Zab v. Rhode Island Department of Corrections
| Decision Date | 02 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2019-459-Appeal.,2019-462-Appeal.,PM 17-4195,PC 17-433 |
| Citation | 269 A.3d 741 |
| Parties | Cody-Allen ZAB v. RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al. Jose R. Rivera v. State of Rhode Island Department of Corrections, by and through its Director, Patricia Coyne-Fague, in her official capacity. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Sonja L. Deyoe, Esq., for Plaintiffs
Katherine C. Sadeck, Department of Attorney General, for Defendants
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court.
In these consolidated appeals, the plaintiffs, Cody-Allen Zab (Zab) and Jose R. Rivera (Rivera) (collectively plaintiffs), appeal from Superior Court judgments entered in favor of the defendants, the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (DOC), Director Patricia Coyne-Fague in her official capacity (DOC Director), and Global Tel*Link Corporation (Global) (collectively defendants).1 Before this Court, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in finding that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' claims based on G.L. 1956 § 13-6-1, Rhode Island's civil death statute (the civil death statute).2 For the reasons stated herein, we have determined that the entirety of the civil death statute is unconstitutional and in clear contravention of the provisions of article 1, section 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution.3
It is undisputed that plaintiffs are serving sentences of life imprisonment at the Adult Correctional Institutions. Zab pled guilty to one count of first-degree murder and arson charges; on April 9, 2008, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Zab v. Zab , 203 A.3d 1175, 1175 (R.I. 2019) (mem.).4 Rivera was convicted of sexually assaulting three developmentally disabled women and was sentenced to life imprisonment, plus sixteen years. State v. Rivera , 987 A.2d 887, 893, 897 (R.I. 2010).5
The plaintiffs assert that while imprisoned at the ACI they incurred injuries due to defendants' negligence. Specifically, Zab alleges that his arm was severely burned and permanently disfigured when he made contact with an exposed hot water pipe at the ACI. The pipe was located adjacent to telephones used by inmates, and Zab alleges that defendants knew about the hazard but failed to mitigate the danger it posed. Zab filed suit against defendants in the Superior Court, asserting a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his constitutional rights, as well as a state law claim for negligence. Rivera alleges that he suffered a broken ankle when he was ordered by DOC employees to walk across an icy walkway at the ACI and, as a result of the icy and untreated conditions, he slipped and fell. Rivera filed suit against the DOC in the Superior Court, asserting only a state law claim for negligence.
Zab and defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the DOC filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in the Rivera action. Arguments and consideration of the motions for summary judgment and the motion for judgment on the pleadings were consolidated in the Superior Court. The issue before the hearing justice was whether plaintiffs' negligence claims were barred by the civil death statute, which provides that "[e]very person imprisoned in the adult correctional institutions for life shall, with respect to all rights of property, to the bond of matrimony and to all civil rights and relations of any nature whatsoever, be deemed to be dead in all respects[.]" Section 13-6-1. In addition, and only as to the Zab case, the hearing justice was faced with whether Zab could establish a § 1983 claim, whether his request for injunctive relief was moot, and whether federal law provided for monetary damages against defendants.
At the conclusion of oral arguments, the hearing justice issued a bench decision, concluding that the civil death statute barred plaintiffs' negligence claims. The hearing justice also ruled that Zab's § 1983 federal claim failed as a matter of law because Zab had not sued a person, as required by the statute.
On September 11, 2019, the hearing justice entered the following orders and judgments: (1) an order in the Zab matter granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and denying Zab's motion for summary judgment; (2) an order in the Rivera matter granting the DOC's motion for judgment on the pleadings, or alternatively motion for summary judgment; and (3) judgments in both matters in favor of defendants.6 The plaintiffs filed timely notices of appeal and we granted the parties' joint motion to consolidate the two appeals.
"This Court reviews a decision granting a party's motion for summary judgment de novo ." Middle Creek Farm, LLC v. Portsmouth Water & Fire District , 252 A.3d 745, 750 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature Controls, Inc. , 212 A.3d 594, 598 (R.I. 2019) ). We, like the hearing justice, "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and if we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the judgment." Id. at 751 (quoting Boudreau , 212 A.3d at 598 ).
Moreover, it is well settled that "[t]he judicial branch * * * is the ‘ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.’ " In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor , 732 A.2d 55, 69 (R.I. 1999) (quoting City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun , 662 A.2d 40, 58 (R.I. 1995) ). Accordingly, "this Court is the only body authorized to finally determine the constitutionality of a statute." Id. (citing Sundlun , 662 A.2d at 58 ); see R.I. Const., art. 10, § 2 ().
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the civil death statute is unconstitutional because it violates their right to access the courts and seek a remedy for wrong done to them. In addition, Zab maintains that the civil death statute is unconstitutional because it prevents him from asserting a § 1983 claim.
We first address Zab's claim that the civil death statute violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, clause 2, because it prevents him from bringing a Superior Court action under § 1983. The Supremacy Clause "preempts or invalidates state law that interferes or conflicts with any federal law." Verizon New England Inc. v. Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission , 822 A.2d 187, 192 (R.I. 2003). Accordingly, it has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court that "state courts have inherent authority * * * to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States" and that state courts may not be divested of jurisdiction except in narrowly defined circumstances. Haywood v. Drown , 556 U.S. 729, 735-36, 129 S.Ct. 2108, 173 L.Ed.2d 920 (2009) (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt , 493 U.S. 455, 458, 110 S.Ct. 792, 107 L.Ed.2d 887 (1990) ).
Although Zab contends that the civil death statute is unconstitutional because it divests the Superior Court of jurisdiction to hear his § 1983 claim, it is clear to us that the hearing justice dismissed the § 1983 claim on the merits and not based on the authority of the court to proceed. In his complaint, Zab sought declaratory relief finding that defendants violated the United States Constitution, injunctive relief ordering defendants to remedy the burn hazard, costs, and "such further relief as this [c]ourt deems fair and just."
The hearing justice found that Zab's § 1983 claim failed on the merits against the DOC and the DOC Director because "the State is not a person," and Zab "has no right of action * * * unless he is suing a person." This Court has recognized that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983." Pontbriand v. Sundlun , 699 A.2d 856, 868 (R.I. 1997) (quoting Will v. Michigan Department of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) ). Because Zab sued the DOC and the DOC Director in her official capacity, that portion of his complaint based upon § 1983 was properly denied by summary judgment. See Mills v. State Department of Mental Health Board of Medical Licensure and Discipline , 863 A.2d 202, 202, 203 (R.I. 2004) (mem.) (recognizing that a "plaintiff is precluded from bringing civil rights actions against the state or its agencies").7
We now turn to plaintiffs' contentions that the civil death statute unconstitutionally divested the Superior Court of authority to hear their negligence claims. The plaintiffs contend that the civil death statute treads upon their constitutional rights, including the right of access to the courts as guaranteed by article 1, section 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution.
The plaintiffs carry the burden of persuading this Court that the civil death statute "violates a specific provision of the state constitution or the United States Constitution[.]" Moreau v. Flanders , 15 A.3d 565, 574 (R.I. 2011) (brackets omitted) (quoting Mackie v. State , 936 A.2d 588, 595 (R.I. 2007) ). It is well settled that "[t]his Court approaches constitutional questions with great deliberation, caution, and even reluctance[.]" Id. at 573. Accordingly, "[i]n reviewing the constitutionality of statutes, ‘we begin with the principle that legislative enactments of the General Assembly are presumed to be valid and constitutional.’ " Id. (quoting Newport Court Club Associates v. Town Council of Middletown , 800 A.2d 405, 409 (R.I. 2002) ). We attach to the statute in question "every reasonable intendment in favor of constitutionality" and will not "declare a statute void unless we find it to be constitutionally defective beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 573, 574.
This Court has interpreted the plain and unambiguous language of the civil death statute as declaring "that a person * * * who is serving a life sentence, is deemed civilly dead and thus does not...
To continue reading
Request your trial