a different statute, the remedy sought is not for the denial of a FAPE, then exhaustion of the IDEA's procedures is not required. After all, the plaintiff could not get any relief from those procedures: A hearing officer... would have to send her away empty-handed.... [T]he only ‘relief' the IDEA makes ‘available' is relief for the denial of a FAPE.” (Fry, supra, 137 S.Ct. at pp. 754-755.)

The Trial Court Properly Required

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

As indicated, appellant contends that the trial court erroneously required her to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA. She concedes that “[t]he trial...